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
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COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN DUAL SOCIETIES:

A COMPARISON OF

FRENCH-CANADIAN AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISM

BY



JOEL NOVEK

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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TO THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

RESPECTFULLY,
Yours truly,
[Signature]

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Cooperation and Conflict in Dual Societies: A Comparison of French-Canadian and Afrikaner Nationalism" submitted by Joel L. Novek in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

DEDICATION

To my mother and father.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to examine the bonds of conflict and cooperation in two dual societies, Canada and South Africa, from both a comparative and a historical perspective. In particular, those structures and institutions which have served to heighten or extinguish the conflict between English and French in Canada, and English and Afrikaners in South Africa, will be discussed in some detail.

Several perspectives relevant to the comparative analysis of intergroup relations are examined. A process model which suggests that French-English relations in Canada and English-Afrikaner relations in South Africa have evolved through four stages of intergroup contact, conflict and cooperation is proposed.

In stage one, an antecedent European settler community - the French in Quebec and the Afrikaners in South Africa - claims a new world territory and establishes its dominance over a native population. In stage two, the antecedent settler community, in turn, comes under the political domination of a second group of European settlers - in both cases the British. Conflict develops between the two European settler communities. Stage two comes to a close when both communities are able to arrive at an agreement to form a new dual society comprising both groups.

Stage three begins when the cooperative relations established between the two segments of the dual society are disturbed by the social transformations associated with

urbanization and industrialization. The traditional institutions of the antecedent community are threatened as members of the former group become employees in the new industrial enterprises established by the dominant community.

In stage four, the subordinate ethnic community - the French in Canada and the Afrikaners in South Africa - reacts to the twin challenges of diminished institutional autonomy and falling socio-economic status by turning inward and attempting to achieve maximum ethnic enclosure. In addition, the subordinate group strives to rectify its socio-economic inferiority. Stage four ends when the drive toward ethnic enclosure is halted, and intergroup cooperation once again is restored, by the establishment of a modus vivendi between the political elites of the antecedent group and the economic elites of the second group.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM STATED

Prologue:

The drive toward European expansion which took place in the centuries following the discovery of America, produced an unprecedented reshuffling of the ethnic and cultural boundaries of the world. Migration, conquest and colonization created new ethnic frontiers as Europeans came into contact with migrants from other European nations and with indigenous cultures in the territories of Africa, Asia and America. Clearly Louis Wirth's observation that "territory, political authority, people and culture rarely coincide" (1964: 264) is especially applicable to the situation created by European colonial expansion.

The legacy of this expansion is immense and far-reaching. The desire of the European migrants for land and wealth brought about numerous situations of contact in which the European migrants competed, either among themselves or with the indigenous peoples whose territory they **usurped**, for the spoils of the new world. Contact and competition between diverse groups in the new lands of Africa, Asia and America created two distinct kinds of conflict situations. The first type, which is the one that most commonly comes to mind during any discussion of the effects of colonialism, involves the subjugation of an indigenous population by technologically superior European invaders. Thus French and British settlers wrested control of the North American continent from the native Indians. In Mexico and South

America, native civilization suffered shattering defeats at the hands of Spanish and Portuguese invaders. The continent of Africa was a battleground in which British, French and Dutch colonists seized huge blocks of territory from the Arab and African inhabitants.

There is a second type of conflict situation, less well known than the first, which is also a direct result of the colonial experience. In this situation, a dual society is formed when two distinct communities of European-origin settlers in the new world are united under one political authority, usually as a result of the subjugation of one community by the other. The two most outstanding examples of this type of conflict situation occurred in Canada and South Africa. French settlers were the first Europeans to achieve extensive colonization throughout the area now known as Quebec. Canada remained an essentially French-speaking colony until the conquest of Quebec by the British in 1760. After that date, the settlements along the St. Lawrence Valley gradually developed into a dual society of French and English-speakers under British political authority. In South Africa, Dutch colonists were the first Europeans to settle the area around the Cape and subjugate the indigenous native tribes. The Dutch ceded control of the Cape to the British in 1806, and the British gained control of the entire area of what is now South Africa with their victory in the Boer War of 1898-1902. As a result, the white population of South Africa developed along dual Afrikaans and English-speaking lines, a situation quite

similar to the one prevailing in Canada.

While the conflicts between French and English-speaking Canadians and English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans originated deep in the colonial past, time has failed to erode all of their intensity. Indeed, the early 1960's were a period of considerable tension between the dual sectors in both Canada and South Africa. In Canada, the conflict between French and English Canadians had become so severe that a government-appointed commission was moved to warn that "Canada...is passing through the greatest crisis in its history" (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1966: 13.). Similarly, the longstanding conflict between English and Afrikaners surfaced visibly in 1961 when South Africa took the decisive step of becoming a republic and leaving the Commonwealth, thereby ending all formal ties with Britain (Thompson, 1964: 204.).

The apparent continuity in the conflict between English and French in Canada and English and Afrikaners in South Africa, conflicts which originated at the time of first contact between the two pairs of groups, poses a substantial sociological problem. It is essential to understand what structures and processes act to sustain or extinguish the conflict between the founding segments of dual societies.

THE PROBLEM

This dissertation will attempt to identify those structures and processes which have served to augment, accommodate or resolve the conflict between English and French in Canada, and English and Afrikaners in South Africa,

from the time of first contact until later phases of each relationship. In order to achieve this goal, attention will be devoted to those social and cultural institutions which have played a major role in establishing the type of relationships which have prevailed between the segments of the two dual societies.

This dissertation will adopt a methodology which is both historical and comparative. Selected aspects of the history of French-English relations in Canada and English-Afrikaners relations in South Africa, extending from the time of first contact between the two pairs of groups down to the period ending in the year 1961, will be re-examined from the point of view of institutional history. In other words, the system of institutions which prevailed at various points in Canadian and South African history, and the effects of these institutional systems on the structure of English-French and English-Afrikaners relations, respectively, will be analyzed in some detail. Furthermore, by comparing the two dual societies, this dissertation will propose some tentative generalizations of interest to those concerned with specific problems of Canadian dualism, South African pluralism, and the broader field of ethnic relations in general.

As a first step toward developing a theoretical framework applicable to the study of dual societies, selected works from the large body of literature concerned with ethnic-relations will be reviewed. From this review of the literature, several insights relevant to the study of dual societies will be identified. The first perspective to be

examined is the fragmentation thesis proposed by Louis Hartz.

LOUIS HARTZ: THE FRAGMENTATION THESIS

The concept of the dual society as used in this dissertation bears a strong resemblance to the idea of two-fragment society, which has emerged as an intriguing derivation from the fragmentation thesis of new world development formulated by Hartz (1964: 3-65.). Hartz argues that the new world societies in North and South America, South Africa and Australia did not originate as microcosms of their European societies of origin. Rather, they were founded as fragments of European nation-states when particular groups detached themselves from the rich complexity of political life in the parent country and claimed possession of new world territories.

Thus, French-Canada emerged as a feudal fragment, not a replica, of metropolitan France, for it was founded primarily by military, clerical and rural elements who imbued the new society with a conservative and authoritarian ethos (ibid.: 27.). Alternative traditions of liberalism and democracy associated with the urban bourgeoisie of metropolitan France were not present to the same extent in the colonial offshoot. Similarly, the United States originated as a liberal offshoot of seventeenth century England, for it was founded by a bourgeois and individualistic faction in conflict with the feudal elitism of the mother country (ibid.: 4.). Hartz contends that the isolation of these fragments in the new world from the competing ideologies that they would otherwise have had to contend with in the old, has given the new

societies an ideological continuity not found in their European countries of origin.

This continuity emerges through an evolutionary process involving, first, an extrication from the complexity of political life ~~in~~ the European mother-country (ibid.: 24.). This is followed by an atrophy of future possibilities (ibid.), as exemplified by French-Canada's isolation from the liberalism of the French Revolution, and the dissociation of America from the waves of socialist agitation which beset Europe. The result is an unfolding of each fragment's potential to an extent possible only under conditions of isolation from competing ideologies. This historically determined pattern of ideological fixity is not broken until the contemporary era, when mass communications and the pressures of global political struggles breach the insularity of the fragments. Hartz is adamant that this breakdown in the pattern of ideological fixity occurs as a result of the external pressures of modernity and never as a consequence of the fragment's internal dynamics (ibid.: 47-8.).

A leading derivation of the fragmentation thesis is the concept of the two-fragment society, with Canada and South Africa as the most obvious examples. Both countries were founded by two successive fragments of European societies, and both Canadian and South African history have been much concerned with the relations between these fragments. According to Hartz (ibid.: 15-16, note), Canadian dualism juxtaposes French-Canada, a feudal fragment of metropolitan France, with English-Canada, a liberal individualistic

fragment of British society. Similarly, the South African dilemma pits the Afrikaner community, a liberal individualistic fragment of Dutch society, against English-speaking South-Africa, which harbors a radical ethos, as exemplified by the nineteenth century reformist London Missionary Society and, later, by the socialist Fabian Society (ibid.: 27-8, note.). Hartz' thesis seeks to explain the perpetuation of national differences between English and French in Canada and English and Afrikaners in South Africa, and the prolonged conflicts between both pairs of groups, as an outcome of distinctions in ethos which emerged in the early fragmentation process and have been maintained up to the present day. Thus, contemporary ethnic cleavages are seen as a consequence of the colonial past, when the fragmentation process established two distinct cultural communities of European origin in both Canada and South Africa, hence presenting both societies with long term problems of national unity.

The fragmentation thesis is responsible for a major contribution toward our understanding of the origins of new world societies. It has performed an important service in bringing to our attention the special problems associated with the two-fragment societies - Canada and South Africa where longstanding cleavages have been perpetuated up to the present day. However, as an explanation of the persistence of these national differences, and not just of their origins, the fragmentation thesis presents numerous difficulties. For one thing, most of the discussion concerns the values or ethos associated with a particular fragment. There is little

analysis of the related social structures and processes necessary to maintain a given ethos. Furthermore, Hartz tends to exaggerate the extent of consensus and homogeneity within a given fragment. The possibility of major conflicts within a fragment is dismissed. Similarly, Hartz adheres to a rigid determinism in insisting that the ethos established in colonial times persists unmodified down to the present epoch, and in rejecting the possibility that the fragment may undergo substantial changes as a result of internal social processes. Finally, Hartz analyzes each fragment of the two fragment society in isolation, and fails to devote adequate attention to the ways in which the relations between the two fragments may modify the outlook and behavior of each other.

This dissertation is concerned with the problems associated with the dual societies of Canada and South Africa, and problems raised, but not adequately answered, by Hartz's fragmentation thesis. Specifically, an attempt will be made to identify those social structures and processes responsible for augmenting or diminishing the cleavages between French and English - Canadians, and English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, for the period from the time of first inter-group contact until the year 1961. Furthermore, attention will be focused on the factors responsible for the survival and cohesion of the French-Canadian community in Canada and the Afrikaner community in South Africa, in the face of their shared experience of subordination under politically dominant English-speaking groups. Finally, the structure of relations between French and English

in Canada and Afrikaners and English in South Africa will be assessed in terms of their impact on the French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalist movements, respectively. In order to accomplish this task, it is necessary to supplement the insights offered by Hartz's fragmentation approach with additional insights gleaned from other perspectives. The next perspective to be reviewed will be the theory of social and cultural pluralism.

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PLURALISM

Essentially, the theory of social and cultural pluralism seeks to explain racial and ethnic relations as a particular instance of the division of a single political society into distinct horizontal social and cultural enclaves. This politically united, but ethnically segmented, society is referred to as a plural society.

The contemporary theory of social and cultural pluralism has been significantly foreshadowed by certain previous works of political and social analysis. A good example is Lord Acton's celebrated essay on the nationality question (Acton, 1972: 141-70), first published in 1862. Acton championed the cause of those states formed through a political union of two or more national or ethnic groups. He argued that the unity in diversity resulting from the combination of two or more nationalities is a superior principle of political organization than the virulent nationalism which accords citizenship rights only on the basis of membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.

The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as the best security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation; and, as such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism (ibid.: 160).

In emphasizing that political unity could be fashioned on a framework of social and cultural diversity, Lord Acton correctly anticipated the major points of what later came to be called the theory of social and cultural pluralism.

The most important immediate forerunner of the plural society tradition was the work of the English economist, J.S. Furnivall. He concentrated his research on colonial nations, particularly those in the tropics. Furnivall suggested that the colonial nations were plural societies because they were composed of distinct ethnic and racial groups living in economic symbiosis but practising mutual avoidance and adhering to no common will which could function to bind the diverse communities together. The following passage illustrates the flavor of Furnivall's thinking.

In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples -- European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labor on racial lines (Furnivall, 1948: 304.).

The anthropologist M.G. Smith has refined Furnivall's

observations into a more systematic theory of the plural society.. He **suggests** that the core of the plural society lies in distinct cultural communities existing within the same political society. Culture for Smith involves a common system of institutions (Smith, 1965: 79-80.). Institutional systems include kinship, religion, values, education and economic activity. Thus the plural society is subdivided into segments which exhibit "formal diversity in the basic system of compulsory institutions" (ibid.: 82.).

Smith argued that the plural society is a mosaic of parallel communities whose institutional systems are complete, incompatible and non-complementary (ibid.: 88.). There are no common values or interests to cement relations among the component sectors. The only exception to institutional diversity is political authority, for without a common government there would not be a single society but rather a multiplicity of societies. Indeed, Smith holds that integration is only possible if one cultural section achieves political domination over all the other sections.

Smith is very careful to distinguish pluralism from stratification. While each of the cultural sectors is itself internally stratified according to its own criteria of ranking, neither a coherent series of strata which cross-cut the plural cleavages nor a hierarchic arrangement of cultural sections can be easily established. This is because, in the absence of common values, there are no criteria of ranking acceptable to all the cultural sections (ibid.: 83.). Hence a clear status continuum is only possible within each

cultural sector, while the plurality as a whole can only be imperfectly ranked.

Van den Berghe addresses himself to some of the issues raised by Smith's analysis. One problem is that Smith relies heavily on a cultural interpretation of pluralism, in the sense of a society compartmentalized into separate, incompatible institutional spheres. The other is that he holds a rigid and absolute conception of pluralism, seeing it as qualitatively different from the heterogeneity of region, social class and ethnic origin which characterizes modern western societies. Van den Berghe tackles the first problem by attempting an analytic distinction between cultural pluralism and social pluralism.

[Cultural pluralism] results from the presence within a given society of several ethnic groups, or, at least in the minimum case, of several distinguishable varieties of the same cultural tradition. Social pluralism, however is present in pure form to the extent that a society structurally compartmentalized into analagous and duplicatory but culturally alike sets of institutions, and into corporate groups which are differentiated on a basis other than culture (Van den Berghe, 1969: 72-3.).

While in practice, social and cultural pluralism often go together, they need not necessarily. Cultural pluralism is usually accompanied by social pluralism but the latter can be found without the former. For instance, in the segregated American south, there were social cleavages along racial lines although both the black and white communities tended to share the same basic cultural patterns (*ibid.*: 83.).

Van den Berghe rejects any absolute, or rigid, definition of pluralism. Instead he suggests that pluralism is a variable

quality, a matter of degree which can be broken down into several dimensions. These dimensions include such things as the number, size and geographic distribution of ethnic groups; the range of institutional autonomy and the extent of value consensus among groups; and the ease, speed and frequency of passing from one group to the next (ibid.: 142-3.). These dimensions are in turn organized into four levels of analysis: the group level, the institutional level, the value level and the individual level.

Finally van den Berghe restores some of Furnivall's earlier emphasis on economic symbiosis among the plural sections as an important integrative bond. This aspect of the plural society was relatively neglected by Smith who saw political institutions as the only source of integration. Van den Berghe states, "Pluralistic societies have often been held together by a mixture of political coercion and economic interdependence" (ibid.: 138-9.).

The theory of social and cultural pluralism can be seen as providing us with a good general introduction to the sort of social and cultural compartmentalization so characteristic of pluralism. Those sociologists accustomed to regarding societies as entities exhibiting a basic consensus on values are confronted with societies characterized by an obvious value dissensus among their constituent communities. Others, who emphasize the importance of normative bonds for social integration, are refuted by the evidence of empirical societies markedly deficient in normative bonds and integrated primarily through coercion and secondarily by utilitarian

sanctions.

Beyond a general introduction to the problems of communal cleavages and a refutation of "normative functionalism" in social theory, the plural society perspective encounters grave difficulties in attempting to analyze ethnically heterogeneous societies holistically. Writers in the pluralist tradition are so intent on examining those institutions operating in restricted segments of society that they are guilty of a relative neglect of other institutions which are shared by all constituent groups.

For example, Smith sees the political order as an essential feature of plural societies. Yet he fails to concede any possibility of inter-group cooperation and participation in the political process, insisting that the governmental apparatus must be controlled by one group. The rigidity of this position may be due to the fact that it was developed in the context of the colonial nations which were characterized by extremes of political domination and racial discrimination (Van den Berghe: 72-3.).

More glaring still is Smith's refusal to see economic institutions as common to all sectors. Instead he posits a plural economy as fragmented as all other institutions except the polity. Van den Berghe revives the notion of economic interdependence but significantly fails to include any economic variables among his "dimensions of pluralism." It is principally this failure to account adequately for institutions common to all segments of society that leads John Rex to accuse Smith of reducing ethnic relations to the

- mere study of discrete autonomous plural sectors (Rex, 1970: 23.) What is missing is any notion of those institutions which are generated within the process of culture contact.

The institutions which relate to the employment of labor in any society... are institutions of the whole society and not simply of one cultural or social segment (ibid.: 23.).

Nevertheless, the theory of social and cultural pluralism provides useful insights for the study of dual societies. By focusing attention on the extent to which each of the segments maintains autonomous social and cultural institutions, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of an important mechanism by which separate ethnic identities are maintained over time.

ETHNIC RELATIONS AS A FORM OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

If a model of society divided horizontally into plural enclaves appears inadequate as a complete explanation of ethnic relations, other sociologists have attempted to step into the breach by offering more traditional social theories as alternatives. For many sociologists adhering to widely differing theoretical and ideological perspectives, the study of ethnic relations must be seen as a particular instance of the more general field of social stratification. Thus Lockwood (1970: 58) argues that in much sociological research "race has been treated not as a phenomenon sui generis but rather as a special case of more general sociological concepts."

Lockwood (ibid.: 59) adds that "racial discrimination is seen essentially as the outcome of an historical accumulation of social and economic and cultural disadvantages

that have made the racial minority at once visible as a 'status-disqualified' group and as a section of the community most vulnerable to class exploitation." He then goes on to ask to what extent can the variables **used in the** study of ethnic relations be reduced to stratification variables. Perhaps the only way to confront such a question is to examine the adequacy of those theories that attempt to explain ethnic relations as an instance of a more general division of society into horizontal strata.

An important contribution to the stratification perspective on ethnic relations was W. Lloyd Warner's theory of color-caste (Warner, 1936: 234-7.). His main task was to conceptualize the relationship of blacks and whites in the American South. He posits that American society is divided along both class and caste lines. White society is segmented vertically into a series of classes. The individual's position within the class system can be determined by ranking him according to a number of subjective and objective criteria.

Warner held that the color-bar between blacks and whites represented a cleavage far more profound than any class divisions. Mobility across this barrier was impossible. He suggested that the nature of the color-bar was essentially a caste relationship in incipient form. He defended his caste hypothesis by attempting to demonstrate the similarity of the color-bar to what he felt was the essence of the Hindu caste system -- a prohibition on intermarriage.

The color-caste line was alleged to slope diagonally,

reflecting the superior socio-economic position of the white community. Should increasing numbers of blacks raise their social class position, the result would not be greater integration across the color-caste line but rather the tilting of that line toward a vertical position as a barrier between two communities of equivalent socio-economic status.

Oliver C. Cox objected to Warner's effort to conceptualize racial segregation according to a model derived from the Hindu caste system. He maintained that a caste system implies an integrated society exhibiting a fundamental consensus on values so that the subordinate castes accept their status as legitimate. By contrast, he asserted that the relations between blacks and whites in the United States are unstable and that there is no consensus between the two communities as to the Negro's rightful "place" in the system.

The caste system of India is a minutely segmented, assimilated social structure; it is highly stable and capable of perpetuating itself indefinitely. Castes in India constitute a natural status system in one society, while Negroes and whites in the South tend to constitute two status systems, i.e. two social-class systems in two societies that are in opposition (Cox, 1959: 502.).

This criticism clearly sheds reasonable doubt on any attempt to build a general theory of ethnic relations on the caste analogy. Nevertheless, as John Rex (Rex: 15) points out, the problem Warner was trying to confront was valid, even if his solution was not. "Warner's view that (ethnic) relations cannot be explained in terms of normal stratification models survives, even if his notion of caste is rejected. Any adequate race relations theory must necessarily deal with this

point."

Cox seeks to develop a Marxist explanation of ethnic relations. According to him, a subordinate ethnic group is maintained in an inferior position in order to facilitate its economic exploitation at the hands of the dominant group. Racial ideologies are the legitimating superstructure for what is essentially a process of economic exploitation.

Race prejudice, then, constitutes an attitudinal justification necessary for an easy exploitation of some race. To put it in still another way, race prejudice is the social-attitudinal concomitant of the racial-exploitation practice of a ruling class in a capitalistic society (Cox: 476).

This position must be taken seriously because, to a great extent, issues of stratification and differential power are involved in most ethnic-relations situations. However, too rigid an adherence to the Marxist theory of ethnic inequality presents certain difficulties. One problem is that although the Marxist position can explain why certain individuals or groups have greater or lesser social status than others, it appears to beg the question why roles in the social hierarchy should be assigned on the basis of racial or ethnic criteria. This leads to a sort of chicken and egg dilemma. Did racism arise to legitimate a system of economic exploitation or did the lines of stratification develop in conformity with a pre-existing regime of ethnic inequality. Rex states categorically that "a prior distinction had been made as to [which ethnic group] should fill inferior working class roles, and that this distinction was based on non-economic [i.e., non-Marxist] criteria" (Rex: 15).

Another problem relates to the persistent failure of class consciousness to override ethnic consciousness in ethnically heterogeneous societies.

Revolutionary goals are unlikely to emerge from the antagonism of groups in plural societies unless ethnic and racial divisions happen to coincide with lines of economic and other power relationships. Yet even where this coincidence obtains, it by no means always follows that the equation of race or ethnicity with class position leads to forms of conflict in which the latter element predominates over the former (Lockwood, 64-5.).

Once more we find that the existence of distinct ethnic groups in society modifies the pattern of stratification in a direction unforeseen by the proponents of a leading theory in that field.

Finally, Talcott Parsons, in his contribution to the theory of social inequality, acknowledges that ethnic differentiation can act to modify the prevailing system of stratification. According to him, each society establishes its own hierarchy of roles and privileges on the basis of its particular system of common values and priorities. Ethnic differences act to modify the stratification system in two ways. "In the first place the value-system of an ethnic group may vary from that paramount in the dominant society. Then within certain limits of tolerance it may tend to form a variant subsociety within the larger society, more closely approximating implementation of its own values" (Parsons, 1964: 425.).

The second issue relates to what is generally termed discrimination. "The second mode of modification derives

from the fact that the ethnic group, with regard both to its value-patterns and to many other aspects of its status in the larger society, constitutes an entity somewhat apart, to which non members react in patterned ways" (ibid.). This Parsonian position is plausible except that it may not go far enough. For instance, in certain colonial or hybrid societies segmented by deep plural cleavages, it is insufficient to say that the value systems of ethnic sub-cultures are at variance with the stratification values of the larger society. Rather, there simply is no common pattern of stratification values which could in any way be said to characterize the larger society (Rex, op. cit.: 18.). The idea of stratification on the basis of a consensual value pattern only makes sense within each of the plural segments.

While ethnic relations cannot be wholly reduced to a problem of stratification, the stratification perspective can make a useful contribution to the study of dual societies. Attention is directed toward the pattern of socio-economic relations which prevail between the two sectors. It is important to discern whether the relationship is one of equality or socio-economic subordination. Clearly, an inferior economic position may serve to exacerbate sentiments of nationalism and discontent in the affected group.

THE CHICAGO SCHOOL

An important contribution to the sociology of ethnic relations was made by what can be loosely termed the Chicago School. They examined racial and ethnic relations

from the point of view of social history. They suggested that race relations could best be understood as ongoing processes of contact and interaction among diverse peoples in particular social and historical situations. The orthodoxies and the constricted vocabularies of both the cultural pluralists and the stratification theorists were avoided by the members of this group who attempted to observe and classify the contacts that took place across the inter-racial frontier.

Everett C. Hughes maintained a keen interest in the economic and technological environments of race relations' situations. Especially important to Hughes were questions dealing with the linkage between ethnicity, political struggles and the industrialization of formerly agrarian regions. Like Park, he felt that the genesis of racial and ethnic relations lay in the conquest and political domination of one nation state over another. However, he went beyond merely positing the importance of conquest and attempted to elaborate the next phases in the development of ethnic frontiers between dominant and subordinate groups (Hughes, 1952: 52.).

[The] conquest made and contact established, other differences between the peoples affect the course of their relations. Among them are the ways in which they occupy and cultivate land, their ability to recognize and exploit the resources in their environment, and their ways of mobilizing and exploiting human effort for these purposes (ibid.).

For Hughes, the most significant ethnic frontier of modern times is that which centers around industrialization

and technological development. Situations of conquest allow the victorious group a free hand to industrialize and transform the conquered territories. In order to do this, they must systematically solicit and exploit the resources and labor of the subordinate groups. A common pattern, according to Hughes, is for a technologically superior people to dominate technologically inferior groups, and use the advantage as a lever to draw the subordinate groups unto the incipient industries which they create. It follows that the dominant group tends to monopolize the key positions in industry.

Industrial revolutions create ethnic and racial frontiers, for in no major industrial region of the world has one ethnic group furnished the whole labor force, from managers down to unskilled labor (ibid.: 61.).

Hughes proposes three major generalizations about ethnic relations in an industrial setting (ibid.: 63-6.). One is that industry mixes people of diverse ethnic groups to work in the same economic enterprise. However, in the very act of mixing people, industry segregates them. There is usually a functional separation of ethnic groups within the economic organization. Furthermore, stratification within industry often follows ethnic lines. There is a marked deviation from chance expectation in the distribution of ethnic groups in industrial enterprises.

Finally and most significantly, Hughes asserts that industry is an agent of ethnic discrimination. Hiring and promotion are often accorded on the basis of traits not

directly relevant for work. This leads him to conclude that non-rational factors, such as political power, are very crucial in determining policies of hiring, promotion and exclusion.

Industry thus considers its participants not as mere technical help but as actual or potential participants in a struggle for power within industry, and as potential close colleagues (or as unfit to be such) (ibid.: 82.).

Hughes' analysis is marked by a strong pessimism as to the ability of the industrial order to overcome barriers of ethnic segregation and discrimination. Indeed, it is fair to say that Hughes believes that discrimination is built into the very framework of industrial organization and that hiring and promotion according to rational criteria take place only within the boundaries of an established system of ethnic stratification.

Herbert Blumer strongly adheres to the position that industrial organization operates within the confines of a prearranged pattern of ethnic discrimination. He refutes the argument that industrialization has a built-in dynamism that breaks down a traditional racial order. He rejects the notion that race vanishes as a factor which structures social relations and that in industrial settings hiring and promotion are accorded on the basis of skill alone. Instead, he argues that industrial enterprises conform to the existing pattern of race relations of the host society.

The picture presented by industrialization in a racially ordered society is that industrial imperatives accommodate themselves

to the racial mould and continue to operate effectively within it (Blumer, 1965: 238-9.) .

Any transformations of race relations in industry are not brought about by industrial imperatives but "arise from outside pressures, chiefly political pressures" (ibid.: 247.).

Perhaps the major contribution of the Chicago School is its emphasis on racial and ethnic relations as an on-going political process of conflict and accommodation among groups. Hughes and Blumer both point to an initial political imbalance, usually the result of conquest. This imbalance seems to be sustained even though the economic and technological base of the society may change from agrarian to industrial. It can then be asked, "Just how rigid are most ethnic relations situations?" "Is there any possibility of changing them?" Perhaps the answer lies in Blumer's assertion that racial and ethnic relations are subject to political pressures. Yet questions of precisely what political processes are required to transform specific ethnic relations situations in any given direction are only implied and never directly faced by the Chicago School.

The implications of the Chicago School for the study of dual societies are two-fold. First, there is the question of the impact of industrialization on the relations between the segments. This problem is most closely associated with Hughes. The second question deals with the specific political processes required to transform relations between the segments under conditions of industrialization. This question is indirectly raised, yet not answered, by Blumer.

SUMMARY

To summarize, the large body of literature reviewed in this chapter has yielded the following insights relevant to the analysis of dual societies. First, Hartz's fragmentation thesis focuses attention on the processes by which dual societies emerged as a result of the colonial experience. Second, the plural society approach sensitizes the researcher to an awareness of the institutional cleavages which may exist in any ethnic relations situation. Hence, dual societies can be fruitfully examined from the point of view of institutional enclosure and autonomy. **Third, the** stratification perspective concentrates on the relationship between ethnic distinctions and socio-economic disparities. Thus, dual societies may be expected to display some stratification patterns different from those associated with ethnically homogeneous societies. These different patterns might take the form of one segment exhibiting marked socio-economic inferiority compared to the other, or else the society may be seen as harboring two quite distinct systems of stratification which coincide with ethnic membership.

Finally, the Chicago approach, as exemplified by Hughes and Blumer, has greatly influenced the direction adopted by this study. For this reason, a major concern of this dissertation will be the effects of industrialization **on** dual societies. Especially important here are the consequences of industrialization for the types of relations that prevail between the segments. These themes and others will be more precisely conceptualized in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER TWO
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DUAL SOCIETIES

Schermerhorn: Three Principal Variables.

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to formulate a framework suitable for the comparative analysis of English-French relations in Canada and English-Afrikaner relations in South Africa. Such a framework must be able to specify and explain those factors which have operated to sustain or extinguish segmental conflicts in dual societies, as well as provide a sound methodological basis for comparative research.

A major contribution toward the development of such a framework for comparative ethnic research has been advanced by Schermerhorn (1970). Schermerhorn sees conflict and integration as the key problematic concerns in the study of intergroup relations. He asks (ibid.: 14) "What are the conditions that foster or prevent the integration of ethnic groups into their environing societies?" His answer is that the modes of integration and conflict between ethnic groups must be seen as dependent variables in a scheme which he labels "inductive typology." (ibid.: 11.). Relations of integration or conflict between ethnic groups are viewed as a composite function of a set of independent and intervening variables (ibid.: 238-40.). The heart of his scheme lies in the following three principal or independent variables:

1. Repeatable sequences of interaction which circumscribe the relations between diverse groups from the period of first contact into later phases of the relationship.

Each of these sequences carries with it a typical chain of consequences in which one group assumes a superordinate position while one or more of the others plays a subordinate role. These sequences, such as colonization or annexation, involve some degree of conflict between the groups which originates in the period of first contact and continues, unresolved, until a later stage of development.

2. The degree of enclosure (institutional separation or segmentation) of the subordinate group or groups from the society-wide network of institutions and associations. While this is derived historically from (1), it is a structural variable that operates autonomously and independently in the present.
3. The relationship between ethnic membership and social stratification. This involves an examination of socio-economic and political relations between the ethnic segments.

Schermerhorn's three principal variables provide a useful starting point for developing a framework applicable to the comparative analysis of intergroup relations in dual societies. The next step is an elaboration or modification of Schermerhorn's generalizations with observations furnished by other writers.

ETHNIC SEQUENCES

It is essential to specify the particular ethnic sequence which has served to constrain the relations between the segments, from the time of first contact until later

phases of the relationships, in both dual societies.

Schermerhorn talks of colonization (ibid.: 96-7), but the particular problems associated with dual societies call for a more specific conceptualization. Rex (1970) argues that ethnic relations situations in plural societies have their historical origins in conditions of conquest and political domination. He states (ibid.: 10-11), "Intergroup relations have the form they do because the two groups involved were not originally one, but have been brought together into a single political framework as a result of the conquest by one of the other." If this argument is correct, then group differences will be maintained in dual societies as a lingering consequence of the conquest or political domination by one group of the other.

Support for this view is provided by Lieberman (1971: 51-64), who formulates a theory of "migrant superordination" to explain longstanding intergroup conflicts. He posits that cases where migrant invaders establish political domination over antecedent settler groups are marked by a low degree of assimilation and a high degree of intergroup conflict. The reason for this is that the subordinate group tends to maintain its own institutional structure intact after it has come under the political domination of another group. Conflict can occur early in the relations between superordinates and subordinates, as the dominant group attempts to transform the institutions of the subordinate group to make them conform to the formers' habitual practices. The migrant superordinates strive to establish their own

political and economic institutions as the dominant ones in the composite society in order to create a suitable milieu for extending and consolidating their hegemony. This process is highly conducive to conflict as the subordinate group resists efforts to deprive it of political and economic power.

The case for a conflict interpretation of intergroup relations in dual societies can be strengthened by using the concept of "double-layered" colonialism (Ossenberg, 1967: 203) to identify the historical sequence common to both French-English relations in Canada and English-Afrikaner relations in South Africa. The rationale for terming both Canada and South Africa as examples of double-layered colonialism is that, in each case, the original European colonizer is in turn colonized by a subsequent invading European power. In Canada, the original French colony was conquered by British invaders. In South Africa, the original Dutch colony was absorbed into the British Empire in a gradual process starting with the British occupation of Cape Town and culminating in the Boer War. The concept of double-layered colonialism adds a sense of the conflict of rival territorial and political ambitions essential to the understanding of dual societies.

The process of double-layered colonialism in Canada and South Africa can be better understood through an examination of the neo-Marxist metropolis/hinterland perspective. According to this approach, colonization involves a close symbiotic relationship between dominant

and subordinate groups (Frank, 1969: 3-17; Davis, 1971: 12-13.). The dominant group, through its control of the urban areas, controls the metropolis of the colony. The subordinate group is relegated to the countryside and serves as a hinterland community of the metropolis, and a target for economic exploitation. The colonial metropolis, occupied by the dominant group, enjoys a privileged position in the colonial society. It is the instrument of political domination and serves to incorporate the subordinate group into the economic order introduced by the dominant group (ibid.). Furthermore, the colonial metropolis incorporates the colonial society into the wider world economy.

This perspective is of particular interest for the study of dual societies, for it suggests that the politically dominant group will gain control of the urban areas in the composite society, while the subordinate group will be relegated to the countryside. Thus, political domination is linked to ascendancy in the urban areas while subordination is linked to rural residence. Double-layered colonialism, then, involves demographic, as well as political, cleavages between the segments.

In sum, ethnic relations situations must be analyzed, at least in part, in terms of their historical origins. More specifically, it is suggested that the conflict between English and French in Canada, and English and Afrikaners in South Africa, both had their origins in a situation of double-layered colonialism, in which an antecedent European settler community came under the political domination of a

migrant European invader who assumed control of the metropolitan institutions of the colony, and bound the colony economically, politically and culturally to its metropolitan homeland. The history of Canada and South Africa has been, to a great extent, the struggle of the French-Canadians and Afrikaners to regain some of the political and economic ascendancy they lost as a result of conquest and domination.

DEGREE OF ENCLOSURE

According to Schermerhorn (239) the degree of enclosure refers to the extent of separation of a particular ethnic group from the society-wide network of institutions and associations. While the degree of enclosure is related historically to the particular ethnic sequence in which intergroup conflict has taken place, it is a structural **variable operating autonomously and independently. It examines the extent to which the various ethnic groups in society form autonomous and non-interdependent institutional systems. The concept of enclosure as presented by Schermerhorn requires further clarification. In particular, he does not inform the reader as to what are the indicators of an ethnic group's enxlosure, or separation, from the larger society.**

Van den Berghe (1967: 142-3) furnishes several dimensions of pluralism which can serve as useful indicators of the extent of an ethnic group's separation from the larger society. Great stress is placed on demographic factors. Thus, the size of a particular ethnic group and its geographical distribution - whether the members are

concentrated in certain regions or more thinly spread throughout the society - are important factors influencing the degree of pluralism. There are other important factors which Van den Berghe terms pluralism at the level of institutions (ibid.). This refers to the extent to which basic economic, educational, political and socio-cultural institutions are segmented into autonomous sectors which perform parallel functions for different ethnic groups.

If membership in a particular ethnic group is significantly related to institutional participation, then ethnic cleavages may tend to reinforce cleavages in institutional structure. Kuper (1969: 479-80) terms this compounding of the lines of cleavage as superimposition. He goes on to suggest that the superimposition of an ethnic cleavage over other lines of cleavage in social institutions (e.g. religion, political party membership, etc.) can lead to a situation of polarization in which the salience of ethnic divisions is heightened. This superimposition of ethnic cleavages over institutional cleavages may be accompanied by a subjective polarization of conflict ideologies asserted by the antagonistic groups.

Building on this argument, it is suggested that in situations of polarization, the goals which the dominant group put forward as desirable for the subordinate group or groups will come to resemble the legitimations of the status quo which Mannheim termed "ideologies" (1936: 192-5.). Similarly, in situations of polarization, the goals which the subordinate group or groups advocate will take on the

character of those systems of ideals orienting activity toward social change which Mannheim (ibid.) termed "utopias."

Furthermore, it is also suggested that under conditions of polarization in dual societies, one or both of the two segments will develop what Lipset (1963: 74-6) has termed a "party of integration." According to Lipset, a party of integration is a political party which strives to become the exclusive representative of a particular group, be it an ethnic group, social class, interest group, or some other. The party of integration attempts to maintain unity or integration within the group it represents by suppressing internal dissension and by isolating members as much as possible from any outside influences (ibid.). When a party of integration comes to represent the interests of a particular ethnic group, it can usually be identified by its nationalist ideology as well as its strong ties with other ethnic organizations.

The opposite process of superimposition is dissociation in which the lines of cleavage in society diverge. This leads to depluralization or, in other words, the diminished salience of ethnic cleavages. Depluralization is usually associated with a lessening in the intensity of ethnic nationalism and the replacement of parties of integration with parties of representation. The latter are composed of memberships which crosscut ethnic and other social divisions (ibid.).

Kuper (Kuper: 479-800) warns, however, that it is not possible to conclude that superimposition always leads to

conflict or that dissociation always leads to moderation. For instance, under conditions of extreme superimposition, a powerful dominant ethnic group may compel compliance with its will and stifle all dissent. On the other hand, polarization can occur during the process of dissociation. As the members of an ethnic group gain in social status, or embark upon new experiences and activities, they may be subject to feelings of "rising expectations" and a heightened awareness of the differences between themselves and other groups which still remain. Conversely, they may be fearful that the separate institutional structures which guaranteed their ethnic autonomy may be threatened by deppluralization. These feelings may lead to greater militancy and mobilization on their part, and greater apprehension on the part of other groups.

Hence, there is a significant relationship between ethnicity, institutional participation and intergroup cleavages. Social, cultural and political institutions serve to maintain intergroup cleavages over time. This compounding of intergroup barriers with institutional differences polarizes ethnic relations situations, and increases the possibility of conflict and hostility.

ETHNICITY AND STRATIFICATION

The third variable proposed by Schermerhorn relates to the degree of control over scarce resources (economic, political or prestige factors) in the society by the superordinates, as manifested in the sharing of such resources by the subordinates. This is a stratification variable and

involves any departure from chance expectation (Hughes and Hughes, 1952: 64-5) in the distribution of ethnic groups through the stratification system. What is sought is any evidence that positions in the social hierarchy are allocated according to ascriptive criteria based on ethnicity. This point is well made by Rex:

[Race-relations situations] refer to situations in which two or more groups with distinct identities and recognizable characteristics are forced by economic or political circumstances to live together in a society. Within this they refer to situations in which there is a high degree of conflict between the groups and in which ascriptive criteria are used to mark out the members of each group in order that one group may pursue one of a number of hostile policies against the other (Rex: 160.).

Rex here refers to "ascriptive criteria" being used in the allocation of roles and rights to each group. Essentially he is using Parsonian terminology to make the point that the individual's position in the stratification hierarchy is determined by his racial or ethnic membership. He prefers the term "ascription" to the alternate term "discrimination" which has become fuzzy through frequent use to describe certain practices seen as morally repugnant. However, both words may be acceptable providing they mean some patterned allocation of power and privilege according to racial or ethnic criteria.

There is, however, one important methodological reservation which should be noted in connection with the analysis of ethnic stratification. Blalock (1967: 15-18) points out that discrimination (or ascription or control) cannot be directly measured. We can measure directly only

such things as the degree of possession by each ethnic group of such scarce values as wealth or education. Concepts such as discrimination or the ascriptive allocation of roles can be inferred only indirectly from the data by a set of theoretical assumptions. These theoretical assumptions of discrimination are used as partial explanations of the measured inequality in preference to less palatable alternatives such as biological inferiority or cultural differences. It must be added that discrimination can be measured directly in those societies where the degree of access of each ethnic group to scarce resources is regulated by official decree.

Socio-economic inequality is a particularly pressing issue in ethnic-relations situations when ethnic cleavages are superimposed over social class cleavages. A common condition experienced by subordinate ethnic groups in plural societies is what Rioux calls "double alienation" (1971: 88.). That is, the group faces alienation on two fronts, political and socio-economic. As a result of political domination, the subordinate group in a plural society is subjected to inferior political and cultural status. Similarly, the inferior socio-economic status of the subordinate group in a plural society often results from a program of industrialization carried out under the auspices of the dominant group (Hughes and Hughes: 52.). Members of the subordinate group find themselves proletarians in the new industrial order not of their own making.

It is suggested that a nationalist political campaign

on the part of the subordinate ethnic segment of a dual society is a likely response to double alienation. Hughes (1963: 883) and Schermerhorn (113) both assert that an ethnic group which has been reduced to proletarian status due to industrialization finds itself caught in the horns of a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, the group can attempt a nationalistic political response to its predicament and mobilize to attain greater socio-economic and political standing as a group. On the other hand, group members can renounce their cultural and social identity and strive for assimilation into the larger society through a process of individual mobility. However, as shall be demonstrated below, there is a substantial body of sociological theory which asserts that individual mobility is unlikely to occur, as an automatic process, in the industrial order of an ethnically segmented society.

As was stated in the previous chapter, both Hughes and Hughes (63-6) and Blumer (1965: 238-9) argue quite forcefully that in ethnically segmented societies, the lines of ethnic stratification and inequality which prevailed before industrialization tend to be maintained in the new industrial order. For this reason, it appears quite unlikely that in dual societies which have experienced a long history of segmented cleavages and tensions, industrialization will automatically result in greater individual mobility for members of the subordinate group and a substantial decrease in intergroup differences. Indeed, as was suggested above, industrialization in dual societies is likely to compound

pre-existing political and cultural cleavages with additional socio-economic cleavages, as members of the dominant group occupy the leading positions in the new industrial order, while members of the subordinate group are relegated to the inferior ones. For these same reasons, Blumer (ibid.: 247) has been led to observe that any transformations of the lines of ethnic stratification in industrialized societies arise mainly as a result of political pressures extraneous to the industrialization process itself. Hence, a subordinate ethnic segment of a plural society is likely to respond to its inferior economic position with a campaign of nationalist political agitation.

Support for this view is provided by Lockwood (1970). He argues that the existence of autonomous ethnic subcultures can perform positive functions for subordinate ethnic groups experiencing both political and socio-economic inferiority. Ethnic subcultures can function both as bases for future political action and as immediate sources of status compensation for disadvantaged ethnics. Thus, the reassertion of a vigorous ethnic nationalism can compensate at once for both low socio-economic status and the low cultural esteem in which the group is held. As Lockwood (ibid.: 65) states:

The institutionalization of...ethnic and racial subcultures and contracultures, with varying degrees of deviance from the dominant values of society, is a common mode of adjustment of disadvantaged groups that are subject to a system of domination whose structure is unshakeable or for which no alternative is available.

It is suggested that if individual mobility is not

forthcoming through the normal workings of the stratification system, then an attractive strategy available to a subordinate group in a plural society is a nationalist political movement designed to deal with the problem of double alienation. Such a campaign would be designed to relieve both the political alienation the group experienced as a result of political domination and the socio-economic alienation resulting from industrialization. In such a situation it becomes increasingly difficult to separate the two arenas of conflict. Political conflicts may take on economic implications as the subordinate group attempts to use any newly won political power as a form of leverage to open up access to economic opportunities. Similarly, economic conflicts such as strikes **will, in an** atmosphere tinged with nationalism, be invested with considerable political significance. This interaction between the political and socio-economic dimensions of struggle can heighten the overall level of conflict. The result is a considerable amount of social turbulence in which "ethnic and social conflicts are in the process of overlapping and activating one another" (Rioux, : 134.) .

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The final section of this discussion of intergroup conflict deals with a possible direction toward conflict resolution. A significant foundation for the resolution of intergroup conflicts can be developed from what Rex (1968: 127-9) has termed "institutions of the truce." These emerge when compromises between conflicting parties pave the way for the creation of value systems and social institutions which

belong exclusively to no one group but rather to the truce situation itself. The truce thus opens up a limited area of intergroup cooperation. The conflicting parties develop some vested interests in maintaining the common institution of the truce. However, it is important to note that the institutions of the truce are often precarious creations, highly dependent on the maintenance of the balance of power which brought about the initial truce situation. Should the balance of power shift, or should one of the parties become dissatisfied with its role in the truce situation, then the conflict may, once more, be resumed.

Institutions of the truce can extend the process of conflict resolution in several key ways. They can supervise the allocation of scarce resources in such a way as to contribute to a dissociation of ethnicity with such stratification variables as income, education and political power and, hence, to a depluralization of the society along lines suggested by Kuper. The status of members of the subordinate groups is raised to a level satisfactory to them and acceptable to the dominant group. As a result, the society becomes transformed from a discordance of conflict accentuating plural sectors to a growing affinity of multiple affiliations and crosscutting cleavages in which particular conflicts can be isolated and thus more easily resolved.

A second key task which the institutions of the truce may assume occurs on the ideological or symbolic level. Institutions of the truce may be set up specifically for the purpose of proposing some definitions of desirable relations

between dominant and subordinate groups which would be acceptable to both parties. For instance, they may be called upon to formulate that balance between assimilation and pluralism which is mutually satisfactory. The goal, of course, is to achieve that congruence of dominant and subordinate ideologies which, according to Schermerhorn, is an important basis of intergroup consensus.

Finally, the very act of intergroup cooperation to achieve certain common, albeit limited, ends can itself function to improve the climate of ethnic relations. As Horowitz (1969: 265-79) has pointed out, cooperation between antagonistic groups can be an important source of social integration. Particularly salient is the fact that institutions of the truce which have emerged through the cooperative effort of both parties may, as a result, be defined as legitimate by both sides. In Smith's terms, the institutions of the truce would provide a formal-legal framework for pluralism which is perceived as legitimate by all parties involved. However, it is necessary to reiterate Rex's earlier point that the basis of this legitimacy is highly precarious and dependent on a delicate balance of power between the parties to the truce.

It is now possible to restate the various theoretical formulations discussed in the first two chapters in terms of a framework applicable to the comparative analysis of relations between the segments of dual societies. Specifically, this framework will outline a mode of analysis in which to examine the paths along which relations between

French and English in Canada, and English and Afrikaners in South Africa, have evolved, from the time of first contact until the period ending in the year 1961.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
A SUMMARY AND REFORMULATION.

The theoretical framework in which the institutional histories of French-English relations in Canada and English-Afrikaner relations in South Africa are to be conceptualized can now be summarized and reformulated into what Cohen (1966: 43-4) has termed an "interaction process" model. According to Cohen (*ibid.*), an interaction process involves a cluster of related events unfolding into a pattern through a series of stages in which actors interact both with each other and with the different situations in which they find themselves. For purposes of this theoretical framework, each of the four segments of both dual societies under consideration will be considered an historical actor, or collectivity, which interacts with its opposite segment through a complex network of institutionalized structures and processes. Each historical stage, or situation, within which the segments interact, will be identified by the particular form of institutionalized relations which prevail between the segments at that point in time. As can be seen, strong emphasis is being placed on the different institutional systems which predominate at a given historical stage.

The first stage to be identified is that of early colonization, when the antecedent group lays claim to a particular territory and establishes a system of institutions which enables that group to cope with the new environment.

The second stage, that of double-layered colonialism, is one of intergroup contact and political and military conflict in which the antecedent group falls under the domination of a second more powerful group laying claim to the territory occupied by the first. The elements of a dual society begin to take shape during this second stage, which is marked by the emergence of major institutional cleavages between both groups. An important line of cleavage is the metropolis/hinterland dichotomy, with members of the dominant group increasingly commanding the key economic and political positions in the urban areas, while the subordinate group responds by entrenching itself ever more firmly in the rural regions. Here, the subordinate group constructs a network of rural-based institutions designed to maximize internal integration and enclosure and minimize contacts with the dominant group. Thus, ethnic divisions become polarized around demographic and socio-economic cleavages.

The third stage occurs when the urban/rural dichotomy breaks down under the impact of massive urbanization among members of the subordinate group. This urbanization takes place in conjunction with widespread industrialization - most likely resulting from economic initiatives undertaken by members of the dominant group. In this situation, the rural isolation of the subordinate group collapses as its members migrate to the expanding urban areas. This transformation gravely threatens the institutional autonomy of the subordinate group which can no longer count on the protection formerly provided by rural isolation. At the same time,

members of the subordinate group experience a decline in socio-economic status from that of independent farmers to that of employees of, more often than not, alien bosses. This growing proletarianization also threatens the former rural homogeneity and integration of the subordinate group.

In this fourth and final stage, the subordinate group responds to these twin threats of diminished institutional closure and inferior socio-economic status by creating a new system of **interrelated institutions designed to deal with** the new urban conditions. These institutions, socio-cultural, economic and political, are intended to achieve maximum internal integration while, at the same time, attempting to raise the collective socio-economic and political status of the subordinate segment. During this period of intergroup antagonism, the intensity of the conflict is diminished by the existence of a temporary modus vivendi reached between the elites of the two competing segments. When parity, or near parity, in political and socio-economic status has been achieved between the segments, then this particular series of intergroup actions and reactions will be considered to have run its course.

Chapter three deals with stages one and two of the intergroup process. Chapter four concludes the discussion of the urban/rural dichotomy which marks stage two and discusses urbanization and industrialization - stage three. Chapter five is devoted exclusively to the fourth and final stage. Chapter six is a discussion of those generalizations which can be abstracted from this study.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE EMERGENCE OF DUAL SOCIETIES

IN CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA

This chapter is devoted to stages one and two of the interaction process delineated in the previous chapter. During stage one, the antecedent settler community - the French in Canada and the Afrikaners in South Africa - establishes a distinct system of institutions in order to cope with the exigencies of life on a new continent.

Stage two, that of double-layered colonialism, is marked by the political domination of the antecedent group by a second European invader - in both cases the British. During stage two, the first outlines of the dual society emerge as the relations between the segments become polarized around key institutional cleavages - demographic, socio-economic and political - which serve to reinforce, and are in turn reinforced by, the salient ethnic division. The conflicts and hostilities which characterize relations between the segments during stage two come to be resolved, at least temporarily, by a political agreement, or pact, in which the two segments cooperate in the founding of a new dual society.

In this chapter, the institutional system of French Canada on the eve of the British conquest of 1760 is examined. French-English relations are analyzed from 1760 down to 1867, when the Confederation agreement produced a formula enabling French and English to coexist. Then, Afrikaner society at the time of the first British occupation of the

Cape in 1795, is examined. Finally, English-Afrikaner relations are traced from the time of first intergroup contact in 1795 down to 1910, when the Act of Union agreement was the result of both segments cooperating to found a new society.

CANADA FROM 1760 - 1867: DUALISM AND POLARIZATION

The historic conflicts between French and English in Canada originated in the conquest of Quebec by the English in 1759. While it is clear that the conquest exerted considerable influence on the direction of French-English relations in the years which followed that event, the precise nature and extent of that influence remains in doubt.

There is considerable disagreement among Canadian historians concerning the exact nature of French-Canadian society on the eve of the conquest. One group of historians, including Michel Brunet and Guy Fregault, usually referred to as the "ecole de Montreal", emphasize the urban, mercantile nature of the social structure of New France. Others, notably Fernand Ouellet and Jean Hamelin, point out the weakness of the French-Canadian mercantile interests, their low level of capitalization and the lack of innovation in their business methods. For them, New France was essentially a feudal-agrarian society as epitomized by the authoritarian power of the Governor and Intendant in Quebec City, the seigniorial system of land tenure and the paternalistic relations that prevailed between seigniors and habitants, the latter constituting the majority of the population.

Whatever the case, it is clear that New France was composed of both metropolitan and rural elements. This hybrid, mercantile and agrarian mosaic in New France has led Hubert Guindon to characterize it as a "feudal-trading" society (1968: 141-2). The metropolitan elites consisted of the more influential seigniors, the wealthier fur traders, the higher clergy and government officials. They lived in the growing urban areas of Montreal, Quebec City and Three Rivers which, by 1759, had a combined population of 13,000 or about 25% of the 55,000 inhabitants of New France at the time (Fregault, 1968: 12).

There is evidence of considerable interpenetration among various elements of the elite group. A considerable number of seigniors were not French noblemen but wealthy merchants who had grown rich in the fur trade which accounted for approximately two-thirds of the value of the colonies' exports (Fregault, 12). The seigniories were highly prized by the merchants for their social prestige (Ouellet, 1966: 561). Furthermore, the clergy were the proprietors of a considerable number of seigniories (ibid.: 559-60).

The mainstay of the rural element of New France were the habitants, or tenant farmers, living on the seigniories. The habitants had achieved a considerable degree of social homogeneity and solidarity due to the unique social patterns associated with the row-type settlements in which they lived (Falardeau, 1968: 19-32), the influence of the clergy and the strength of the French-Canadian family (Ouellet, 1966: 562).

However, it is essential to realize that the success of the fur trade and the large demand for coureurs de bois (or roving fur trappers and traders) provided a significant alternative to the habitant way of life for a substantial number of French settlers. The presence of this alternative way of life on the frontier prevented the consolidation of a thorough-going regime of seigniorial feudalism in French Canada, for it provided the habitant an avenue of escape from oppression (McRae, 1964: 223). As such, the fur trade was vigorously denounced by seigniors and clergy for encouraging a spirit of independence, individualism and **crass** materialism among the lower classes (Ouellet, 1966: 561).

Certain writers have alluded to conflicts and tensions occurring between the metropolitan and rural elements of New France. Ouellet (1966: 562) suggests an essentially socio-economic cleavage between the elites who lived off land rents and the habitants who paid the rent. Rioux (1971: 22) feels that the source of the friction was based on differences in national identification. According to him, the wealthier merchants, more powerful seigniors and higher clergy who constituted the urban elite were either Frenchmen or were oriented to France in their economic and political dealings. The habitants, on the other hand, had become the Canadiens, an indigenous rural peasantry who had adapted themselves to the requirements of Canadian living (ibid.).

Thus, there is some evidence of heterogeneity and dissensus in French-Canadian society on the eve of the conquest (Ossenberg 1967: 209). The fragmentation thesis

proposed by Louis Hartz, which suggests that the new world societies were well integrated and internally homogeneous, should be modified to account for the possibility of internal cleavages.

It will be argued that the conquest of Quebec superimposed an ethnic cleavage over pre-existing social class and metropolitan/rural divisions in French-Canadian society, and hence tended to polarize these divisions. Major institutional cleavages - demographic, socio-economic and political - began to emerge between French and British in Quebec. These cleavages, originating in the regime of double-layered colonialism which followed in the wake of the conquest of Quebec, formed the basis for the emergent patterns of Canadian dualism during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

There is little doubt that the conquest and its aftermath seriously diminished the numbers and influence of the French-Canadian economic and political elites. Several hundred French military men and high political officials and about a hundred of the leading French-Canadian merchants returned to France after the conquest (McRae: 231). All told, somewhat fewer than 2,000 individuals or slightly under 3% of the total population of New France left the colony after the British Conquest (Brunet, 1958: 57, note). More important, the majority of French-Canadian merchants and political officials who chose to remain behind suffered a collective decline in wealth and power.

French-Canadian merchants were squeezed out of the fur

trade, which they once controlled, by the growing economic presence of the Northwest Company and other English-owned concerns. In 1774, French-Canadian merchants furnished 52% of the canoes engaged in the fur trade (Ouellet, 1966: 104). By 1782, the proportion of canoes equipped by French-Canadians was down to 21% and falling. The English-speaking merchants of the Northwest Company had succeeded in wresting the bulk of the fur trade from French-Canadian hands.

In other areas too, French-Canadian commercial interests fared poorly. In 1792, 23% of the merchants registered in Quebec City were of British origin, while in 1805 almost half of Quebec City's merchants were of British origin (ibid.: 157). Those French-Canadian merchants still in business were mainly small retailers. The booming new lumber and grain industries were financed almost exclusively by British capital (ibid.: 194).

The reasons offered for the near disappearance of the French-Canadian merchant community after the conquest are many and varied. Michel Brunet (49-112) argues that the businessmen who remained after the conquest were the smallest and the poorest in terms of capital resources. They were hurt by the bankruptcy of the French treasury which left them holding considerable amounts of worthless paper money. An especially severe blow was the loss of contacts with French suppliers and buyers as the center of trade shifted to London. Meanwhile, British merchants were favored by protection and contracts by the new military government at Quebec. Ouellet (1966: 76-8) asserts that French-Canadian enterprise suffered due to an almost exclusive attention to the fur trade, an

excessive attachment to small enterprises and a failure to cultivate trade relations with Great Britain. Whatever the precise reasons, it is clear that by 1800 the French-Canadian business community was no longer a significant factor in Canadian life.

Similarly in political life, English-speaking personnel assumed control of the major political institutions of the colony, including the executive and legislative councils and the civil service. In 1781 there was only one French-Canadian among the 22 highest government officials. In 1784, French-Canadians occupied only 26% of the civil service positions, and most of those were of the humbler variety. Between 1764 - 1791, of the 48 councillors who advised the governor-general, 15 were French-Canadians (Brunet: 99-100).

The seigniorial elite survived the conquest numerically intact but with its prestige much diminished. This was because the seigniors were discredited among the habitants by their ready collaboration with the English military authorities. Evidence of this was the inability of the seigniors to rally the habitants against the American Revolution in 1776 (ibid.) The only remnant of the old French-Canadian elite whose power and influence remained intact, even augmented after the conquest was the Catholic Church. The church was the sole French-Canadian formal organization of great power left in the wake of the conquest (Garigue, 1968: 131). As such it was recognized by the English authorities and cooperated with them in maintaining order and dampening dissent.

French-Canadians found their cultural, economic and geographic horizons contracting. The conquest resulted in a diminishing of cultural ties with France, a process which paralleled the loss of trading contacts with the former metropolitan homeland. In addition to losing contact with France, the French-Canadians lost their geographic and economic contacts with western Canada. Before 1760, French-Canadian explorers and fur traders were heavily involved in the development of western Canada. The loss of preeminence in the fur trade, the failure to get established in the new lumber industry and the opening of Upper Canada to English-speaking settlement all combined to confine French-Canadian economic, political and cultural aspirations to the St. Lawrence Valley for a considerable period to come (Ouellet, 1966: 11-12).

The French-Canadian response to British economic, political and cultural hegemony in the metropolitan centers of the colony was to entrench themselves even more in the rural parishes, and there try to preserve the basic elements of the habitant way of life. There was a marked trend toward re-ruralization and a migration from town to country. According to a census taken in 1765, 77% of the Quebec population lived in the rural areas while a substantial 23% were listed as urban dwellers. In 1790, the proportion rural had increased to 80%. By 1825, 88% of all Quebecers were living in the rural areas (Leger, 1952: 260). While it is difficult to ascertain whether or not this information refers mainly to French-Canadians, there is evidence that it does.

For instance, during the first half of the nineteenth century, English-speakers became increasingly numerous in the major cities of Quebec. At mid-century, English-speakers, while constituting about a quarter of Quebec's population, were a majority in Montreal (Joy, 1972: 104) and made up about one-third of the population of Quebec City (ibid.: 101-2). Hence it is unlikely that English-Canadians contributed significantly to the ruralization of Quebec.

Rioux (ibid.: 35-6) argues that other transformations occurred in French-Canadian society parallel to ruralization. The birth rate tended to remain high with the French-Canadian population doubling every twenty-five years despite a substantial emigration to the New England states.

Illiteracy was high and the French-Canadians maintained their way of life through an oral tradition. Seventy-eight thousand of 87,000 signatures on a petition to Governor Dalhousie were signed by a cross (ibid.: 36). Some connection with Europe was maintained by the clergy whose influence had greatly increased in French Canada. Rioux posits that these changes indicate that a folk society tradition had developed among the French-Canadians.

[After] the conquest, Quebec society, far from continuing to develop like other Western societies of the era, becoming industrial, urbanized and secular, on the contrary draws inwards upon its popular and rural elements and, instead of becoming more urbanized, becomes more folklike. We observe, among other phenomena, a greater predominance of agricultural occupations; a greater scattering of the population among the rural parishes; more social homogeneity; reinforcement of

moral and religious norms; less important internal stratification and differentiation; and, finally, a more restricted territorial, occupational and upward mobility (ibid.: 33).


Similar sentiments are voiced by Ossenberg (205) who argues that a nativistic reaction took place among the French-Canadians. Nativism is a reaffirmation of traditional values, and often occurs when the non-elite members of a group find their opportunities for upward mobility blocked, and the established elites of that group suffer a decline in power and prestige (ibid.). This process suggests a polarization of relations between French and English in Canada along several dimensions of conflict. The core of this polarization lies in the superimposition of ethnic divisions over previously existing urban/rural and social class cleavages.

An important line of cleavage was demographic. In the latter half of the eighteenth century the demographic balance stood heavily in favor of the French-Canadians. Up to 1775, the English-speaking community in Canada constituted little more than 3% or 4% of the total population (Ouellet, 1966: 142-4). The American Revolution brought in the first large wave of English-speaking immigrants. About 6,000 United Empire Loyalists moved to what became Upper Canada between 1775-1790 (McRae: 236). By 1790, the proportion of English-speaking Canadians reached around 10% or 15% of the total (Ouellet: 142-4). This was a large enough number to allow Upper Canada to form a separate English-speaking province in 1791.

This English-speaking immigration was strongly opposed

TABLE 3-1 GROWTH IN QUEBEC'S POPULATION 1760-1850

population
000'



Source: Fernand Ouellet, Histoire économique et sociale du Québec, Fides, Montreal, 1971, p. 599.

by the French-Canadians who feared that they would be swept away by an Anglo-Saxon tide (Wade, 1968: 141). It was just as strongly supported by the English-speaking community hoping to establish its numerical predominance in Canada. Despite French-Canadian opposition, about a million British immigrants came to Canada between 1815 and 1850. In the same period, the population of Upper Canada increased from 95,000 to 950,000, making that province the most populous in British North America (McRae: 245). Meanwhile Irish and English immigrants continued to flow into Quebec. In 1837, the English-speaking population of Quebec reached a peak of 28% of the total population (Joy: 86). At the same time, as has already been demonstrated, the major cities of Quebec had become as English as they were French.

The conflict over immigration tended to resolve itself in favor of the English-speaking community. This assured the numerical preponderance of the English-speaking element west of the St. Lawrence Valley. To this day, French-Canadian leaders continue to be uneasy about immigration, especially as the overwhelming majority of immigrants assimilate into the English-speaking community.

A second line of cleavage opened up over issues of social stratification. English Canadians were over-represented among the metropolitan elites who controlled the economic and political life of the colony. At the apex of English-speaking society in Canada were the Family Compacts (McRae: 241). These were cliques of the highest government officials and the leading businessmen interested in

dominating the economic and political life of the emerging cities.

The French-Canadians, by contrast, were over-represented in the rural, agricultural and lower status occupations. This tendency toward the under-representation of French-Canadians in elite positions and their over-representation in low status positions has continued down to the present day. However, Rioux (27) goes too far when he insists that one effect of the conquest was to abolish internal differentiation within French Canada so that "all Quebec becomes a subjugated ethnic class." This is a misleading oversimplification. Certain elements of the old French-Canadian metropolitan elites, such as the higher clergy, had survived the conquest with their power intact, even increased.

More important, a new secular elite of educated professionals arose in French-Canada to take the place of the seigniors whose prestige had dwindled after the conquest. These men were the sons of habitants who had been educated in the classical colleges and graduated as lawyers, notaries and doctors. Their numbers increased rapidly. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, while the general French-Canadian population increased 32%, the number of professionals increased by 58% (Ouellet, 1966: 202-3). As shall be demonstrated, the growing class of professional men in Quebec took to politics as a means of advancing their own personal prestige and of championing the interests of the French-Canadian community as a whole (ibid.). Out of the

ranks of this class were to emerge the leaders of French-Canada in the political struggles of the nineteenth century.

A third arena of conflict concerned cultural and legal institutions. Here there was a conflict between English capitalists who wished to establish legal and cultural institutions conducive to business expansion and commerce, and the seigniors and, later, the French-Canadian professionals, who wished to preserve their agrarian and Catholic way of life. In this dispute, the British metropolitan government adopted a "divide and rule" policy, first supporting one side, then the other.

At first the British government sided with the Anglo merchants. The proclamation of 1763 suggested the replacement of the French legal system with English civil and commercial law and trial by jury. In addition, it advocated the establishment of a democratically elected parliament. These measures were not designed to forcibly assimilate the French-Canadians. Rather, they were instituted with the expectation that the commercial superiority of the British and massive immigration from the American colonies would soon transform Canada into a mercantile state with an English majority (ibid.: 92).

This immigration failed to materialize until much later. One reason for this was the growing conflict between the British government and the American colonies to the south. The new governors of Canada, Murray and Carlton, autocratic and authoritarian by temperament, felt closer to the conservative, promonarchist seigniorial and clerical elites

of Quebec than to the Montreal Anglo merchants, many of whom were republican and pro-American in their sympathies. The British government deemed it wise to try to preserve certain traditional French-Canadian institutions as bulwarks of stability against growing rebellion to the south (ibid.: 94-5).

As a result, the Quebec Act was passed in 1774. This Act sought to repeal many of the provisions of the Proclamation of 1763 and, as much as possible, attempted to restore the old regime of New France (Ossenberg: 211). This act established the legal foundations of Canadian dualism. French civil law was restored although English criminal law was retained. The seigniorial system of land tenure was maintained and the power of the seigniors reinforced. The Catholic Church was formally established and the position of the high clergy was likewise affirmed. To the delight of the seigniors and the high clergy who feared the political power of the habitants and to the chagrin of the Montreal Anglo merchants, a legislative assembly was denied the colony.

The Montreal Anglo merchants could not be reconciled to many of the provisions of the Quebec Act. The British government responded to the growing economic and numerical importance of the English-speaking community by passing the Constitutional Act of 1791 (Ouellet, 1966: 146-7). This act granted the minimum demands of the Anglo community for a province which it could be assured of controlling by creating a new English-speaking province and granting a legislative assembly to both Upper and Lower Canada.

In the early nineteenth century, an important area of

institutional conflict concerned land tenure. Anglo capitalists, determined to create a thoroughgoing capitalist economy in the St. Lawrence Valley, demanded the abolition of the seigniorial system of land tenure and its replacement by a commercial land market. The French-Canadian professional elites strongly resisted what they saw as a threat to their way of life. By mid-nineteenth century the cultural and institutional conflicts between French and English had reached a standoff. It was clear that French-Canadian institutions would survive in Quebec but that English institutions would predominate in the rest of Canada.

The political conflict between French and English reflected the demographic socio-economic and cultural polarization between the two communities. The Anglo mercantile interests controlled the civil service and the appointed legislative and executive councils. They feared the growing power of the elected legislative assembly which had come under French-Canadian control. They were upset at the refusal of the French-Canadian leaders to agree to a modernization of the Lower Canadian rural social structure and the establishment of public works programs to stimulate the economy (Ouellet, 1966: 200-1).

The popularly elected lower house of the assembly had come under the control of the French-Canadian assemblymen who were generally drawn from the new class of educated professionals. Preeminent among these men was Louis Joseph Papineau, leader of le parti patriote. This group formulated a program which combined demands for a more liberal and

democratic political system with a social outlook that was nationalist and conservative (Ouellet, 1969: 9).

The patriote group realized that the principle of democratic government and majority rule would enable the French-Canadians to control the government of Lower Canada. Hence the patriotes demanded responsible government, for that would subordinate the Anglo-controlled executive branch of the government to the French-Canadian controlled lower house (ibid.). This power struggle was legitimated in the name of a growing sense of French-Canadian nationalism. This ideology of nationalism sprang from the common origins of the educated professionals among the rural habitants and reflected their nativistic reactions against Anglo-Saxon domination. They looked to the past and rejected capitalism and economic transformations as an Anglo-Saxon attack on the French-Canadian way of life (ibid.: 10). Although many of the patriote leaders were anti-clerical themselves, they came to see the Catholic Church as an essential bulwark against assimilation and social change.

The Anglo mercantile oligarchies reacted strongly against the patriote challenge. They resisted the granting of responsible government and demanded the union of Upper and Lower Canada in order to drown the French in an English sea. By the 1830's, relations had become so polarized that the patriote leaders were no longer satisfied with mere responsible government but were demanding independence and the creation of a French-Canadian republic (ibid.: 15-16). The struggle between the patriotes and the Anglo-controlled

government broke out in open conflict in the Rebellion of 1837-1838. This rebellion cannot be treated solely as an ethnic conflict, for important sections of the French-Canadian elites, such as the clergy, opposed it. Furthermore, the patriotes maintained close relations with Mackenzie's followers in Upper Canada (Wade: 152), a fact which may explain why the rebellions in the two provinces took place in the same year. Nor can it be seen as a purely political conflict for the nationalistic and nativistic aspirations of the patriote movement had gone well beyond mere political reform. Rather, it must be seen as the superimposition of ethnic divisions over basic cleavages of social class.

This point is well illustrated by McRae's (McRae: 248-9) comparison of the Rebellion of 1837-1838 in Lower Canada with its sister rebellion in Upper Canada. Both represented a revolt of the countryside against the ruling commercial oligarchies of the metropolis. Both envisaged a more egalitarian social order based on American notions of democracy. Both had as their goal a stable agrarian society but found some support among the emerging labor force in the cities. However, there were important differences between both rebellions. In Lower Canada, ethnic differences intensified the urban/rural and social class cleavages. Thus, while the Upper Canadian leaders envisaged an American-style agrarian order of freehold farmers, the patriote leaders looked to the traditional seigniorial system as a bulwark against Anglo capitalist society.

The experience of the Rebellion of 1837-1838 and the

atmosphere of conservative nationalism in Lower Canada which followed its suppression both operated to guarantee the plural, segmented character of the Canadian nation. French-Canadians were more determined than ever before to guard their social and cultural distinctions from English Canada. However, the crushing of the 1837-1838 Rebellion eliminated, for the time being, any hopes the patriote leaders had for an independent French Canada. They were replaced by another generation of French-Canadian political leaders who had adopted the strategy of attempting to improve the status of the French-Canadian nation within a united Canada.

This view of French-Canadian destiny as something linked to the fortunes of English Canada developed in the aftermath of the defeat of the 1837 Rebellion and in the wake of the Durham Report which followed soon afterwards. Commissioned by the British government to inquire into the causes of the 1837 Rebellion, Durham concluded that the problem lay both in the conflict for political supremacy being waged between the elitist executive and the popularly elected legislature, and in the ubiquitous ethnic conflict between French and English which pervaded all aspects of Canadian life.

To deal with the political conflict, Durham recommended the granting of responsible government to British North America. To deal with the ethnic conflict, Durham recommended the legislative union of the numerically inferior province of Lower Canada with numerically superior Upper Canada (Wade: 196). His aim was to end the "French problem" once and for all by subjecting the French-Canadians to an Anglo-Saxon majority,

which he hoped would bring about their speedy assimilation. Thus Durham correctly foresaw that a society divided ethnically, religiously and culturally as Canada was at the time could not hope to achieve the extent of integration which he believed was essential for a viable society in British North America. This realistic insight led Michel Brunet to acclaim Durham as Canada's greatest historian. However, Durham's alleged realism left him in his assertion that the French-Canadians could be assimilated through a legislative union with Upper Canada. What guaranteed the cultural distinctiveness of the French-Canadians of the time was not so much their political autonomy -- for that was more apparent than real -- but rather, their social and cultural isolation in a near-subsistence rural hinterland economy. Durham, rather wisely, never considered instituting the type of social engineering necessary to destroy the French-Canadian rural society.

The British government, reacting rather conservatively to events in North America, gladly accepted Durham's recommendation of a legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada but refused his request for responsible government. This action virtually assured that English Canada would not unite to suppress the French-Canadian minority, for Upper-Canadians were soon split between reformers who demanded responsible government and conservatives who opposed it. Any possibility of an anti-French alliance was precluded when English-speaking reformers began seeking out like-minded colleagues in French Canada in order to conclude a political

alliance across ethnic lines. Hence the Upper-Canadian reformer Baldwin concluded an alliance with the French-Canadian leader Lafontaine in order to fight for responsible government in the new united Province of Canada (ibid.: 231).

Men like Lafontaine and Cartier, who succeeded the former as the most important French-Canadian leader of his generation, represented a significant departure from the older nativist and separatist leaders as exemplified by Papineau. Lafontaine and Cartier were nationalists in the sense that they wished to preserve French-Canadian culture and institutions, but they were cautious and moderate nationalists. Having reached political maturity at a time when French-Canadian survival was threatened by the defeat of the 1837 Rebellion and the implications of the Durham Report, these men concluded that the best hope for French Canada lay in collaboration with sympathetic factions in English Canada rather than any separatist adventures. This strategy easily voided whatever assimilationist tendencies might have existed in the Canadian Legislative Union. In 1849, French was restored as an official language in Canada (ibid.: 269). By the late 1850's, the Macdonald-Cartier administration, which replaced the previous Lafontaine-Baldwin government, began to prepare Canada for Confederation.

In the Confederation negotiations, Cartier insisted on a federal rather than a legislative union. This would give back to Quebec what it had lost two decades earlier -- a government of its own. French was guaranteed as an official language in the federal parliament and English in the Quebec

legislative assembly. Generally, French-Canadians supported Confederation with little enthusiasm and much uneasiness as to the future of their nation in a united Canada subject to an English-speaking majority at the federal level (ibid.: 321).

At best, Confederation achieved only a partial unification -- a pluralistic exercise rather than a fusion (ibid.: 323). Some French-Canadian leaders who opposed Confederation, such as Perreault and Dorion, predicted that Canadian federalism would be subjected to continuing crises in order to maintain French-Canadian rights. Subsequent events have shown this pessimism to be at least in part justified (ibid.: 327). Thus Confederation tended to crystallize, in constitutional form, the existing plural segmented character of Canadian society and preserved this plural structure for future generations. At the same time, Confederation was a product of voluntary cooperation between leaders of French and English Canada in order to maximize certain common interests. It is through this form of conditional cooperation between the various plural sectors in order to achieve certain common aims, rather than through the closer union attained only by common values and definitions, that integration in Canada has often times been established.

SOUTH AFRICA, 1795 - 1910: DUALISM AND POLARIZATION

In South Africa, as in Canada, ethnic conflicts grew directly out of the colonial experience. Unlike Canada, however, there is little disagreement about the nature of

South African society on the eve of the first British occupation in 1795. The colony was sparsely inhabited by about 30,000 people (Marquard, 1962: 5) of whom roughly 17,000 were white (Thompson, 1964: 181). White settlement in South Africa dates from 1652 when Jan van Riebeeck established a refreshment station on the Cape for the Dutch East India Company. By 1691, about 1,000 whites had settled in the Cape. These early colonists were the ancestors of today's Afrikaners and were two-thirds Dutch, one-sixth French Huguenot and one-seventh German in origin.

The non-white population was composed of natives and imported slaves. The Hottentots and Bushmen were indigenous to the Cape and were relatively easily subdued. The slaves were imported from Malaya, Indonesia, the East Indies and Madagascar.

Compared to the North American colonies at the dawn of the nineteenth century, South Africa was economically underdeveloped, politically inexperienced and culturally backward (De Kiewet, 1942: 30). Metropolitan traditions of urban living do not seem to have been as advanced in South Africa as they were in New France. One reason for this was the small size of the white population of the Cape. Another was the absence of any staple product remotely similar to the fur trade in New France, which could be the basis for urban wealth and prestige. Finally, the Dutch East India Company which administered the colony had little interest in developing it economically, and viewed it mainly as a supply station for its lucrative East Indies trade. Nevertheless,

it seems clear that by 1795 the Cape Colony was experiencing a schism between its metropolitan and rural segments.

The metropolitan traditions in South Africa developed in the settled districts of the western Cape, along the coast, and centered on the townships of Cape Town, Paarl and Stellenbosch (van den Berghe, 1965: 15-16). Around these townships were grouped some fairly prosperous wine, fruit and wheat farmers occupying large sedentary farms and employing slave labor. Cape Town was the center of a small metropolitan community that maintained economic, political and cultural ties with Europe via the Dutch East India Company. This community was composed of officers of the garrison, company officials and a small urban middle class of professionals and merchants.

The Cape Town merchants were mostly small businessmen and only a few managed to accumulate large fortunes (Thompson: 186). This was because the Dutch East India Company maintained a rigid monopoly of trade and allowed little leeway for local initiative. However, a few merchants benefited from the company's policy of auctioning exclusive rights to deal in large commodities and became quite wealthy (ibid.: 189). In political matters as well, the company officials administered the Cape autocratically, and so the Cape burghers benefited from only minimal training in self-government (ibid.: 185-6). A few of the more prominent Cape burghers were appointed to a special council to advise company officials on policy matters but, as in New France, the colonists were allowed little direct participation in managing their own affairs.

Race relations in metropolitan South Africa were friendly and reasonably liberal. Relations between master and slave were fairly warm and close and the slave could expect good treatment providing he acknowledged his "place" (van den Berghe: 15-16). From these attitudes emerged those sentiments known as "Cape liberalism". A better term would be Cape paternalism, for the slave and native were viewed as friendly and affable but also childlike and in need of instruction and uplifting.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century a second tradition emerged in South Africa quite distinct from the graceful living of the colonial metropolis. This was the tradition of the voortrekker society of the frontier to the north and east of the settled Cape. The trekking way of life got its start when some Cape burghers trekked north and east with their cattle in search of new grazing lands (Thompson: 184-5). The Trekboers were semi-nomadic, near-subsistence pastoral farmers (van den Berghe: 21-2). Unlike the Cape burghers, the frontier Boers were poor, had no slaves and relied on the cheap labor of the tribes they subjugated, such as the Hottentots and later the Bantu. The frontier Boers were semi-literate and isolated from the mainstream of European culture (Walker, 1964: 99). Their life was harsh, but they were sustained in their struggles by the Old Testament fundamentalism of the Dutch Reformed Church, which was a significant influence in Boer society.

The political behavior of the frontier Boers centered around two major points of contention. One of these was

strained relations with the colonial metropolis at the Cape. The other was unceasing conflict with the Bantu tribes to the north and east of the Boer settlements. The inharmonious relations between frontier and Cape developed out of the isolation of the former, and, in addition, out of their radically divergent political interests. The frontier districts were supposedly administered by a company official called a landdrost (Thompson: 185-6). In practice the frontier districts were hardly administered at all.

The trekkers developed their own fighting units called **commandos**. There was incessant conflict over scarce land and water between the Boers and the Bantu tribes who were also pastoralists. These conflicts took the form of cattle raids and cattle thefts, war parties and ambushes. The historical animosity between Boer and Bantu, quite distinct from the paternalism of the Cape, has its origin in these conflicts over scarce resources.

The Dutch East India Company, anxious to preserve peace and order on the frontier, tried to compel the Boers to cut down the scope of their commando activities against the Bantu. These directives were resented by the frontier Boers. In 1795, resentment broke out into armed conflict as Boers in the frontier Graaf-Reinet district declared their independence and took up arms against the company (De Kiewet: 31-2). The rule of the Dutch East India Company ended with the colony in a precarious financial situation and with a distinct cleavage opened up between Cape and frontier.

For the next decade, Britain, France and Holland

manoeuvred for control of South Africa. Finally, in 1806, a British fleet seized Cape Town harbor and established a permanent British presence in South Africa (Marquard: 8). As a result of the British occupation, the colonial metropolis came under British control, while the frontier remained solidly Boer. Thus an ethnic division was superimposed on a pre-existing cleavage between the metropolis and the frontier, with grave consequences for the future course of South African history.

The British took control of the colonial administration at the Cape and generally excluded the Boers from effective political participation (van den Berghe: 29). The collapse of the Dutch East India Company resulted in the economic ruin of those few Boer merchants who had benefited from its monopolistic protection (Thompson: 190). Henceforth, the major economic initiatives in South Africa would be undertaken by English-speaking businessmen. Finally, through their control of Cape Town harbor, the British could maintain economic and cultural contacts with Britain and Europe. The Boers, like the French-Canadians, found themselves cut off from their former European homeland and forced to turn inward to their own indigenous cultural traditions. In other words, the metropolitan aspects of South African society became increasingly British. What was left to the Boers was the frontier, hence the frontier was destined to play an even larger role than previously in Boer history.

The Boer society that developed on the frontier, like the culture of the habitants, had many characteristics which

could be termed folklike. The frontier Boers were socially homogeneous to the extreme. There was almost complete equality of wealth and condition on the frontier (Marquard: 12). The society was pre-industrial and almost entirely based on a backward form of near subsistence agriculture (De Kiewet: 58-9). The Boers were isolated from cultural contacts with Europe and were, at best, semi-literate. They had developed their own dialect, a simplified homespun version of Dutch called Afrikaans. Their religiosity was high, and under the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church they came to regard themselves as a chosen people, destined to fulfil a divine mission in Africa (van den Berghe: 28). The British occupation of the Cape, coupled with the cultural isolation of the Boers, accentuated sentiments of nativism among the Boers who warmly embraced all indigenous traditions and cast a cold eye on all things British, foreign or "uitlander"*.

The first years of British occupation were cautious and conservative with few changes in the laws and customs established by the Dutch colonists (Walker: 138-40). However, by about 1820, British policy had begun to crystallize. "[British] policy consisted broadly in consolidating the British position to the detriment of both Boers and Africans, and, if necessary, in using the latter against the former" (van den Berghe: 26). Whereas the British in Quebec looked on French-Canadian society as a

* The Afrikaans term for foreigner.

bulwark against American expansion, the British in South Africa distrusted the Boers and counted on the Bantu tribes to check Boer ambitions on the frontier. Hence the British saw little need to pass **the South African equivalent of the Quebec Act** to protect the Boer way of life.

Polarization between Boers and British opened up along the following lines of conflict: political, economic, immigration, culture and relations with non-whites. Politically, the British attempted to modernize the efficiency of the colonial administration and extend its power throughout the colonial territories. The civil service was modernized, trial by jury was instituted and circuit courts were introduced to the frontier districts (Marquard: 8). This was resented by the frontier Boers who valued their independence from any kind of central control. The colonial government was autocratic and the British refused to grant the colonists a representative assembly (Walker: 165). The Boers resented their lack of say in governmental affairs (ibid.: 198).

Economically, the British wished to modernize the archaic and unproductive form of agriculture practised by the Boers. Their aim was to create the sort of agricultural surplus which would enable them to incorporate South Africa into the world economy. In order to do this, it was necessary to replace the old loan farm system* in which the Boers occupied huge areas temporarily with a more modern

*System of temporary land occupation developed by the trekking Boers.

system of permanent tenure and commercial farming.

The implicit aim of British policy had not been to deprive the [Boer] farmers of their land, but to attach them more firmly to it. The tendency of this policy had been to make the land scarcer and more valuable; economically this was an essential preliminary to a more productive use of the land (De Kiewet: 56).

The Boers, however, resented any controls which made land more scarce and which attempted to control their trekking.

The British colonial administration hoped to encourage immigration in order, as in Canada, to give the colony a predominantly British character. In this area their policy was an utter failure. The poverty of South Africa and the difficulty of farming successfully there discouraged immigration. Between 1815-70, fewer than 50,000 British immigrants moved to South Africa (Thompson: 192-3). An illustration of the problems which hindered English immigration is provided by the sorry history of the Albany settlement. In 1820, 5,000 British settlers moved to South Africa to establish an agricultural community. In less than a decade the settlement collapsed and two-thirds of the settlers had drifted to the towns (De Kiewet: 39-40). This little episode illustrates the historic differentiation between the rural Afrikaners and the more urban English. More important, the failure of the British immigration policy helped to assure the continuing numerical supremacy of the Afrikaners over the English. Thus, a census taken in the Cape Colony in 1865 showed that of a white population of 181,000, only 26,300 were born in Europe - these latter being overwhelmingly British (Robertson, 1958: 176). British

TABLE 3-2

WHITE POPULATION OF THE CAPE COLONY, 1793-1891

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>	
1793	13,842	ancestors of today's Afrikaners
1865	154,700	native born (mainly Afrikaners)
	26,300	European born (mainly British)
	181,000	total
1875	207,700	native born
	29,100	European born
	236,800	total
1891	327,000	native born
	50,000	European born
	377,000	total

Source: H.M. Robertson, "South Africa", in Brinley Thomas, ed., Economics of International Migration, London, Macmillan, 1958, pp. 174-6.

immigration to South Africa did not occur in any substantial numbers until the gold rush of the 1890's (ibid.: 178).

Culturally, the British authorities attempted to turn South Africa into an English-speaking colony. Between 1823 and 1828, various proclamations were issued to make English the only official language of the colony (Walker: 163-4). Naturally, this measure was regarded with loathing by the Boers.

Perhaps the greatest area of conflict between English and Boers concerned relations with non-whites. The English had inherited the tradition of Cape liberalism which involved a paternalistic rather than a hostile attitude toward non-whites. Also, the British were not above enhancing their position by playing off Bantu against Boer. On the other hand, it was the Boers who had to bear the brunt of most of the fighting against the Bantu on the frontier.

British missionaries such as John Philip of the London Missionary Society had, since the early nineteenth century, campaigned against harsh and discriminatory treatment of native people. His activity was to a great extent responsible for the passage of Ordinance Fifty in 1828 (Marquard: 9). This measure repealed the previous pass law for native agricultural workers and established legal equality for "all persons of color." In 1834, slavery was abolished. These laws were resented by the Boers who regarded any suggestion of the potential equality of white and non-white as unthinkable.

The frontier in the early nineteenth century was the

scene of a continuing series of battles over land and grazing rights between the Boers and the various Bantu tribes. For the Boers, these "Kaffir Wars" were an essential means to increase their scarce grazing land. The British, on the other hand, wished to maintain order on the frontier and control both Boers and Bantu. In one such skirmish several Boer settlements were overrun. As compensation, Governor D'Urban annexed a portion of Bantu territory in Queen Adelaide province and turned it over to the Boers. However, pressure from London forced the governor to reverse his decision (ibid.: 10). The Boers felt cheated and were infuriated at the British administration.

By the mid 1830's, relations between the Boers and the British had become so polarized that some form of overt conflict was almost inevitable. The Boers had developed new breeds of nativist and nationalist leaders, such as Piet Retief and Pieter Jacobs, who had risen from the ranks of the frontier Boers and were respected for their military, diplomatic and organizational ability (Walker: 195). The conflict did not take the form of a rebellion, as in Lower Canada, but rather that of a mass exodus which, during the decade of 1836-1846, took 10,000 people out of the Cape Colony and out of the reach of British control. They trekked across the Orange River and north and east into the highveld beyond (Marquard: 10). This mass exodus, which resulted in the founding of the independent Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, is known as the Great Trek of 1836-1846.

In some ways the Great Trek was an acceleration of a previously existing process in which pressure on the land had led some of the Boers to seek new pastures beyond the confines of the colony (De Kiewet: 52-55). In its long term consequence for South African history, however, the Great Trek must be seen as an assertion of political autonomy on the part of the white hinterland. "Had there been no land available outside the Colony there might have been a rebellion... As it was the Boers trekked. Once the movement had begun it gathered speed by its own momentum" (Walker; 200).

The experience of the Great Trek was a major **historical** event in the crystallization of Afrikaner nationalism (Marquard: 15). Its success meant that white society in South Africa would be bifurcated, for a considerable time period, into two incompatible plural segments. One was Afrikaans-speaking, rural, poor and hostile towards non-whites. The other was English-speaking, urban, affluent and paternalistic towards non-whites. Furthermore, the success of the Great Trek coupled with the failure of the British immigration policy ensured that in South Africa, as opposed to Canada, the first of the two European-origin sectors would ultimately prevail numerically and politically.

The Great Trek indissolubly linked the future of all South Africa with the Boer race (sic.). Within fourteen years a thin layer of Dutch settlement had spread over the most desirable parts of the interior, leaving no considerable areas vacant which might, like Ontario, have become a region of almost exclusive British settlement (De Kiewet: 56).

The immediate result of the Great Trek was the establishment of two independent Boer republics north and east of the Cape Province. These were the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal). Both were loosely governed, near-subsistence pastoral societies where the individualistic trekking spirit prevailed. Farms were immense -- 5,000 acres was the average -- but were poorly farmed and unremunerative and rural poverty was the rule rather than the exception. The economic backwardness and inertia of the Boer republics was conditioned by a number of factors. One was the poor soil and a hot, dry and inhospitable climate. Another was the backwardness of the agricultural techniques practised by the Boers. The existence of a plentiful supply of cheap black farm labor did much to discourage white economic initiative. Finally, the Boer often considered himself as much of a frontiersman as a farmer, so he did not mind supplementing his meagre crops by hunting.

The Boer republics might have been permitted to continue in their independent ways for a considerable period of time had it not been for the discovery of fabulous mineral deposits in their midst in the late nineteenth century. The huge diamond find at Kimberley in 1867 was soon overshadowed by the discovery of the world's largest gold fields on the Witwatersrand, near Johannesburg, in 1886. The enormous mineral treasures soon brought Boer nationalism into open conflict with an expanding British imperialism. English capital, originating both in London and the Cape

Province, poured in to develop the Rand gold fields. A huge crowd of newcomers began to populate the formerly simple and pastoral land: prospectors, miners, speculators and hangers-on. In 1895, 26,000 **immigrants arrived in South Africa**. The next year, the figure jumped to 36,000 (Robertson: 178). By the end of the nineteenth century, the population of Johannesburg had more than quadrupled, mainly due to the invasion of foreigners -- uitlanders -- predominantly English-speaking and regarded with suspicion by the rural Boers.

Conflicts between the uitlanders and the Boers in the South African Republic soon threatened to engulf the latter in a war with the British Empire. South African President Kruger, fearing the disruptive influence of the uitlanders on the Boer way of life, denied them political and citizenship rights in the Republic. This naturally angered the uitlanders, already resentful of the high taxes and gold duties they had to pay to Kruger's government. Furthermore, Cecil Rhodes, the Rand's most powerful gold magnate as well as premier of the Cape Province, attempted to strengthen British control over the gold trade by encouraging the transportation of gold by rail to the Cape ports of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth for trans-shipping. At the same time, Kruger was attempting to establish a rail link with the Portuguese East African port of Lorenzo Marques to give him access to a sea port independent of British control. To further complicate matters, the Germans had imperial ambitions in Southern Africa and were making overtures to Kruger's republic. Needless to say, this caused the British considerable concern.

At the same time that the conflict between the imperial factor and the independent Boer republics was escalating, a rebirth of Afrikaner nationalism occurred in the Cape Province (Patterson, 1957: 51-2). Afrikaner cultural societies such as the "Genootskap" and the "Afrikaner Bond" were established around the Paarl area during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Efforts were underway to transform Afrikaans into a literary language and they successfully culminated in the publication of the first Afrikaans-language newspaper, Di Patriote.

A full scale conflict between Boer and Briton might have been avoided in the 1890's had it not been for the abortive Jameson raid on the Transvaal. Rhodes and Jameson plotted a raid on Johannesburg to coincide with an expected uitlander uprising. The uprising never occurred and Jameson and his raiders were easily caught and subdued by the Transvaal burghers (Marquard: 19). This episode so poisoned the political atmosphere in South Africa that war between the British Empire and the Boer republics had become inevitable.

The Boer War, which lasted from 1898-1902, had several important consequences. One was the unification of all South Africa under the British Crown. However, this British hegemony was to be short-lived, mainly due to two other consequences of the war. First, the Boer War left a legacy of bitter hatred between Boer and Briton in South Africa. The bitterness was accentuated among the Boers by the sting of defeat and the memory of the concentration camps into which Boer women and children were herded by British soldiers and

where about 26,000 of them died of disease (Walker: 498-500). Significantly, the unification of South Africa ensured that the moderate Cape Province would come under the increasing political influence of the populous and prosperous Transvaal, where Afrikaner nationalism was (and still is) at its most extreme.

The Union of South Africa formally came into being in 1910. A unitary form of government was decided upon rather than a federation. English and Dutch were both declared official languages. The liberal Cape Province voting franchise was retained and could only be changed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Parliament.

The key Afrikaner leaders in the negotiations **preceding the unification of South Africa in 1910** were the former Boer War generals, Botha and Smuts. Like the French-Canadian architects of Confederation, these men were moderates, believing that cooperation with the English to achieve certain common ends was in the best interests of the Afrikaner nation and South Africa as a whole. However, their views could never predominate within Afrikanerdom to the same extent that the doctrines of the French-Canadian moderates would prevail in Quebec. The experience of the Boer War was too recent a memory in the minds of many Afrikaners. Furthermore, English-Afrikaner relations, already complex enough, would soon become even more complicated by the problems posed by the existence of an African majority. Hereafter, political life would be dominated by a triangular relationship involving English-

Afrikaner and native South Africans.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, the first one hundred years of contact between French and English in Canada, and Afrikaners and English in South Africa, have been examined in some detail. During this period, the relations between both pairs of groups evolved from stage one through to the end of stage two of the interaction process model proposed in the previous chapter.

In stage one, the antecedent communities - the French in Canada and the Afrikaners in South Africa - established distinct systems of institutions in the new world. At the same time, both of these new world communities developed significant internal cleavages based on the distinction between their metropolitan and hinterland components. In New France, the coureur de bois tradition provided an attractive alternative to farming or city life. In South Africa, the semi-nomadic trekboers of the frontier developed a way of life sharply different from the settled communities of the Cape Town area. These urban/rural distinctions, existing within the French-Canadian and Afrikaner communities, would become reinforced by other institutional cleavages and compounded by ethnic divisions, after both these antecedent groups had succumbed to the political domination of the British.

Stage two, that of double-layered colonialism, begins

with the political domination of the antecedent community by a second European-origin community. In Canada, this occurred in 1760 with the conquest of Quebec by the British. In South Africa, the British occupation of the Cape took place in 1806. Stage two was of critical importance in the histories of both Canada and South Africa, for it marked the emergence of those patterns of institutional cleavage which were to characterize Canadian and South African dualism. These cleavages became polarized when they were reinforced by, and in turn served to reinforce, the ethnic distinctions that had become manifest in Quebec and South African society during stage two.

Thus, the urban/rural dichotomy, which had emerged as an internal cleavage in both French-Canadian and Afrikaner society, became increasingly, in Quebec after 1760 and in the Cape Colony after 1806, an ethnic cleavage as well. In Quebec, after the conquest of 1760, French-Canadians began colonizing the rural frontiers as Montreal and Quebec City became more and more English-speaking. Similarly, in the Cape Colony after 1806, and particularly during the decade 1836-46, the Boer trekkers moved further into the interior as the British came to occupy the coastal cities.

Another important cleavage was demographic. The politically dominant British attempted to become numerically dominant in both Canada and South Africa, while the politically subordinate French-Canadians and Afrikaners resented any large influx of British immigrants. However, the demographic conflict had two vastly divergent outcomes in the two countries.

In Canada, the huge English-speaking immigration to the Upper St. Lawrence and Great Lakes area shifted the population balance westward from Quebec to Ontario, and assured Canada an English-speaking majority. In South Africa, on the other hand, the failure of early British colonization combined with the Great Trek, which filled the northern frontier districts with thousands of Afrikaner migrants, shifted the population balance northward to the Afrikaans-speaking Transvaal and Orange Free State, and guaranteed an Afrikaner majority of the white population.

A third source of cleavage was socio-economic. The political and economic elites of both Quebec and the Cape Colony became increasingly British. French-Canadians and Afrikaners, for the most part, were relegated to a subordinate status in the territories which they regarded as home.

Finally, an important political cleavage emerged between dominants and subordinates in both Canada and South Africa. In Quebec, disaffection with British colonial rule was a factor behind the revolt of 1837. In South Africa, conflict between Boer settlers and British authorities lay behind the Great Trek of 1836-46 and exploded in the Boer War of 1898-1902. However, in both countries, stage two of the interaction process culminated in a pact in which the two segments agreed to resolve their differences, at least temporarily, and cooperate in the formation of a new dual society. This effort at conflict resolution lay behind the Canadian Confederation of 1867 and the South African Act of Union of 1910.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPACT OF URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the transition from phase two to phase three of the interaction process outlined in the second chapter. The first part of the sections on Quebec and South Africa examines the urban/rural cleavage that had come to characterize French-English relations in the former location and Afrikaner-English relations in the latter. As was argued in the previous chapter, this urban/rural cleavage served to reinforce, and was in turn reinforced by, the all-pervasive ethnic division.

It will be shown in this chapter that during phase two of the intergroup process, the subordinate French-Canadian and Afrikaner communities developed a semi-subsistence rural way of life which guaranteed them a high degree of physical and social separation from the dominant English communities. The rural community provided the framework within which linguistic and cultural autonomy could be maintained. Furthermore, both communities generated social institutions and elite groups whose power and influence were dependent on the existence of a semi-autonomous rural society. In turn, as shall be shown, these French-Canadian and Afrikaner elites, and the political, religious and cultural institutions they dominated, acted to preserve the autonomy of the ethnic rural community.

However, as shall be demonstrated in this chapter, the relationship which had evolved between both segments of the emerging dual societies in Canada and South Africa during phase two of the interaction process, a relationship based on rural/urban differentiation and mutual avoidance, proved to be highly unstable. This relationship was based on a very delicate balance between metropolitan and rural elements of the society. When this balance was upset by the economic and demographic factors associated with rural overpopulation, industrialization and a subsequent rapid rate of urbanization among both the French-Canadians and the Afrikaners, those rural-based institutions which up to now had guaranteed the cultural survival of both ethnic segments were threatened. The rapid urbanization of the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner communities marked the transition from stage two to stage three of the interaction process. To a large extent, stage three is concerned with the problems posed to both the French-Canadians and the Afrikaners by the loss of their former rural-based isolation.

FRENCH CANADA: THE RURAL PARISH SYSTEM

Ruralization:

The obvious fact about French Canada at the close of the nineteenth century was its overwhelmingly rural and agrarian character. In 1900, agriculture accounted for over 65% of Quebec's total production of goods and services (Faucher and Lamontagne, 1953: 28). This heavy rural predominance in French Canada is well known and will surprise few people who have some acquaintance with Canadian history.

What is interesting is that the rural bias of the French was so pronounced that, at the turn of the century, while the rural areas of Quebec were overwhelmingly French, the urban areas had a significant English-speaking minority.

In 1871, 80% of the French population of Quebec lived in the rural areas. While French-speakers made up 78% of the population of the province of Quebec in that year, they formed 81% of the rural population and only 68% of Quebec's urban population (Joy, 1972: Tables 41, 43 and 47). Meanwhile, Montreal was only 65% French-speaking (Keyfitz, 1968: 223). In 1901, French Quebecers were still predominantly, though not overwhelmingly rural, with 64% of all French-speaking Quebecers living in the rural areas (Joy: Table 41). French-Canadians remained even more strongly overrepresented in the rural areas, forming 85% of Quebec's rural population as against 80% of Quebec's total population (*ibid.*: Tables 41, 43 and 47). At the same time, French-Canadians were markedly underrepresented in the urban areas, forming only 72% of Quebec's urban population (*ibid.*) and only 66% of Montreal's population (Keyfitz: 223). This meant that Quebec's English-speaking community was overrepresented by 8% - 10% in the urban areas of the province.

The demographic separation of French and English, with the former occupying the rural areas while the latter, with certain exceptions, inhabited the cities, played a major role in isolating French-Canadians from extensive cultural contacts with English-Canadians which might have led to assimilation. This segregation was further compounded by the

TABLE 4-1

Population of Quebec 1871 and 1901
Urban/Rural and French/non-French.

1871

	<u>Urban</u>		<u>Rural</u>	
	000'	%	000'	%
French (78% total pop.)	185	68	745	81
non-French (22% total pop.)	<u>87</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	272	100	920	100

1901

	<u>Urban</u>		<u>Rural</u>	
	000'	%	000'	%
French (80% total pop.)	474	72	848	85
non-French (20% total pop.)	<u>180</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	654	100	995	100

Source: Richard Joy, Languages in Conflict,
McClelland and Stewart, 1972, Tables 41 and 47.

closed system of institutions which characterized French-Canadian life in the rural parishes.

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF THE RURAL PARISH

For most of French Canada in the late nineteenth century, life centered around the rural parishes. The social structure and way of life associated with a French-Canadian rural parish have been ably presented in a number of studies; those by Miner (1939) and Gerin (1968) being outstanding. The significant point which emerges from a study of the rural parishes is that they formed homogeneous, egalitarian rural enclaves existing in semi-isolation from the turbulent economic and cultural activities of the larger cities. Within the parishes, the French-Canadian habitants could carry on their day to day activities and satisfy their basic economic, political and spiritual needs. The parishes thus exhibited many of the characteristics of small-scale total societies and approached the situation of what has been called a complete society (Corbett, 1967: 186). That is, the parish comprised a distinct social system of members who participated at all levels of the social structure. The needs of the habitants were fully taken care of within the parish, and all but sporadic contacts with the outside world were deemed unnecessary.

Parish life was dominated by three fundamental and interrelated institutions, whose combined effects functioned to integrate the French-Canadian habitant within a protective network of social relations. These three institutions were agriculture, family and religion. Farming was the main

vocation of the French-Canadian people, the chief outlet for their physical labor and a key focus of attention for their thoughts and feelings. It provided the staple diet of the habitant as well as a small cash income for a few essential purchases and minor luxuries. The farm economy also served as a source of livelihood for the small group of French-Canadian merchants who carried on the limited trade between the parishes and the outside world, and supplied the food and cash to maintain the ecclesiastical institutions of the community.

The family system in French Canada was closely related to the agricultural vocation. As amply demonstrated in the classic studies of Gerin and Miner, the French-Canadian family structure was geared to the necessities of farm life. The land was worked as a family enterprise designed to provide sustenance for the family's daily needs and to provide for the settlement of the non-inheriting children. Families were large and a substantial pool of farm labor was always available. The system of land tenure was based, to a large extent, on transmitting intact the family's holdings to one of its children.

An extended and reasonably close-knit family was the rule. The family was the major means of transmitting to the young the technical and spiritual knowledge necessary to prepare them for their future roles as French-Canadian Catholic farmers. The authority and integration of the family could be maintained as long as sufficient land could be found in the vicinity of the parish to provide for those

sons who did not inherit the family property. When this became impossible, the linkage between farm and family, which formed the basis of the rural system, was cut (Hughes, 1951: 8).

The institution which did most to promote social integration within the parish was the Roman Catholic Church (Guindon¹, 1968: 152-3). The parish was, first and foremost, a geographic and administrative unit of the church. Church attendance provided a convenient focal point for social gatherings and informal contacts. Charity and welfare services were generally dispensed by the clergy. Education was entirely a clerical matter. The church provided the opportunity for a small cadre of young men of talent and ambition who aspired to the priesthood or the liberal professions to complete their education at one of several seminaries and colleges located throughout the province.

Above all, the presence of the Roman Catholic Church assured the survival of French Canada as a separate social and cultural entity. In nationalist ideology, Roman Catholicism was totally identified with the survival of French culture in North America (Brunet, 1958: 113-66; Dumont and Rocher, 1968: 188-97). It was felt that a strong Roman Catholic Church in Quebec was absolutely necessary to reinforce institutional cleavages between French and English, and hence perpetuate the autonomous status of the French community in North America (*ibid.*). One reason why the church was seen as an integral part of French Canada and rarely as an oppressive institution was that, unlike certain European countries, the

Quebec clergy never constituted an aristocratic elite remote from the lives of ordinary men. On the contrary, according to Falardeau (1953: 112-3), the clergy **were not recruited** from any hereditary upper class but rather from all walks of life, and maintained an intimate relationship with the rural parishioners.

Finally, the French-Canadian ideology of the late nineteenth century linked a belief in the agrarian vocation of the French-Canadian nation with a fervent Roman Catholicism (Brunet: 113-66; Tremblay: 1953). Rural life and a strong religious faith were seen as the essential basis of French-Canadian national survival. In addition, a third element of French-Canadian social thinking at the time was suspicion of the power of the state, whether that power was exercised by federal or provincial governments. This suspicion resulted from the days when the state represented the alien British colonial authority. It was buttressed by the isolation and parochialism of the rural parishes and the tendency to look at politics in terms of personal relations instead of in terms of more abstract issues. It was felt that the government which governed least, governed best.

LEADERSHIP

Although the parish was a highly egalitarian community composed of habitants sharing similar vocations and life chances, a small elite did arise to provide leadership for the parish. The nature of this local bourgeoisie has been well described by Guindon¹ (151-2). These men were mainly

educated professionals such as doctors, lawyers and the parish priest, as well as local merchants. They administered to the needs of the local community and provided a linkage between the parish and the outside world (ibid.). Especially important were the politicians, usually recruited from the ranks of the educated professionals. The politicians represented the interests of the parish in the Quebec legislature and the federal parliament. In this capacity, they acted not only as representatives of their particular parishes but also as spokesmen for French Canada to their English-speaking colleagues in government. Above all, the presence of a strong French-Canadian elite leadership at the community level acted to maintain integration within the parish and control the level of contacts between French-Canadians and the English-speaking world of the cities. For the few economic and political contacts the habitant was likely to have with the outside world would, for all practical purposes, be carried on through channels established by the local elite leadership (ibid.).

However, the relationship between the habitants and their political elites was, at best, an ambivalent one. Paradoxically, the elites lived off and for the rural parishes. They provided the leadership and the contacts with the outside world which enabled the parishes to function as vital units of French-Canadian society. At the same time, they depended on the rural parish and its institutions for their livelihood, and thus had a vested interest in maintaining their leadership in the rural areas as well as

limiting the political awareness of the habitants (ibid.). That this ambivalent situation was not lost on at least some of the habitants who looked to their educated elites for leadership is well illustrated by the following statement made around 1862 by one Isidore Gauthier, a nineteenth century resident of the parish of Ste. Irene.

We are simple people, we habitants... and because of our ignorance, we are forced to put educated citizens at the head of our municipalities and our administrations; but these leaders basically exploit us and perhaps do not deserve the respect of honest people (quoted in Gerin, :57).

In sum, the French-Canadian rural parish at the turn of the century functioned as a semi-autonomous community with a high degree of institutional completeness. As Guindon¹(154) states, "By and large, the system of social institutions traditional to French Canada was built upon rural society, financed by its economics, controlled by its own ethnic elites with a cultural flavor of its own." The principal function performed by the rural parish system in the history of French-Canadian society was to assure the survival of French and Catholic culture in North America by providing a set of institutions which maximized the physical, social and cultural isolation of the majority of French-Canadians from the dominant English-speaking culture.

Under the rural parish system, the regime of ethnic cohabitation in Quebec was based on a system of mutually desired self-segregated institutions of religion, welfare, leisure and residence (Guindon², 1968: 161). Furthermore, Confederation increased the autonomy of French Canada by

giving Quebec a provincial government and thus allowing for the political integration of the local parishes with the wider world of Quebec provincial politics (Falardeau, 1966: 6-7). Contacts between French and English were few and sporadic, and usually conducted through the mediation of the French-Canadian elites, who cultivated economic, political and only rarely, social ties with the dominant English-speaking community. At the same time, the Gemeinschaft-like intimacy of parish life maximized contacts and hence integration within French-Canadian society. The success of the parish system in guaranteeing the survival of the French fact in North America was so marked, the material and emotional investment of clerical and secular elites in the parish system so great, that it is little wonder that, as we have seen, cultural survival was identified with an agrarian vocation. The praises of the rural way of life continued to be sung long after the rural parish system in French-Canada was eclipsed by other forms of social organization.

THE ECLIPSE OF THE RURAL SYSTEM

By the end of the nineteenth century it had become evident that the rural system in Quebec was no longer capable of providing the same institutional support for the French-Canadian way of life as it once did. As the pioneer sociologists of Quebec - Gerin, Miner and Hughes - have all shown, the weakness of the rural system was not attributable to any outside forces acting on it but rather to demographic contradictions inherent in the very system itself, specifically

the ratio of population to land.

The birth rate in the rural parishes had always been extremely high. According to Keyfitz (1968: 240), in the year 1931 the French-Canadian birthrate per 1,000 females in the 15 - 44 age category stood at 142, as against the national rate of 104. This high birth rate meant that there were a large number of sons who would not inherit the family farm. This did not matter so much as long as there was plentiful land available in the surrounding parishes to accommodate them. Arable land in Quebec is scarce, however, and the best land in Quebec was already colonized. The rural system could no longer sustain increases in population. Between 1891 and 1951, despite the fact that the population of Quebec trebled, the number of persons gainfully employed in agriculture decreased by 17,000 (ibid.: 228).

Clearly then, with such a high birth rate and such limited opportunities in farming, massive over-population in the rural areas was prevented only through heavy out-migration. It is estimated that between 1871 and 1951, 400,000 migrants left the Quebec rural areas (ibid.: 229). Approximately one out of every two farm boys between the ages of 15 and 34 left his home parish (ibid.: 232). Throughout the nineteenth century, the principal recipients of this massive migration were the industrial and mill towns of New England. However, by the turn of the century, the capacity of New England to absorb this population runoff had become considerably attenuated (Hughes,: 20). This raised the question of what new outlets would arise to draw off the

surplus population in the rural areas.

As Miner (66) suggested, the high internal social integration of the rural parish system was based on a merely short term adjustment to the demands of the environment. The weakness of the rural system, its inability to provide employment for its surplus sons and daughters, upset the delicate balance between rural and urban elements on which the integration of French-Canadian society and the equilibrium between French and English-Canadians had been based for more than a century. The changes were more gradual than abrupt, however. "There was no sudden disruption of the traditional ways, only an increasing attempt to find other ways" (ibid.). Increasingly, the "other ways" were sought in the new industrial towns and burgeoning urban centres of Quebec.

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF QUEBEC

At about the same time that rural French Canada was undergoing a crisis of over-population and outmigration, English-speaking industrialists began turning their attention toward harnessing Quebec's vast natural resource potential. Quebec had immense resources of timber, water power and such minerals as copper, asbestos and iron ore. It had excellent shipping and rail facilities, and was located near important markets in central Canada and the United States. Furthermore, French Canada offered a huge pool of cheap labor as well as an inviting market for consumer goods. By the end of World War I, the industrialization of Quebec was clearly progressing.

Between 1881 and 1911, manufacturing accounted for an

average of only about 4% of Quebec's total production of goods and services (Faucher and Lamontagne: 28). In 1920, for the first time, manufacturing surpassed agriculture in contributing 38% of Quebec's total production as against the latter's 37%. By 1941, manufacturing and mining combined accounted for 73% of Quebec's total production, and agriculture a mere 10% (*ibid.*: 33). Between 1939 and 1950, 200,000 new manufacturing jobs were created in Quebec. Manufacturing growth was ten times greater than in the preceding century and greater than that of Canada as a whole - with the rate of new investment in manufacturing rising by 181% in Quebec compared to the Canadian rate of 154% (*ibid.*: 23). Employment in manufacturing jumped from 79,000 in 1911 to 237,000 in 1951 (Keyfitz: 228). Quebec, formerly a land of quiet rural parishes and cottage industries, had become a leading producer of hydro power and electrical products, aluminum, textiles, transportation equipment and pulp and paper.

Concomitant with industrialization, the rate of urbanization of Quebec's French-speaking population increased dramatically. As is indicated in Table 4-2, at the turn of the century almost two-thirds of Quebec's French-speaking population was rural. By 1931, considerably more than half of Quebec's French-speaking population had become urban. Since then, the rate of urbanization has accelerated. At the same time, Montreal had become an urban giant. Between 1871 and 1951, the population of metropolitan Montreal had multiplied nine times to 1.5 million, while the population of the rest of the province multiplied only 2.5 times (Keyfitz:217).

TABLE 4-2

French Population of Quebec 1871-1961. Rural/Urban

	<u>1871</u>	<u>1901</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>1961</u>
Urban 000'	185	474	1,325	3,039
Rural 000'	<u>745</u>	<u>848</u>	<u>953</u>	<u>1,235</u>
Total 000'	930	1,322	2,270	4,270
% Urban	20%	36%	58%	71%

Source: Richard Joy, Languages in Conflict, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1972, Table 43.

Montreal contained 25% of Quebec's 11,000 manufacturing establishments (Wade, 1968: 862). Meanwhile, other important industrial centres developed in Three Rivers, Hull, Chicoutimi and Shawinigan.

CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION

The industrialization and urbanization of Quebec presented French-Canadian society with two major challenges. The first of these was a threat to the maintenance of the traditional social structures and values of the rural society which, up to this point, had guaranteed the institutional autonomy of French Canada from English Canada. A second and related problem was a revolutionary change in the socio-economic status of the average French-Canadian (Quinn, 1967: 34). By 1930, the "average French-Canadian" was more likely than not to be an industrial employee of some kind, usually for a firm owned by English speaking interests. This meant that the structure of French-English relations would be significantly transformed by the former's new status as an employee of the latter. It also meant that the growth of a large urban French-speaking proletariat would endanger the internal solidarity of the formerly homogeneous French-Canadian community.

The traditional institutions of rural French Canada were not so much shattered as superseded by the extensive social transformations associated with urbanization and industrialization. The new population centres which had sprung up around the urban areas and industrial towns had begun to generate novel institutions to deal with the problems

of the recently urbanized proletariat. It soon became readily apparent to the leaders of French-Canadian society, both clerical and lay, that the traditional institutions of rural French Canada could not be transported wholly intact to the new urban settings. An important reason for this phenomenon lies in the difference between the homogeneous and egalitarian nature of the rural parish and the heterogeneous and structured nature of its urban counterpart.

The rural parish is not only a community of essentially one socio-economic class - namely independent farm-owners. The city parish is not a community and has a variety of classes, both economic and social. The integrity of the [urban] parish as an institution dealing equally and effectively with all people within a given territory, is put to great strain (Hughes: 105).

During the 1920's and 1930's, French-Canadian intellectuals, both inside and outside the Church, began to worry that the urban parish would be unable to provide the integrating services formerly provided in the rural parishes. There was a fear that those who had entered the new urban proletariat were likely to be lost to both the French-Canadian nation and the Catholic faith. The nationalist Abbe Groulx termed the decline of the peasantry "sorrowful" (Jones, 1972: 44). The noted theologian Msgr. Paquet warned that "our mission is less to manipulate capital than to ponder ideas; it consists less in lighting the fires of factories than in undertaking to spread afar our religion and thought" (*ibid.*). Even such an ardent advocate of greater French-Canadian involvement in business as the educator, Esdras Minville, feared that "a thousand habitants who have tumbled down into the

proletariat are likely to be both an economic and a moral liability" (*ibid.*). It was felt that it would be difficult to maintain the traditional French-Canadian values in the complex and rapidly changing urban milieu.

Perhaps a more serious threat to French-Canadian solidarity than the strain on its traditional values was the loss of institutional completeness in the world of work. Instead of being able to live and work in a wholly French environment, as was the case in the rural parishes, large numbers of French-Canadians found themselves obliged to seek employment in English-owned industries where the language on the factory floor was, more often than not, English. Falardeau (1953: 109), expresses with compelling poignancy the dilemma facing the newly urbanized worker.

Becoming an industrial worker meant, for the French-Canadian, not only learning new skills but entering the highly competitive struggle of a new impersonal work world for which his traditional education had not equipped him. It meant coming into a status of occupational subordination to a culturally alien employer, whether anonymous or individualized. He was used to social relationships of a highly personal and emotional character and felt like a stranger in the bureaucratic hierarchical social universe of the factory or the plant where most English and Protestant managers put a premium on technical efficiency and communicated with him in a language he did not master. New values as well as new goals of life ambition were imposed on him. The almost inevitable result was frustration, loss of self-confidence and a growing consciousness of alienation.

From a broader perspective, this loss of institutional completeness in the world of work ensured that French-Canada had become a partial society. French-Canadians

participated extensively in the new industrial concerns established in Quebec but only at the lower socio-economic levels. The upper reaches of industry and commerce were, for the most part, closed to them. As such, the political, economic and religious structures of French-Canadian society were no longer in equilibrium (Dofny and Rioux, 1968: 316). The political and religious hierarchies of Quebec were open to French-Canadians at all levels but the economic hierarchy was closed at the top. French Canada had thus developed an internal system of stratification skewed towards the lower socio-economic levels and directed towards the upper reaches of the political and religious hierarchies. This stratification pattern differed considerably from that of English Canada.

French-Canadian nationalist intellectuals were also concerned that the growth of a large urban proletariat would open up internal class cleavages in French-Canadian society tending to weaken its solidarity vis-a-vis English Canada. Dofny and Rioux (309) see a tension within French-Canadian society between "social class consciousness" -- the tendency of the French-Canadian proletariat to define their objectives in terms of working class goals -- and "ethnic class consciousness" -- the tendency to define working class objectives in terms of nationalist goals. Ossenberg (1971: 109) sees a situation of "double pluralism" in an industrialized and urbanized Quebec. Inequalities between French and English were matched by sharp internal divisions between French-Canadian workers and elites. These problems

were the almost inevitable result of the transition from rural homogeneity to urban complexity.

Finally, the urbanization of Quebec threatened the old ideology of traditionalism and agrarianism which equated French-Canadian survival with its agricultural vocation (Rioux: 65). Clearly this doctrine was no longer tenable. "The Industrial Revolution in Quebec abruptly disturbed a pastoral symphony" (Falardeau, 1953: 120). However, it must be repeated that the industrialization of Quebec did not so much destroy the old order as create new environments in which new institutional arrangements would have to be created.

SOUTH AFRICA: RURAL DORPS AND PLATTELAND

Ruralization:

Like French Canada, Afrikaner society at the close of the nineteenth century was predominantly rural and agrarian. Afrikaners made up the great bulk of the white rural population in the Cape Colony and virtually all of the rural whites in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Only in Natal was there a significant English-speaking rural population. If the white countryside, or platteland, was overwhelmingly Afrikaans-speaking, the cities, the centres of new industrial developments which were to transform South Africa, were just as overwhelmingly English-speaking. It is estimated that in 1904, Johannesburg, the largest city in South Africa, was only 14% Afrikaner, despite the fact that it is located in the Transvaal which was at least 50% Afrikaner (Ford, 1971: 257). In 1911, over 70% of the Afrikaners still

TABLE 4-3

White Population of South Africa 1936
Urban/Rural and English-Speaking/Afrikaans-Speaking

	<u>Rural</u>		<u>Urban</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	000'	%	000'	%	000'	%
English-speaking	95	14	688	53	783	39
Afrikaans-speaking	585	84	536	41	1,112	56
Other	<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>5</u>
	696	100	1,308	100	2,004	100

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years 1910-1960,
 Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria, 1960, Table A-18.

lived in the rural areas (ibid.: 258), even though only 48% of all South African whites were rural dwellers (Census of South Africa, Report No. 02-02-01, 1960: Table iii). As Table 3 indicates, as late as 1936 English-speakers formed the majority of urban whites in South Africa. It was not until 1951 that the Afrikaners, though they made up almost 60% of South Africa's whites, were able to form even a plurality of the urban white population (Union Statistics for Fifty Years, 1960: Table A-18).

Again, similar to the situation in Quebec, the predominance of the English-speaking community in industry and mining in the urban areas gave it an ascendance throughout the country. "Dominance in urban affairs enabled English-speakers to acquire control of the means of production in South Africa and therefore of the country's economic power" (Ford: 257). Between 1875 and 1904 about 400,000 British skilled workers and technicians poured into the growing industrial towns, consolidating the English community's position in the urban areas (Saloman, 1964: 223).

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE RURAL DORPS

Meanwhile, for the vast majority of Afrikaners, whether living in the Cape Colony or the independent Boer Republics, life centred around their farms or the tiny hamlets called dorps which were the focus of Afrikaner village life. Boer society was homogeneous and egalitarian. As in French Canada, agriculture, family and religion were three key interrelated aspects of the Boer rural society. The farms were large, often averaging between 5,000 and 8,000 acres (Horowitz,

1967: 31) and, at least until the end of the nineteenth century, there was plentiful land for all the whites. The homogeneity and equalitarianism of the Boers stemmed from the fact that nearly all were farmers (the word Boer means farmer in Afrikaans) and nearly all were proprietors of similar huge spreads.

Despite the large size of most Boer farms, methods of agriculture were primitive and inefficient and subsistence farming, often supplemented by a little hunting, was the rule rather than the exception (ibid.). The growth of commercial farming was severely limited by the absence of a money economy in most of the rural regions.

As in French Canada, the family was directly related to the Boer land tenure system. Under the Roman-Dutch law of inheritance, the father's property was divided among all his children (De Kiewet, 1942: 191). This set of laws coupled with the high birth rate which prevailed among the Boers would have resulted in an irrational subdivision of a finite area of land to service a multiplying population were it not for the abundant reservoir of land available for colonization or seizure. When the amount of territory available for Boer colonization was fixed by law, at the end of the Boer War, South Africa began to experience a serious problem of rural white overpopulation, a matter to be discussed in a later section.

Again similar to the situation in French Canada, religion played a central role in the integration of Boer rural society. Nearly all Afrikaners were members in one

of the three principal branches of the Dutch Reformed Church. During the nineteenth century, the ministers of the Afrikaans' churches were almost solely responsible for education in the Boer community (Marquard, 1962: 236). Through their educational and cultural functions, the churches provided the only link between a rude frontier society and the culture and ideas of Europe. Furthermore, much of the prestige of the Dutch Reformed Church among the Afrikaners could be attributed to the fact that the clergy, like the French-Canadian priests, were often directly recruited from the ranks of the Boers themselves.

Religion was closely linked with agrarianism and the survival of the Boer people in Afrikaner nationalist thought, a relationship not unfamiliar to students of French-Canadian social thinking (on Afrikaner political and social thought see Van Jaarsveld, 1964; van den Berghe, 1967: 28-9). In religious terms the Afrikaners saw themselves as a chosen people, destined to triumph over British rule and dominate the native tribes of Southern Africa. The relationship between the Dutch Reformed Churches and Afrikaner nationalism was more than merely ideological. During the Boer War, ministers went on commando patrols with the Boer forces. After the war they rebuilt churches and schools and their persistent efforts played a major role in the reawakening of Afrikaner nationalism as a political force in South Africa (Marquard, : 237).

If religion was the first cornerstone of Afrikaner nationalist ideology, agrarianism was the second.

Agriculture was held up as a model vocation for physical and moral well-being, and for assuring the survival of the Afrikaner nation. The Afrikaner, similar to the French-Canadian in his political thinking, was suspicious of, and often hostile to, organized government. This suspicion developed out of the experience with British colonial rule in the Cape as well as the natural individualism of the frontier. The type of government which most suited the Boer's ideological preferences was an egalitarian democracy of white landowners which interfered as little as possible in the private lives of its citizens (Patterson: 93). The Afrikaner ideology differed from that of the French-Canadian in one important respect. Whereas the latter was restricted in its goals to mere survival and autonomy, the former looked forward to the day when the Afrikaner Volk would constitute the dominant political force in Southern Africa (ibid.).

Leadership:

While Boer society during the nineteenth century was essentially an equalitarian community of rural landowners, the Afrikaners, like the French-Canadians, developed a core of professional elites. The traditional elites of the Afrikaner Volk have usually been preachers and lawyers (Patterson, 1957: 152). Hartman (1962: 61) argues that the dominance of professional men among the Afrikaner elites was due to the strong religious orientation of the community and the low cost accessibility of those careers to the comparatively impoverished Boers. A third, and perhaps most telling, reason is that, in South Africa, the church and

the law have been excellent stepping stones to political careers (ibid.). One thing is certain. The Afrikaner achievements in industry and commerce were virtually non-existent, and so businessmen were even more absent from the Boer social hierarchy than they were from the French-Canadian.

The elites attempted to maintain the integration of the Afrikaner community, to bolster pride in Afrikaans culture and to resist Anglicization. In the Cape Colony during the latter half of the nineteenth century, literary men like du Toit and politicians like Hofmeyer worked with the Afrikaner Bond, a nationalist society, to improve the position of the Dutch language in parliament, in the government and the schools (Walker, 1964: 388-90). Thus the elites acted to define national goals. At the same time, they formed the political leadership of Afrikanerdom and served as intermediaries between the world of the Boer countryside and the English-speaking political leaders in the Cape Colony and industrialists in Johannesburg.

For the most part, Afrikaner political power came to be divorced from English economic power. This was not only the case in the Cape Colony where, in the late nineteenth century, the Afrikaners under Hofmeyer became more influential in government, but also in the supposedly autonomous Boer republics, where the burgeoning gold and diamond industries were controlled by English-speaking uitlander industrialists. The relations between Afrikaner politicians and English-speaking businessmen were never harmonious and often tense, and van den Berghe (207) has

termed their interaction "cooperation-in-conflict". Conflict between the two groups came to a head over the issue of uitlander rights in Johannesburg and later erupted over the problem of black and white labor on the Rand gold fields.

The rural society of the dorps and platteland *, like the French-Canadian parishes, provided a total institutional environment in which the Boer way of life could be isolated and protected against the powerful urban and English-speaking world of the Cape and Johannesburg. The vocation of agriculture, the Dutch Reformed Church and family system served the economic, spiritual and welfare needs of a hardy, individualistic pioneer folk. The limited Dutch-language school system and the world of politics in the Cape and the Boer Republics provided opportunities for a small elite corps to better themselves.

However, in one very important area the institutional completeness of the Afrikaner Volk was lacking. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the prevalence of a large supply of cheap black labor encouraged a growing number of Boers to take on more and more blacks as farm laborers and sharecroppers. Gradually, the Boer was becoming less and less of a yeoman farmer and more and more of a landlord. The result was economic lethargy. As Horowitz says (31), the Afrikaners began losing the Dutch capacity for physical work and entrepreneurship. The longstanding and absolute dependence of South African whites on black labor to carry on their day to day economic activities was cemented at an

* Platteland - Afrikaans word for countryside.

early date. The Boers, who prided themselves on their ruggedness, independence and vigor were being transformed into a nation of rural parasites.

RURAL DISORGANIZATION AND THE POOR WHITES

The Boer rural system, like that in Quebec, showed signs of severe disorganization and strain long before politicians and nationalist intellectuals had ceased singing its praises. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Afrikaner rural life was experiencing severe economic and demographic contradictions, in some ways quite similar and in others markedly different to those which characterized rural French Canada at around the same time. As explained by the historian De Kiewet (182-6), Boer agriculture contained a number of inherent weaknesses which only became manifest when the supply of available new lands was frozen.

Boer farming was generally poor, inefficient and barely above subsistence level. The farms were too large to be worked efficiently and the presence of a large pool of cheap black agricultural labor did not encourage experimentation with improved agricultural techniques. The system could work only so long as land was abundant. New lands were usually acquired by forced dispossession of the native peoples from their tribal territories. The British annexation of Zululand in 1843 and Basutoland in 1867 halted Boer expansion and prevented any more dispossession of native lands. The Boer War and the Act of Union in 1910, fixed the boundaries of the present republic. Land values immediately soared due to scarcity, growing demand and rising gold prices (ibid.:186-7).

This scarcity of land, combined with a high birth rate, produced rural overcrowding and cramped, unsanitary living conditions on the Boer farms (ibid.: 191). The situation was worsened by the continued functioning of the Roman-Dutch law of inheritance which, as we have seen, compelled the division of a father's property among all his children. With new farm land scarce or non-existent, such a law led only to an irrational subdivision of already strained resources. It also resulted in surplus population backing up in the rural areas instead of migrating to new homelands, as in French Canada. Rural overcrowding soon produced a large landless white proletariat known as bywoners, squatters or poor whites. The formerly equalitarian rural white society was now sharply bifurcated into a class of landowners and a class of impoverished bywoners (ibid.: 187).

The position of the landless and disinherited bywoners was aggravated by two additional factors. One was the Boer War which caused widespread devastation and uprooted at least 10,000 whites and untold numbers of natives from their lands. Another and more serious long term problem was the increasing use of cheap black agricultural labor. A considerable portion of the native population found itself in a situation similar to that of the white bywoners. With tribal lands considerably reduced by Boer land seizures and depleted by poor farming methods and overgrazing, the native areas could not feed their expanding populations. The native tribesmen were thus forced to seek employment as agricultural laborers on white farms. The white landowners usually

preferred the cheaper and more docile black labor to that of their own compatriots. The landless bywoner, then, had little opportunity to find steady employment on the plattelands (ibid.: 193).

The bywoners filled an impoverished marginal position between landowners and natives. They were neither tenant-farmers nor wage-earners, but usually eked out a meagre existence by sharecropping or squatting on the larger farms. Like poor whites in the United States south, only their white skin and their pride as Boers separated them from the blacks who were their economic equals. "In South Africa... the poor white occupied an intermediate position between the class of landowners and a servile native population. Their poverty separated them from the one; their pride separated them from the other" (ibid.: 193-4).

The poor white population grew rapidly. In 1921, the Unemployment Commission estimated that there were some 120,000 poor whites in South Africa. In 1930, the Carnegie Commission set the figure at 300,000 impoverished whites or about 18% of the total population of European origin (Horowitz, : 93-6). Since nearly all of the poor were Afrikaners, it could be estimated that approximately one third of the Afrikaans-speaking population was living in poverty.

The decline of the rural system upset the precarious equilibrium which had previously existed between the urban and rural areas, English and Afrikaans-speaking whites and whites and blacks. The platteland began disgorging their -

poor and uprooted, both black and white, into the burgeoning urban and industrial centres. These industrial areas were rapidly becoming the stage on which the social transformations of concern to all South Africa were to be enacted.

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Three key factors lay behind the extraordinary rate of industrialization which South Africa underwent in the first half of the twentieth century. The first was the discovery of huge mineral resources. Gold at Kimberley (1867) and diamonds on the Witwatersrand (1884) first drew the attention of the international business community towards South Africa. A second factor was the availability of finance capital, chiefly from Britain but secondarily from other European countries, as well as the English-speaking community within South Africa. The third factor was the presence of a large supply of cheap African labor which kept the mines' working costs to a minimum (Asherson, 1969: 58). The growth of the mining industry was spectacular. By 1911, mining accounted for a hefty 27% of the South African national income (van der Horst, 1965: 98).

The most important economic development in South Africa, however, was the growth of the manufacturing industry in the 1930's and afterwards. In the 1930's, the rate of net investment, 80% financed by domestic savings, averaged 12% of national income (ibid.: 99). The manufacturing sector's share of the national income rose from 7% in 1911 to 25% in 1960. The numbers engaged in manufacturing and construction increased by eight times, from 101,000 in 1915 to over

800,000 in 1962. The numbers engaged in mining have approximately trebled from 210,000 in 1910 to 616,000 in 1962. In the same period, agriculture's share of the national income declined from 17% to 11% (ibid.: 98). In addition to the lucrative staples of gold and diamonds, South Africa had become a significant producer of iron and steel, mining and other heavy equipment, and textiles.

The industrialization of South Africa contributed to and benefited from a massive migration from the rural to the urban areas. The first comprehensive South African census of 1904 revealed that 48% of the white and 85% of the non-white population lived on the land. At that time there were only two cities, Cape Town and Johannesburg, with populations over 100,000 (ibid.: 107). In 1960, 47% of the total population lived in the urban areas, 84% of the white, 68% of the colored and 32% of the African. Now there are at least 10 towns with over 100,000 inhabitants (ibid.: 109). The sprawling industrial towns and dormitory suburbs along the reef surrounding Johannesburg have made that area one of the world's larger urban agglomerations.

The Afrikaners were heavily involved in that urbanization movement. The proportion of Afrikaners living in cities jumped from 29% in 1911 (Ford,: 258) to 48% in 1936, and to 60% in 1946 - for the first time exceeding the number living on the land (Table 4-5). By 1960, almost 1,400,000 Afrikaners or about 77% of the total white Afrikaans-speaking population was living on the land. The centre of Afrikaner life gradually shifted from the platteland and tiny dorps to the

TABLE 4-4Urbanization in South Africa, Whites and Africans, 1904-1960

<u>Year</u>	<u>Whites</u>		<u>Africans</u>	
	<u>Urban</u>		<u>Urban</u>	
	000'	%	000'	%
1904	599	53	361	10
1911	677	52	524	12
1921	908	59	658	14
1936	1,367	67	1,252	19
1946	1,793	75	1,902	24
1951	2,089	79	2,391	28
1960	2,575	83	3,471	32

Source: South African Statistics 1968, Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria, 1968, Table A-22.

TABLE 4-5

Afrikaner Population of South Africa, 1936-1960, Rural/Urban

	<u>1936</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1960</u>
Urban 000'	536	822	1,035	1,369
Rural 000'	585	538	468	421
Total 000'	1,121	1,360	1,503	1,790
 % Urban	 48%	 60%	 67%	 77%

Sources: Union Statistics for Fifty Years 1910-1960, Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria, 1960, Table A-18; Census of South Africa, 1960, Vol. 7, No. 1, Table A3.

larger urban areas.

CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION

As was the case with French Canada, the urbanization of South Africa presented the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population with two serious dilemmas. One was the destruction of the rural social system which had formerly guaranteed the isolation on which the cultural survival of the Afrikaner Volk had been based. The second was a radical transformation of the socio-economic status of the average Afrikaner (Welsh, 1969: 267-8). As De Kiewet had observed,

The new population of indigents which began to grow up on the outskirts of the towns after 1902 gradually altered the early simple division of the country's white population into urban English and rural Dutch. The Dutch-speaking community as a whole began to lose, like the French-Canadian population in Quebec, its predominantly rural character and to achieve new social and economic interests (215).

It is suggested that the Afrikaners' urban trek posed even greater challenges to the solidarity of that group than the similar experiences of the French-Canadians. One reason is that South Africa in 1910 became not a federation, but a centralized union, and thus the Afrikaners had no political sub-unit equivalent to Quebec which they could be assured of dominating. Although the Afrikaners formed 60% of the white population, Britain's victory in the Boer War gave the English-speaking element a decisive, though short-lived, influence over the all-powerful central government. This was reflected in the civil service at that time, which was largely English-speaking and run according to British

notions of efficiency and morality (Patterson, : 58).

Similar tendencies prevailed in education. The new national education system, though nominally bilingual, was in fact an instrument of Anglicization. English was the essential language of instruction with Dutch offered as a second language only. Failure to speak English in class was often punished by forcing the errant student to wear a dunce cap labelled "I spoke Dutch" (ibid.: 223). The situation was made worse by a shortage of Afrikaans-speaking teachers and by the fact that education at the secondary school level was in English only.

The Afrikaner elites feared the cities as the very agents of Anglicization which had destroyed the rural isolation of the Boer way of life. Although Afrikaans-speakers were more numerous than English-speakers in the country as a whole, the Afrikaners, even after extensive urbanization, still remained a linguistic minority in the major cities. Cape Town and Johannesburg long maintained an English-speaking majority by a ratio of approximately 2:1 (ibid.: 68). The nationalist intellectuals worried that the Dutch Reformed Churches would lose their hold on the people in the urban areas and that the urban Afrikaners would succumb to the temptations of the affluent and powerful English-speaking world around them (Welsh, : 267).

The urbanization of the Afrikaner population resulted in Afrikaner society losing its former institutional completeness in the world of work, a process similar to that which occurred in French Canada. The leading industrial and

mining concerns where the newly urbanized Afrikaners sought work were all controlled by the English-speaking element of the population. Like the French-Canadian, the Afrikaner worker was handicapped in the new industrial environment because the language of business was English (De Kiewet, : 217). As Patterson (148) suggested, "The Afrikaners came into an alien environment at the lowest economic level and there the majority of them remain today."

The urbanization process ensured that Afrikaner society, because of its lack of economic resources, would, like that of French Canada, be weak at the top of the socio-economic hierarchy. The peculiar circumstances of urbanization in a racially complex society like South Africa also ensured that Afrikaner society, unlike French Canada, would also be weak at the bottom of the industrial hierarchy. The urbanized French-Canadian could usually be certain that a place was open for him, even though it was at the bottom of the economic ladder; the urbanized Afrikaner could not. This is because, while a great number of poor whites were streaming into the cities, so were an even greater number of poor blacks. Both the poor whites and poor blacks had moved from the rural areas to the towns due to similar social transformation affecting the whole society. These two groups were quite distinct in race and culture but they were equivalent in their lack of skills, education and industrial training (De Kiewet: 166-7).

In the towns the poor whites rapidly found themselves in the same marginal position as in the country. They could

not enter the ranks of skilled labor for they had no education or skills. At the same time, they could not engage in unskilled work for that was reserved for the blacks who would work much more cheaply (ibid.: 196-7). This competition from cheap black labor threatened a repetition in the urban environment of a situation which had already caused grave difficulties in the rural platteland. The Afrikaners appeared to be hemmed in by English capital and African workers in a way which Adam (1971: 43) compares to the squeeze of the European middle classes in the 1930's between monopoly capitalists and militant workers. Afrikaner nationalists were particularly worried that economic equality between poor whites and poor blacks, most obvious in the similar conditions of the two groups in the slums and shanty towns surrounding Johannesburg, would eventually lead to social equality and miscegenation (De Kiewet,: 222). Stringent segregation was felt to be necessary to preserve proper social distance. The problems associated with the poor whites were a leading issue in South African politics for a long time. Certainly, the fear of being caught in a bind between the powerful English industrialists and a growing black proletariat did much to increase the stridency of Afrikaner nationalism.

In addition to the above problems, Afrikaner nationalists were also concerned that the creation of an urban white proletariat would open up sharp urban/rural and social class divisions among Afrikaners similar to those which developed in French Canada, and would menace the unity

of the Afrikaner Volk (Welsh: 268). These fears were voiced by the Carnegie Commission of 1930, which warned of the dangers of equality of status, and even possible miscegenation, between blacks and poor whites in the urban areas (ibid.). This concern led to direct action in 1936, when a group of Dutch Reformed clergymen attempted to disrupt the South African trade union movement which, they felt, was responsible for fomenting class consciousness among Afrikaner workers and encouraging cooperation between blacks and whites (Patterson: 153-4). It was clear that the homogeneity within Afrikanerdom had long since disappeared.

[Urbanization] had led directly to a diversification of interest groups within Afrikaner nationalism, and indirectly to internal conflicts posed by the absorption of a traditional agrarian-rooted nationalism in a wider-scale industrial society (Welsh: 275).

However, it is important to keep in mind that industrialization and urbanization only intensified previous class divisions among the Afrikaners which had earlier become manifest in the old rural society.

Finally, extensive urbanization undermined the old Boer ideology which, like its Quebec counterpart, equated Afrikaner survival with agrarianism and rural isolation. It became more and more difficult to hark back to a "golden age" (ibid.: 266) of the rural past when the urban present was the chief focal point of concern. For what was significant was not so much the demise of the old rural pattern of life as the fact that the major issues of South Africa had been transformed, following the shift of population,

from rural problems to urban problems. Clearly, the industrial centres had become the new frontier (De Kiewet: 166) in which the old system of relationships between English and Afrikaners and blacks and whites, rendered obsolete by massive social changes, had to be replaced by newer patterns more appropriate to altered circumstances.

Conclusions:

The process of urbanization and industrialization in both Quebec and South Africa upset the delicate balance between metropolitan and hinterland elements on which the autonomy of both the French-Canadians and the Afrikaners had been based. The previously rural French-Canadian and Afrikaner communities were incorporated into the new social structures developing in the burgeoning industrial areas. Conversely, aspects of modern industrial life, such as social class differences, became incorporated into the formerly homogeneous French-Canadian and Afrikaner communities, creating severe problems for ethnic unity. This dialectical approach to urban/rural transition is applicable to other aspects of the problem as well. Thus, industrialization was not only imposed on the subordinate French-Canadian and Afrikaner communities by newcomers, in both cases the dominant English community, but also arose in response to the failure of both subordinate communities' rural systems to provide sufficient agricultural land for their members. What Saloman (226) says about the Afrikaners can be applied to the French-Canadians as well.

This encounter [with industrialization] was generally involuntary and unpleasant for many of the Afrikaans-speaking descendants of the original Dutch settlers. It was brought about by forces that made the countryside uninhabitable for more and more of the latter, forces which the newcomers helped speed in motion, but whose workings had begun manifesting themselves before the arrival of industrialism.

There is another dialectical aspect to urbanization and industrialization which is applicable to both French-Canadians and Afrikaners. Dofny and Rioux (309), writing about French Canada, argue that a tension exists between the conception of French Canada as a total society which is split by internal class divisions and other cleavages, and the competing nationalist image of French Canada as a unified whole occupying a special position within the larger Canadian society.

On the one hand, this socio-cultural entity considers itself and is considered to be a total society or a nation, and in this sense the problem of social classes resembles that in any other society in the process of industrialization and urbanization; on the other hand, French-Canadians also regard themselves and are considered to be a recognizable ethnic minority which plays the same role within Canada, regarded in its turn as a total society, as a social class plays within a total society.

Thus, looking at French Canada or Afrikanerdom as total societies, we can ask what problems do urbanization and growing heterogeneity pose for a nationalism originally forged in homogeneous rural societies? Or, we can attempt to assess the presence or absence of institutional completeness in both communities. Yet when we regard French Canada

and Afrikanerdom as elements of larger societies, our attention is directed toward a different set of problems, the most obvious being to ascertain the socio-economic position of each ethnic group within the two larger collectivities.

The striking parallels between the historical experiences of both the French-Canadians and Afrikaners as they underwent the process of urbanization should not be allowed to obscure one major difference. The French-Canadians, as one hinterland element of an essentially modern western society, were fairly easily incorporated into the new industrial institutions at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder. The Afrikaners, on the other hand, were the hinterland element of a white settler regime which had established its dominance over a non-white majority. As such, the Afrikaners had to struggle with the non-whites for control of scarce jobs near the bottom of the industrial hierarchy in much the same way that they had once come into conflict with African tribes over land in the rural areas. The dual threat to Afrikanerdom posed by English economic dominance at the top and African job competition at the bottom of the industrial hierarchy tended to give Afrikaner nationalism a sustained intensity never really equalled in French Canada.

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CHAPTER FIVE

COLLECTIVE MOBILIZATION: THE DRIVE FOR ETHNIC ENCLOSURE

Introduction:

Chapter five deals with the fourth and final stage of the interaction process outlined in the second chapter. In this final stage, both the French-Canadian community in Quebec and the Afrikaner community in South Africa respond to the twin challenges of threatened institutional autonomy and diminished socio-economic status, resulting from massive urbanization and industrialization, by establishing inter-related networks of nationalist political, economic and socio-cultural organizations designed to maximize pluralism in all walks of life. The aims of these nationalist organizations were two-fold: on the one hand, the social and cultural survival of both the French-Canadians and the Afrikaners had to be ensured; on the other hand, the inferior economic status of both groups had to be dealt with.

The nationalist organizations established by the two ethnic communities addressed themselves to both tasks. Social and cultural organizations attempted to achieve ethnic enclosure and resist assimilation. Nationalist economic movements looked to various forms of collective mobilization as the most effective means to improve the inferior economic position of both the French-Canadians and the Afrikaners. Political life in Quebec and South Africa was marked by the assertion of conflict ideologies and the emergence of highly

nationalistic "parties of integration", serving as the political arm of broader-based nationalist movements.

Hence, it will be shown that industrialization in Quebec and South Africa resulted in nationalistic efforts to repolarize ethnic relations, and to establish a network of parallel institutions in the new urban setting designed to regain the institutional autonomy lost by the collapse of the old rural way of life. However, in both Quebec and South Africa, it will be demonstrated that the trend towards collective mobilization and ethnic enclosure was checked by the development of a modus vivendi between French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalist politicians and English-speaking businessmen.

Due to the large amount of material covered in this chapter, it will be divided into two sections. Part A deals with Quebec while Part B is devoted to South Africa. Part A and Part B conclude with an evaluation of the consequences and accomplishments of the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner nationalist movements, respectively, up to 1961.

PART A

FRENCH CANADA: SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
AND ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS

PLURALISM AND THE ETHNIC DIVISION OF LABOR

If the industrialization of Quebec disrupted traditional institutions which had guaranteed French-Canadian autonomy, it did not result in any substantial dissociation of ethnicity from such other points of differentiation as social class, religion and language. As was argued in the second chapter, a depluralization of ethnic cleavages is possible if ethnic divisions are not compounded by related divisions of social class, language, **religion or political party support**. Had the industrialization of Quebec resulted in French-Canadians being admitted to the economic hierarchy at the highest levels, in substantial social mixing of French and English at equivalent status levels, and in widespread consensus between French and English on political goals, then a depluralization of ethnic divisions would have been in order. In fact, this was nowhere near the case.

There is abundant evidence that the industrialization of Quebec resulted in a fairly rigid division of labor between English-speaking management and French-speaking workers (see Roy, 1935; Jamieson, 1935; Rennie, 1953). As Table 5-1 indicates, by 1931 a pattern had emerged whereby French-Canadians were underrepresented at the highest economic levels and overrepresented in the lower economic categories.

TABLE 5-1

Ethnic Origin and Occupational Classes,
Male Labor Force, Canada 1931, Percent.

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total</u>		
	<u>All Origins</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>French</u>
Professional and financial	4.8	6.4	4.0
Clerical	3.8	5.3	3.0
Personal service	3.5	3.2	3.2
Primary and unskilled	17.7	13.1	21.0
Agriculture	34.0	31.0	34.1
All others	<u>36.2</u>	<u>41.0</u>	<u>34.7</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic,
University of Toronto Press, 1967, Table 1, p.87.

In that same year, compared to the national average for all ethnic groups, French-Canadians were underrepresented in the two high status categories -- the professional and financial, and the clerical occupational classes -- by .8%. At the same time, they were overrepresented in the primary and unskilled category by 3.3%. Table 5-1 also shows that the occupational distribution of the British-origin group was exactly the reverse of the French distribution, for the British were overrepresented at the two highest economic levels and underrepresented at the primary and unskilled level.

Table 5-2 shows that the pattern of British overrepresentation and French underrepresentation at the highest economic levels was even more striking for the province of Quebec in 1931. The British were overrepresented in the professional and financial category by 5%, while the French were underrepresented by .9%. As Keyfitz (1960: 140-1) and Blishen (1961: 477-85) have both shown, the occupational disparities between French and English, so evident in the 1931 data, remained stable or even increased in the two following decades. Nowhere were these disparities more evident than in the province of Quebec.

Hughes (1951: Ch. 9), writing of the emerging industrial community of "Cantonville" in the 1930's, states that, with virtually no exceptions, the management, technicians and even foremen of the Cantonville factories were English-speaking. The workers were just as uniformly French. This rigid segregation was carried over into residential patterns. The old French-speaking elite families clung to their fine

TABLE 5-2

Occupational Levels of French and British
Male Labor Force in Quebec 1931, Percent.

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total</u>		
	<u>All Origins</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>French</u>
Professional and financial	6.2	11.2	5.3
Clerical	4.7	11.8	3.3
Personal service	3.8	4.3	3.3
Primary and unskilled	19.6	12.1	19.9
Agriculture	27.4	16.8	32.2
All others	<u>38.3</u>	<u>43.8</u>	<u>36.0</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic,
University of Toronto Press, Table III, p.94.

homes near the city centre while the growing population of English-speaking executives and engineers occupied suburban-style developments near a golf course. The huge French-speaking proletariat resided in a ring of cheaper dwellings which surrounded the city and spilled over into neighboring towns and villages.

These cleavages were further compounded by distinctions of religion, between French Catholics and English Protestants, and of language, aggravated by the persistent refusal of English-speaking employers to learn French. As Fernand Dumont (quoted in Rioux, 1971: 120-1) has remarked, "Even when they left the country to come to the city, our proletarian contingents have been cooped up in districts and in occupations where they have clung to speech and behavior patterns which are more or less bastardized but still distinctive".

The large French-Canadian urban proletariat furnished a potential pool of supporters for any nationalist movement. Emerson (1968: 8) has argued that for any nationalist movement to succeed, it requires an elite of active nationalist leaders who are capable of exercising authority over the rest of the population. It is clear that the traditional professional and clerical elites of rural French Canada were in an excellent position to provide leadership in the industrial areas. According to Guindon¹ (1968: 155-6), the industrialization of Quebec in no way undermined the power of the professional and clerical elites. The new industrial concerns gave the surplus population something to do and a

place to go. The interest of the English-speaking capitalists in local Quebec society was highly specific, concerned with maximum yields and minimum involvement (ibid.: 156). They took little interest in local politics.

Thus, the control of local politics was left entirely in the hands of the professional and clerical elites. Hughes (Ch. 9) has confirmed that in "Cantonville", the English businessmen for the most part avoided political activities which were almost entirely a French affair, dominated by prominent French-Canadian elite members. Clearly the English domination of industry and the French supremacy in provincial politics resulted in a divorce of economic power from political power. Guindon¹ (155-7) has argued that the schism between economic and political elites in Quebec paved the way for a "spontaneous agreement" between English capitalists and French politicians, with each side agreeing to remain outside the other's jurisdiction.

As a result, English capitalists vacated the political field to the French elites while the latter rarely mounted a serious challenge to the former's domination of industry. This spontaneous agreement accounted for the predominantly political theme of French-Canadian nationalism in the early stages (ibid.). At the same time, the divorce of economic from political power functioned to intensify French-Canadian nationalist political struggles. A strong political power base was the only way the French elites could maintain their position in a balance of power with English industrialists. Furthermore, political leverage was the only means available

to the French elites to win economic concessions from English capital.

This "spontaneous agreement" can be conceptualized as a form of truce institution developed to ensure the establishment of cooperative relations between the elites of the two conflicting segments. As was discussed in chapter two, both parties to the conflict **had an interest in** maintaining the institutions of the truce. In this case, the "spontaneous agreement" served both the interests of the English elites to ensure industrial expansion, as well as the desire of the French elites to maintain political stability.

Certain key related factors bolstered the political authority of the French-Canadian elites and guaranteed the institutional separation of French and English-Canadians in the urban areas. The professional elites had already to their credit a long and successful history of engaging in politics as a vocation. Structural factors operated to maintain this trend. The English monopoly of the highest levels of industry ensured that politics would remain the major source of career advancement for ambitious French-Canadians. The decentralized structure of Canadian federalism and the permanent French majority in Quebec meant that, in the government of Quebec, the French-Canadians possessed a relatively autonomous set of political institutions which they always could be assured of controlling.

The French-Canadian political elites had already acquired considerable experience in utilizing the institutions

of British parliamentary democracy in order to further ethnic objectives. F.R. Scott (quoted in Rioux: 38-9) distinguishes between the English-Canadian concern with individual liberties and the French-Canadian interest in group rights.

For [the French-Canadian],...democracy is immediately identified with the struggle for his religious and linguistic rights. He has made use of democracy rather than adhered to it as a doctrine. His Catholic education makes him more aware of his duties and obligations as an individual than of his personal rights, and he is readier to accept a hierarchical order. He therefore insists more strongly on the rights of groups, called in Canada minority rights, than on individual liberties.

Provincial jurisdiction over education guaranteed that French-Canadians could maintain their own autonomous education system. Under the auspices of the Catholic Church and with the blessing of the provincial authorities, large clerical bureaucracies were established in the urban areas to provide educational and social welfare services for the expanding class of industrial workers (Guindon¹: 155-6). Thus clerical control over education shielded the cultural and religious distinctiveness of traditional French-Canadian instruction from any changes which industrialization might have brought about. The dominant role in education of the Catholic Church gave that body an important foothold to establish its authority in the urban areas. We conclude that the ethnic division of labor in industry, the continuity in status and influence of the traditional professional and clerical elites and the autonomous political institutions furnished by the government of Quebec provided the basis for

a renewed polarization of French-English relations after the transition to industrialization.

INITIAL REACTIONS TO INDUSTRIALIZATION

At first, the transition to industrialization and urbanization was widely condemned by members of the clerical and professional elites (Jones, 1972: 44-5). Intellectuals worried about the threat to longstanding values. Theologians were concerned about the effects of proletarianization on the morality and outlook of the French-Canadian people. But there was little consensus as to possible courses of action. Some intellectuals and community leaders reflexively advocated a "back to the land" movement as a counterweight to urbanization (Corbett, 1967: 25-6). The Action Francaise movement, founded by the nationalist leader Henri Bourassa, urged a back to the land program involving colonization of frontier regions in northern and western Quebec. Gerard Fillion, as secretary of the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs, argued that agriculture constituted the core of French-Canadian culture and must be expanded (Jones: 45).

The back to the land movement, while pandering to the rural nostalgia which prevailed among many French-Canadian intellectuals early in the century, was pitifully inadequate to stem the flood of urbanization. As we saw in the last chapter, rural Quebec was continuously disgorging a huge surplus population into the urban areas. The colonization of wilderness territories cursed with poor soil and harsh climate would scarcely alter this basic fact. Other voices, equally unrealistic, called for an immediate French-Canadian

"economic reconquest" (Dumont and Rocher, 1968: 182). In 1913 the Ligue des droits de français embarked on a campaign to improve the position of the French language in industry and commerce (Wade, 1968: 866). The ultra-nationalist Abbe Groulx formulated a program under the slogan "maitres chez nous" (Guindon², 1968: 160). He opposed foreign capitalists and foreign control of natural resources. He favored the development of French-Canadian entrepreneurial skills and a positive role for the state in the economy. Meanwhile, Errol Bouchette, a Quebec public relations man, was calling on his fellow French-Canadians to get more involved in industry and commerce.

These demands for a quick "re-Frenchification" of the world of business were hardly more realistic than the back to the land movement. The business skills, capital and technical expertise required for such an economic reconquest were almost entirely absent within the French-Canadian community. The truth was that the French-Canadian elites lacked any clear idea of how to cope with the challenges posed by industrialization. They were slow in developing an ideological framework appropriate to an industrial society due to their almost complete exclusion from the industrial process (Corbett: 24) and to the magnetic attraction still exerted by the old agrarian mythology.

Quinn (1967: 38-40) points out that even if the elites could have formulated an acceptable interpretation of the problems confronting Quebec society, they would have still faced a terrible dilemma in attempting to implement any

policies. Due to the absence of capital and entrepreneurial skills and the theological and professional orientation, any effort to extend the area of French-Canadian economic control would necessarily involve state intervention. Yet this was rendered difficult by the prevalence of a strong bias among French-Canadians against government intervention in social life, a carry-over from the time when the state was distant, English and colonialist (see the discussion of traditional French-Canadian values in the preceding chapter). Furthermore, any state intervention smacked of socialism and the clergy would have nothing to do with it. Finally, the divorce of economic and political power and the spontaneous agreement operating between English industrialists and French political elites limited the capacity of the latter to intervene in economic matters.

By the mid 1920's, a full-fledged French-Canadian nationalist movement emerged in Quebec in order to meet the challenges posed by industrialization. The objective was to develop new political, social and ecclesiastical institutions to ensure maximum institutional autonomy and ethnic enclosure in the urban areas. But in the area of economic control, the area that more than anything else stood as a stumbling block to the institutional completeness of the French-Canadian urban society, the nationalist response was feeble until the economic issue was exacerbated by the Depression.

ACTION CATHOLIQUE AND ACTION NATIONALE:
TOWARDS INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

In the early 1920's, French-Canadian nationalists, under the leadership of the clergy, began a program of social action involving the creation of ecclesiastical bureaucracies, interest groups and voluntary associations to insulate the urban French-Canadian within a French and Catholic environment. Since the heterogeneous urban parish could not provide the same integrating functions as its rural predecessor, a host of clerically-based institutions of assorted sizes and purposes were developed to take up the slack (Guindon¹: 157). Under its program of Catholic Action, the church hierarchy formed the Confederation of Catholic Trade Unions in 1921 (Quinn: 40-41). The Catholic syndicates were not formed as a result of any great sympathy on the part of the church or the professional elites for the problems of the urban proletariat. Rather, they were designed to insulate Quebec workers from the religious neutrality and left-wing ideology of the American unions already active in Quebec (Rioux: 61).

The Catholic syndicates grew slowly. In 1944 they accounted for only 53,000 Quebec workers (Wade: 978). By 1953, however, they included more than 100,000 of the 265,000 organized workers in Quebec (Falardeau, 1953: 115-6). These unions were conservative and paternalistic, almost company unions, in their approach to labor/management relations. They preferred personal negotiations between representatives of government, management and church to strikes

and confrontations (ibid.). Their main function was to maintain as much as possible of Quebec's large urban proletariat within the orbit of the traditional elites.

Other important aspects of the Catholic Action program were the credit unions and farmers' and fishermen's cooperatives (Wade: 864). The credit unions, or Caisses Populaires, became vital institutions in both rural and urban areas as depositories for savings and sources of loans to individuals and small enterprises. The cooperative movement was designed to strengthen the position of small and marginal enterprises.

Youth was a prominent aspect of Catholic Action. The Young Canada movement (A.C.J.C.), the Jeunesse Ouvriere and the Scouts Catholiques all **attempted to provide social outlets** for young people within an ethnic framework. During the 1920's, however, the French-Canadian nationalist movement remained only partially realized, weak in both the political and economic spheres. Under the stimulus of the Depression, which produced considerable frustration and high unemployment, French-Canadian nationalism intensified and became an economic force of some consequence and a political force to be reckoned with.

In the early 1930's, reflecting the trend toward a more virulent nationalism, L'Action Catholique became known as L'Action Nationale. In 1933 a broad-based program of "Social Restoration" was introduced, endorsed by the Jesuits and designed to improve the socio-economic position of the French-Canadians (ibid.: 903). This program drew on two

principal sources. One was the economic nationalism of Abbe Groulx, which we have already mentioned. The other stemmed from European Catholic social thought and its opposition to the individualism and materialism of modern capitalism. At the heart of modern Catholic social thinking was the doctrine of corporatism (Corbett: 26). Corporatist thinkers argued that social peace could best be maintained by an equilibrium among organized classes and interest groups. Price levels and production goals should not be left to the anarchy of the market but should be determined by representatives of government, labor and industry who, presumably, would be guided by Christian principles of justice. The state and organized groups such as businessmen's associations, cooperatives and unions would play a much more important role in the corporatist scheme of things.

Perhaps the most significant practical economic consequence of the social restoration movement was the growth in size, strength and nationalist fervor of various French-Canadian businessmen's associations. Some, such as the Quebec Retail Merchants Association, composed of small retailers, were openly nationalist and anti-semitic, reflecting the inroads of Jewish-owned stores in the Montreal area (Hughes: 133). They campaigned under the tribal slogan "achetez-chez nous".

Other organizations were not consciously nationalist but were in fact French-Canadian and Catholic in membership. As Hughes (ibid.: 122) has pointed out, even an interest group formed for purely utilitarian purposes may be

strengthened if its members share similar ethnic, moral and religious sentiments. When members of a businessmen's association realize that they are all French-Canadian small businessmen and that their most severe competition comes from English-Canadian big business, then that association can easily be transformed into an instrument of the nationalist cause. Thus the Montreal Chambre de Commerce became the de facto spokesman for the interests of provincially-based and French-Canadian small enterprises. By contrast, the Montreal Board of Trade tended to represent the interests of the larger, English-owned and nationally-based concerns (ibid.: 134). Efforts were made to extend the cooperative movement throughout Quebec and cooperative stores were urged as replacements for the chain stores. The credit unions were also extended and one group, the Caisses Populaires Desjardins, gained a prominent place in the provincial economy.

Despite these efforts, the economic thrust of French-Canadian nationalism was modest indeed. As Hughes (ibid.: 33) so aptly observed, the differences between the French and English-speaking businessmen's associations reflected the continuing disparities between the two groups in the economic life of the province. The corner grocery store and credit union remained insignificant beside Eaton's or the Bank of Montreal. As has been suggested, the tacit agreement between the English business elite and the French political elite ensured that the economic distance separating the two groups would not be narrowed. The trade union movement still

occupied only a marginal position within nationalist circles. Corporatist principles were an article of faith to only a small minority of intellectuals. Furthermore, the ultraconservative provincial administrations of Taschereau and Duplessis were opposed to state intervention in the economy. At the same time, the Depression and the growing threat of war in Europe were encouraging greater military and economic initiatives on the part of the federal government - such as the rapid increase in the defence budget between 1937 and 1938 - thereby greatly diminishing the opportunities for Quebec to develop autonomous economic policies.

POLITICS: NATIONALISM, ETHNIC
INTEGRATION AND PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY

It was in the political realm that French-Canadian nationalism scored its greatest success. As we have already seen, French Canada's elites had for a long time made politics their vocation. Furthermore, the federal system provided the French-Canadians with Quebec, a political entity that they could always be assured of controlling. It remained for a nationalist political party to capture control of the government of Quebec and use that government to achieve nationalist goals. The crowning achievement of any serious nationalist movement must be the creation of a political organization which can serve as a "party of integration", maintaining unity within the nationalist movement while struggling for group objectives. In the 1930's, the Quebec political scene witnessed the establishment of several purely French-Canadian political movements, independent of the major


federal political parties and oriented to the national goals of greater autonomy or even independence for Quebec. Although at least two of these movements competed for supporters, they had key interests in common and their combined effect was to heighten the atmosphere of nationalism.

The first nationalist political organization of consequence to emerge in the late 1920's was not a political party but rather a secret society. Annan (1967: 152) states that nationalist secret societies usually arise in opposition to alien rule imposed by conquest. Such was the case in Ireland, Italy and South Africa. French Canada was no exception. In 1928 the Ordre de Jacques Cartier, a secret society, was founded in Ottawa with the blessing of the Catholic Church (Wade: 998-1000). Its goal was an independent French and Catholic state. Prominent French-Canadians in all walks of life were urged to join. The society attempted to extend its influence in politics, government, St. Jean Baptiste Societies, Catholic syndicates and school commissions. Its reach encompassed most of the major institutional spheres of French-Canadian life.

The Ordre de Jacques Cartier maintained a public newspaper, "La Boussole", and a secret newspaper, "L'Emerillon". Under the leadership of a supreme council in Ottawa, it acted to fight Anglicization and minimize contacts between French and English. An important contribution of the Ordre de Jacques Cartier to nationalism in Quebec **was the link it** maintained with the fledgling Union Nationale Party, and the help it gave to that party in its first drive to power in

FIGURE 1.

Ordre de Jacques Cartier
Spheres of Influence



Source: Milner and Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1973, p. 158.

1936 (ibid.).

As Table 3 indicates, an important strategy of the O.J.C. was to infiltrate as many as possible of the major institutional sectors of French-Canadian life. In addition, all programs for strengthening the position of the French language in Quebec were vigorously supported, as were campaigns to promote bilingualism in the federal civil service (Milner and Milner, 1973: 159). The O.J.C. seems to have played a prominent role in the achetez-chez nous movement among French-Canadian retail merchants in the 1930's (ibid.).

It is difficult to estimate either the numerical strength or the effectiveness of the O.J.C. Estimates of its numerical strength ranged between 11,000 (ibid.: 160) and 18,000 (Wade: 998) during the 1930's and 40's. In 1956, its membership was placed at 30,000 (Milner and Milner: 160). The position of the O.J.C. in the institutional life of the province was enhanced by its policy of recruiting only prominent men in positions of influence (ibid.: 159). In this way, the O.J.C. could establish important links with the professional and clerical elites of Quebec.

A political party which served as an important **vehicle** for the expression of French-Canadian nationalism was the Bloc Populaire. During its brief duration from the late 1930's to mid 1940's, the Bloc Populaire was a leading contender with the Union Nationale for the role of the dominant nationalist party in Quebec. The Bloc was essentially a movement of nationalist and Catholic

intellectuals concerned with the threat to traditional values posed by industrialization, as well as the inferior socio-economic position of French Canada (Wade: 957-8). The leaders of the Bloc were heavily influenced by European Catholic social thinking and the "Social Restoration" program proposed by L'Action Nationale. The Bloc favored a more positive role for the state in the economy. Nationalization of electricity, gas and utilities, mines and other key natural resources was demanded. The Bloc urged that chain stores be replaced by cooperatives and that a provincial bank be created. A corporatist economy was proposed to fight the evils of capitalism and more extensive provincial welfare programs were called for (ibid.: 958).

The Bloc Populaire endorsed the concept of a Laurentian state which was originally developed by the Action Nationale movement. Laurentianism was a vaguely defined mixture of nationalism and Catholicism, separatism and bi-nationalism. For some, such as the previously mentioned Ordre de Jacques Cartier, Laurentianism meant outright separatism, a French and Catholic state. For others, such as the Liberal nationalist Gouin, Laurentianism meant a new and more equitable partnership with English Canada, a notion akin to the modern concept of "two-nations". There was also confusion as to the actual boundaries of the proposed Laurentian State. Uncertainty prevailed as to whether they should coincide with the province of Quebec or include a greater French Canada, taking in parts of Ontario

and New Brunswick. The vagueness of the Laurentian idea was a good illustration of what Dumont and Rocher (186) have termed the "dispersed politicization" of the French-Canadian consciousness.

Several factors favored the Bloc. Its leaders included some of the more promising young nationalists in Quebec, among them Andre Laurendeau and Jean Drapeau. World War II polarized Quebec public opinion in favor of the nationalists. Many leaders of French Canada, isolationist in their political thinking, with bitter memories of the conscription crisis of World War I, strongly opposed Canadian participation in what was viewed as a foreign war (Wade: 956). The Bloc made considerable mileage out of its opposition to conscription and the use of Canadian troops in Europe (ibid.). It exploited the considerable fascination of French-Canadian intellectuals for the corporate fascism of Mussolini's Italy, Salazar's Portugal and, later, Vichy France. **The Bloc's** anti-semitism, based on xenophobia and envy of Jewish economic inroads, was reinforced by hate propaganda from overseas. Jews, in Quebec as elsewhere, made convenient scapegoats for complex problems (Hughes: 215-7).

With the war's end, the influence of the Bloc rapidly evaporated. The Bloc had been mainly an activist group of intellectuals and lacked a mass base. At the height of its power it could account for only a handful of provincial assemblymen and federal M.P.'s. Its strength lay in the force of its ultra-nationalist ideology. The ending of World War II deprived the Bloc of a bonanza of nationalist

grievances. Furthermore, much of its strength was dissipated in feuding between reactionary nationalists and a newer breed of social progressives. Above all, the Bloc was outmaneuvered and surpassed by that rising star of Quebec nationalism, the Union Nationale.

By the late 1940's the Union Nationale, having subdued the federalist Liberals and the more extreme Bloc Populaire, emerged as the sole political instrument of French-Canadian nationalism (Quinn: 110-1). From 1944-60, the Union Nationale enjoyed an uninterrupted reign as the ruling party of Quebec. The extraordinary triumph of the Union Nationale was to a large extent due to the political genius of its leader, Maurice Duplessis. Other factors, however, combined to assure its success.

The Union Nationale was created in the 1930's in a political vacuum due to the demise of the Quebec Conservative Party. That party's image was forever poisoned in the minds of the Quebecois by its identification with the British Empire and its support of conscription during World War I. Its demise, however, left behind a considerable number of conservative-minded voters, Quebec's traditional "bleus", and a substantial political organization. These treasures fell into the lap of the fledgling Union Nationale. The party attracted other adherents. As a purely Quebec party, it lured nationalists and clerically-minded corporatists. As an opposition party, it drew social reformers like Rene Chalou and Paul Gouin of L'Action Liberale Nationale, who hoped to defeat the corrupt, do-nothing Taschereau

administration.

The resulting mixture contained a mass of paradoxes. The confusion gradually lifted as the policies and power of the leader, Duplessis, began to crystallize. Duplessis was both a strong nationalist and a social conservative. As a conservative he deprived Chalou and Gouin and the progressive wing of his party of any real influence as soon as he was firmly in power. He oriented his appeal to the more traditional elements of Quebec society (Lemieux, 1973: 102). The strength of the professional and clerical elites was maintained and the tacit alliance between English big businessmen and French politicians was reaffirmed, along with the divorce of economic and political power (Quinn: 192-9). The Duplessis government could use its official position to command support from the business community in the form of patronage, kickbacks and heavy campaign contributions. In return, the labor movement was held in check and opposition to foreign capitalists was muted.

Duplessis made a strong pitch for the support of the conservative-minded rural districts which were heavily over-represented in the provincial assembly. He wooed the rural voter with his program of low taxes, heavy support for agriculture and the traditional politics of personal favoritism and patronage (Lemieux: 102). The patronage system, which was patterned after the form of close personal relationship long prevalent in Quebec, developed strong political loyalties.

Although Duplessis is now remembered as a conservative,

even a reactionary, during his term of office he was best known as a staunch nationalist. In 1944, he won office on the issue of opposition to conscription and support for provincial autonomy. He linked the provincial liberals under Godbout with Mackenzie King's centralizing policies while, at the same time, undercutting the Bloc Populaire with his own brand of nationalism (Quinn: 110-1). His postwar policy involved a spirited defence of provincial autonomy as well as unrelenting opposition to the economic and social initiatives undertaken by the federal government as a result of the Depression and the war. In 1954, Duplessis took a major step in the direction of fiscal autonomy for Quebec by breaking the old pattern of tax agreements with the federal government and, instead, instituting a provincial income tax, thus subjecting Quebecers to double taxation (Larocque, 1973: 77).

There were three distinct features to Duplessis' nationalism. One was his charismatic appeal (Lemieux: 103). As a leader, Duplessis personified the aspirations of ordinary French-Canadians for collective political strength. The figure of the "chief" symbolized a potential re-assertion of national power and prestige lost through conquest. A second aspect of Duplessis' nationalism was its emphasis on provincial autonomy. The Union Nationale administration took advantage of the decentralized structure of Canadian federalism and transformed the Quebec government into the leading focal point of attention for the French-Canadian population. Duplessis' aim was to put an end to the

"dispersed politicization" (Dumont and Rocher: 186) of French-Canadian social consciousness, and locate the chief focus of French-Canadian nationalism within the boundaries of a pre-existing political entity - the province of Quebec.

Perhaps the greatest contribution made by Duplessis and the Union Nationale to Quebec nationalism, during their unbroken period in power, was their ability to impose a degree of unity within the French-Canadian community.

"The Union Nationale was thus cast in the role of the party working to prevent the fragmentation of Quebec society"

(Lemieux: 103). Of course, French-Canadian unity under Duplessis was an essentially conservative unity, fashioned in line with the desires of the professional and clerical elites. The Union Nationale was able to channel the sentiments and dissatisfactions of workers and farmers in the direction of an elite-led and provincially-oriented nationalism (Pinard, 1971: 225-7).

In its efforts to unite Quebec society under its leadership and to become a true "party of integration", the Union Nationale acted to stifle any incipient forces in French Canada which might threaten its hegemony. Two groups within French Canada which constituted potential sources of opposition to Duplessis' **regime were the new middle class** (Guindon²: 159) and the growing Quebec labor movement, which could point to 265,000 organized workers in Quebec by 1957 (Milner and Milner: 153). Duplessis moved against both groups.

The French-Canadian new middle class was largely a

post-war phenomenon (Guindon²: 158). This new middle class differed from the traditional elites of clerics and the liberal professions, in that it was composed of white collar workers trained in the newer professional disciplines of the natural and social sciences. Furthermore, the new middle class was a bureaucratic middle class, for its members occupied positions in the expanding public and clerical bureaucracies of health, education and welfare, which had developed in order to meet the needs of the urban and industrial society that Quebec had become (ibid.: 158-9).

Moore (1965: 66-107) argues that the industrialization of traditional societies generates a new middle class of white collar workers and managers, distinct from the traditional elites of learned professionals and clergymen. This new middle class functions as a modernizing elite whose key tasks in the modernizing process are to democratize the educational system and to establish a national civil service run according to meritocratic principles. Furthermore, Moore postulates that competing systems of stratification develop between the old and new elite groups.

As has been mentioned above, Guindon argued that this is precisely what has happened in Quebec. His views were supported by Taylor (1965: 150-68), Jones (71-5) and Brazeau (1968: 319-27). The new middle class began to challenge the policies of the Duplessis administration on two fronts. There were demands for the modernization of Quebec society, and an end to the special privileges enjoyed by the Church and to political patronage. These calls for

reform were often printed in Cite Libre, a magazine which became a rallying point for those who opposed Duplessis in the 1950's (Milner and Milner: 142). A second issue was the pattern of "ethnic co-habitation" (Guindon²: 157) between French and English in Quebec, particularly the modus vivendi which had allowed English-speaking businessmen to dominate the economic life of the province. By the late 1950's and early 1960's, there was growing disenchantment among the French-Canadian intelligentsia with the political structure of Confederation itself (ibid.: 157-8).

Duplessis was able to limit the power of the new middle class with characteristic effectiveness. By keeping the level of provincial spending low, he successfully slowed down the growth in numbers and power of the administration and technocrats in the provincial bureaucracy who opposed his conservative and laissez-faire approach to social policy (Guindon²: 159). Thus, in 1960, there were only 22,947 provincial employees in Quebec, compared to 57,012 provincial employees in Ontario (Canada Taxation Statistics, 1962: 85). In the same vein, Duplessis prevented any substantial growth in Quebec's educational system, and frustrated the application of the merit system in the provincial civil service by dispensing jobs and favors on the basis of personal relations and political patronage (ibid.: 162). In these tactics, he was relatively successful. The "contribution of the [new middle class] opposition of the forties and fifties appears relatively insignificant" (Milner and Milner: 143). Only when Duplessis died did this class achieve power

in Quebec.

Duplessis was also able to wage a successful battle against organized labor in the province. The provincial Labor Relations Board certified a sizeable number of company-dominated unions, even though they were illegal (Quinn: 91-2). The Board de-certified certain legitimate unions and held up the applications of others for certification (ibid.). The Catholic unions had long been a source of conservative thinking and support for the Duplessis government. When the relatively progressive and modern-minded Gerard Picard became head of the Catholic unions in 1949, the stage was set for a confrontation with the government (Milner and Milner: 151). The confrontation occurred when a strike broke out against the Johns-Manville Company in Asbestos, Quebec, that same year (ibid.). The Duplessis government resorted to brutal tactics to break the strike, and even succeeded in having Monseigneur Charbonneau removed as Archbishop of Montreal for supporting the strikers (ibid.: 153).

While the eruption of the Asbestos strike, and its violent suppression, were to have important long-term consequences relating to the position of unions in Quebec society (see the volume edited by Trudeau, 1956), it appeared that, in the short run, Duplessis was at least partially successful in stifling the development of working class consciousness and maintaining working class support for his brand of French-Canadian nationalism. Thus, during the forties and fifties, the level of strike activity in the province of Quebec remained, on the average, significantly

below that in Ontario (see Table 5-8, this section).

Duplessis received strong support from the urban working class at the ballot box, despite his conservatism and opposition to organized labor. In 1956, the Union Nationale won over 50% of the vote in the French-speaking urban districts of Montreal and Quebec City, and considerably over 50% of the vote in the working class districts (Quinn: 101-2). Even as late as 1962, working class support for the Union Nationale remained high, with 39% of a working class sample indicating support for that party as against only 27% of a middle class sample (Pinard: 216). Clearly, Duplessis was able to maintain a pattern in which the working class saw its interests as coinciding with the aims of the nationalist elite.

While French-Canadian nationalism was consolidating its strength at the provincial level, in the federal civil service French-Canadian representation was markedly weak. The two phenomena are not unrelated. Duplessis' emphasis on provincial autonomy may have contributed to making Quebecers more provincial minded, and hence lessened some of the attractions of federal employment. At the same time, the overwhelmingly English character of the federal government could only confirm French-Canadians in their provincial mindedness.

Most federal governments continued the practice of designating French-Canadian "lieutenants" to cabinet positions, yet the public service remained overwhelmingly English. In 1965, French-Canadians held only 22% of positions in the federal civil service as a whole (Royal Commission on

TABLE 5-3

Quebec Election Results 1936-60

<u>Year</u>	<u>Members Elected</u>		<u>Popular Vote %</u>	
	<u>Libs.</u>	<u>U.N.</u>	<u>Libs.</u>	<u>U.N.</u>
1936	14	76	42	58
1939	70	15	54	39
1944	37	48	40	36
1948	8	82	38	51
1952	23	68	46	52
1956	20	72	45	52
1960	52	42	51	47

Source: Jacques Leclerc, Le Devoir, Oct. 31, 1973.

Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969: 210), despite the fact that they constitute approximately 30% of the Canadian population. In the higher echelons of the public service, the secondary position of French-Canadians becomes even more apparent. Francophones occupied only 11% of 2,894 positions earning between \$10,000 and \$15,000 per year and only 10% of 738 positions worth more than \$15,000 annually (ibid.: 212).

Furthermore, the day to day operations of the public service have been characterized as, for all practical purposes, unilingually English (Innis, 1973: 95). This was not always the case. The status of the French language and of French-Canadians in the public service has deteriorated in the past half century as the old system of appointments and promotions by patronage was replaced by the merit system under which hiring and promotion was conducted according to English-Canadian norms of competence.

The rationalization of the federal Public Service along lines of efficiency and merit in the years after 1918 destroyed the old system of patronage under which there were always a number of Francophone civil servants appointed by Francophone cabinet ministers. No procedure or doctrine was evolved to replace the old system and, with few Francophones in the guiding councils of the Public Service, its explicit qualifications and implicit assumptions became more and more unfavorable to Francophones (ibid.: 98-9).

The consequences of Duplessis' long tenure in office on the province which he governed were contradictory and complex. As a nationalist, Duplessis was able to bolster the trend toward ethnic enclosure in French Canada by transforming the

Quebec government into a rallying point for French-Canadian autonomy. Provincial rights were emphasized at the expense of federal commitments. At the same time, strenuous efforts were made to maintain homogeneity and suppress dissent within Quebec society. Duplessis' ties with local elite groups and his strong support among workers and farmers succeeded in linking two institutional poles of French-Canadian life (Falardeau, 1966: 6): the world of the average French-Canadian was connected to the wider world of provincial politics through the reciprocal bonds of patronage and personal loyalties, as well as the force of nationalist sentiments.

However, the world of big business, which Falardeau (ibid.: 7) has termed the third institutional pole of French-Canadian life, lay beyond the reach of French-Canadian nationalism. The modus vivendi between the Union Nationale and English big business, and Duplessis' conservative outlook, precluded any significant economic initiatives on the part of the provincial government. Duplessis' role as a social reactionary appeared to conflict with his role as a staunch nationalist. By acting to suppress the only forces in French-Canadian society capable of challenging English dominance in the economic sector - the new middle class and the trade unions - Duplessis helped to ensure the continued economic weakness of French-Canadian society. As a conservative, he had consistently purged the Union Nationale of whatever reformist impulses it had inherited from the Action Liberale Nationale, leaving behind only a hollow

residue of nationalism.

Duplessis' impact on Quebec society - especially his ability to suppress the volatile forces welling up within it - can, perhaps, best be understood by looking at what happened in that province after his death in 1959. Deprived of his leadership, and weakened by the untimely death of his able successor, Sauve, the Union Nationale was defeated by the Liberals in 1960, ushering in the era known as the Quiet Revolution. The Quiet Revolution was an era when the various forces and issues, which Duplessis sought to keep bottled up, sprang to the surface. Both the new middle classes and the trade unions made major claims to political power. The modernization of Quebec society and the position of that province within Confederation became significant political issues. A comprehensive analysis of this crucial and turbulent period in Quebec's history, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

THE CONFLICT OF INTEGRATION AND
INNOVATION: AN EVALUATION OF FRENCH-
CANADIAN NATIONALISM 1931-61.

When a sociologist attempts an evaluation of a particular social movement, it is rarely a simple task. If the particular social movement happens to be French-Canadian nationalism between 1931 and 1961, the task is, if anything, made more complex. One way of clearing up some of the difficulty is to evaluate the particular social movement in terms of its stated goals. Thus, the impact of French-Canadian nationalism between 1931-61 will be analyzed in terms of the major goals of the Action Catholique and Action Nationale

movements of the 1930's and 1940's. The goals of French-Canadian nationalism, as discussed earlier in the chapter, were two-fold. (The aims of French-Canadian nationalism during this period can be gleaned by reading the *Action Francaise* - *Action Nationale* magazines published at that time. See the useful content analysis of these two journals during the period 1917-1954 performed by Fernand Dumont, 1956: 49-64). First, there was the concern to resist assimilation and maintain integration within the French-Canadian community in Quebec. The second task was to improve the collective socio-economic position of the French-Canadians.

It is suggested that this twin challenge of menaced integration and subordinate socio-economic status, which confronted French-Canadian society as a result of urbanization and industrialization, presented that society with the dilemma which Sjoberg (1967) has termed that of "contradictory functional requirements". In other words, the need to maintain integration within French-Canadian society in the face of widespread social change, and the associated need to improve the collective socio-economic status of the French-Canadians, constitute contradictory functional imperatives requiring the formation of mutually antagonistic structural arrangements to meet those needs (*ibid.*: 340).

This argument will now be developed in some detail. According to Sorokin (1969), there are two major levels of integration within social structures and institutional systems. One, called "causal-functional" integration,

involves interdependence among institutions, and between particular institutions and the larger institutional system as a whole (ibid.: 101). The other, called "logico-meaningful" integration, involves a common theme, or identity of meaning, around which various institutions are organized (ibid.: 105). The French-Canadian nationalist movement of 1931-61 achieved a considerable degree of integration at both of these levels.

Integration at the level of interdependence among institutions was achieved through the creation of a host of interrelated ecclesiastical, economic, political, educational and socio-economic institutions under the Action Catholique and Action Nationale programs. The object of these institutions was to create an integrated environment in which the French-Canadian could worship, work, be educated and engage in political activity in an overwhelmingly French and Catholic milieu. Integration at the level of thematic unity was achieved through the conformity of this system of interrelated institutions with the nationalist and Catholic ideology of French Canada which lay at the base of the Action Nationale and Action Catholique programs. This set of values and beliefs was the one adhered to by the traditional professional and clerical elites who had long dominated Quebec society.

Integration and stability within Quebec society, though vital for the survival of French culture during a period of rapid social change, was achieved at a price. According to Eisenstadt (1969: 223), institutional rigidities and

constricted development can occur when one institutional sphere comes to dominate the others. In particular, blocked development and stagnation are likely consequences of the domination of all spheres of society by authoritarian religious or political elites which adhere to conservative belief systems (ibid.).

It is suggested that a pattern similar to the one outlined above occurred in Quebec between 1931-61. The concern with integration and the maintenance of power by traditional elites, while unquestionably successful in enabling the French-Canadians to resist assimilation and maintain some stability in their society during a time of rapid social change, helped prevent the emergence of new institutions and new social strata capable of upgrading the inferior socio-economic situation of French Canada. Thus, education remained under ecclesiastical control, the growth of provincial government activity was curtailed, trade union activity was discouraged, and the truce developed between French political elites and English economic elites did little to encourage the development of French economic elites capable of gaining control of the provincial economy. The failure to develop a strong bourgeoisie is not unrelated to Duplessis' efforts to hold back the growth of the bureaucratic middle classes. It would appear that French Canada failed to generate what Eisenstadt (ibid.: 227) has termed "innovating elites". These are men capable of carrying out sufficient innovations in the economic, educational and political institutions of society to adapt these

institutions to new exigencies. As a result, the central institutions of French-Canadian society remained weak and uncompetitive compared to those of English Canada.

The conservatism at the core of French-Canadian society from 1931-61 is related to a fear of the inherently disrupting effects of extensive innovations and rapid social transformations on well-integrated and tightly-knit social systems. As Eisenstadt (ibid.: 216) and Svalastoga (1968: 534) have both argued, an increase in complexity and heterogeneity within any social system can lead to problems of malintegration and internal conflict. Given such conditions, it is fairly clear that the leaders of French-Canadian society from 1931-61 opted for the safest strategy, **and sacrificed innovation and change in order to maximize** integration and stability.

While this argument cannot be proven conclusively, there is sufficient evidence to lend it plausibility. French-Canadian nationalism in Quebec was certainly successful in resisting assimilation. As Table 5-4 indicates, the proportion of Canadians of French mother tongue remained stable, and even increased slightly, during the period 1931-61. As Table 5-5 shows, the proportion of French-speakers in the province of Quebec demonstrated a clear tendency to increase. While some of the strength of the French position could be attributed to a continuing high birthrate (however, in recent years this birthrate has declined precipitously - see Joy, 1972: 51-5), there are indications that institutional factors are involved. For example, Table 5-6 shows that

TABLE 5-4

Population by Mother Tongue,
Canada 1931-61, Percent.

	<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
English	57	56	59	59
French	27	29	29	28
Other	<u>13</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>
	100	100	100	100

Sources: Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. IV, Table 61;
1971, Vol. I - Part: 3.

TABLE 5-5

Population by Mother Tongue,
Quebec 1931-61, Percent.

	<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
French	80	82	83	81
Non-French	<u>20</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>
	100	100	100	100

Sources: Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. IV, Table 61;
1941, Vol. I, Table X; 1951, Vol. I, Table 54; 1971, Vol. I-
Part: 3.

TABLE 5-6

Canadians of French Mother Tongue Living
in Quebec/Other Parts of Canada 1931-61, Percent.

	<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
Quebec	81	81	82	83
Outside Quebec	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>
	100	100	100	100

Sources: Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. IV, Table 61;
Richard Joy, Languages in Conflict, McClelland and Stewart,
Toronto, 1972, Table 8.

TABLE 5-7

Apparent Assimilation of Persons of
French Origin Outside Quebec 1931-61,
0-4 Age Group.

<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
20%	23%	38%	49%

Source: Richard Joy, Languages in Conflict, McClelland
and Stewart, Toronto, 1972, Table 13.

during the period 1931-61, the proportion of French-Canadians living in Quebec increased at the expense of French-Canadians living outside Quebec. Table 5-7 furnishes at least part of the reason why. While assimilation of French-Canadians living in Quebec was negligible during this period (Joy: 27), it increased dramatically among French-Canadians living outside Quebec. Hence, it can be concluded that the maintenance of the position of the French language in Canada from 1931-61 was due mainly to the consolidation of the status of the French language in the province of Quebec.

Richard Joy, whose excellent book on the demographic basis of French-English relations is a mine of information to researchers interested in the subject, attributes the survival of the French language in Quebec province and the regions immediately surrounding it to the existence of a substantial French-Canadian majority in those areas (*ibid.*: 32). While this demographic explanation of French-Canadian survival contributes significantly to our understanding of the situation, it should be supplemented by a sociological interpretation. A sociologist looks not only at the demographic picture but also at the institutional patterns. French-Canadians were not merely a demographic majority in Quebec but were also, as we have seen, tied into a network of institutions designed to protect their language and culture. The modus vivendi worked out between French politicians and English capitalists was an essential element of this institutional network, for as Brunet (1954: 115) has pointed out, this alliance, and the resulting industrialization of

Quebec, were absolutely vital if the French-Canadian population was to be given an economic incentive to remain in that province.

Other indices of stability and integration in French-Canadian society during this period are the long reign of the Union Nationale party and the comparatively low level of strikes and industrial conflicts. As Table 5-8 indicates, strike levels in Quebec were consistently and significantly below those in Ontario. With the exception of the asbestos strike of 1948, the alliance of French political elites and English economic elites was able to maintain a substantial amount of control in the economic sphere.

However, this stability and integration was bought at a price. The price was the inability of French-Canadian society to rectify its economic and educational inferiority. In 1961, the socio-economic position of the French-Canadians showed no improvement over 1931. As Tables 5-9 and 5-10 indicate, French-Canadians were substantially underrepresented in all high status occupations while, at the same time, they were overrepresented in the working class categories. The British distribution, as in 1931, was skewed towards the higher status occupations in a direction opposite to that of the French. As Table eleven indicates, the occupational disparity between English and French was even more pronounced in the province of Quebec. For the nation as a whole, the average income of male urban French-Canadians was only 80% that of male English-Canadians (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol.III, Table one).

TABLE 5-8

Industrial Disputes in Quebec and Ontario 1946-60

	<u>Number of Work-Days Lost in Strikes 000'</u>			
	<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1960</u>
Quebec	430	97	334	207
Ontario	1,885	197	825	337

Source: Strikes and Lockouts in Canada,
Department of Labor, 1946, 1950, 1956, 1960.

TABLE 5-9

Canada Occupations by Ethnic Origin -
Male Labor Force 1961

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total % All Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>British %</u>	<u>French %</u>
Professional and Technical	7.6	9.3	5.9
Managerial	10.2	12.1	7.6
Clerical	6.9	8.2	6.7
Sales	5.6	6.6	5.2
Service	8.5	9.2	7.7
Transport and Communications	7.5	8.0	8.9
Craftsmen and Production Workers	28.8	25.5	31.4
Laborers	6.2	4.6	7.5
Farmers	12.2	10.8	10.8
Other Primary	3.9	3.1	5.3
Not Stated	2.6	2.6	3.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism, Vol. III Table 13.

TABLE 5-10

Occupational Levels of French and British,
Male Labor Force in Quebec 1961, Percent

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total all Origins</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>French</u>
Professional and Financial	7.8	14.9	6.3
Clerical	7.8	13.0	7.1
Personal Service	4.5	3.1	4.1
Primary and Unskilled	10.4	4.4	11.5
Agricultural	9.1	4.7	10.7
All Others	<u>60.4</u>	<u>59.9</u>	<u>60.3</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic,
University of Toronto Press, 1967,
Table III, p.94.

Perhaps no set of statistics better illustrates the failure of French Canada to develop a core of innovating elites in the economic sphere than do those shown in Table 5-11. In 1961, French-Canadians, while constituting over 80% of the population of the province of Quebec, controlled only 6.5% of the Quebec labor force employed in mining and only 21.8% of the labor force employed in the manufacturing sector of the provincial economy.

The educational performance of French-Canadians was no better than their economic performance. In 1961, the proportion of French-Canadians attending institutions of higher learning was approximately half that of Anglo-Saxon Canadians (Table 5-12). Much of this poor performance in the realm of education could be attributed to the continuing clerical control of education in Quebec and the absence of a provincial department of education. Education remained in the hands of the clergy until the publication of the Parent Commission report on education and the subsequent passage of Bill 60 by the Lesage government in 1964 (Corbett: 212-3). The traditional and Catholic orientation of the French-Canadian educational system failed to adequately prepare its graduates for careers in modern industry. As Porter (1967: 92) states:

In the main, French-Canadian education was never geared to the provision of industrial skills at the managerial or technical level. The educational system was inappropriate for the kind of society that by 1950 Quebec was becoming. It was an outstanding example of institutional failure.

TABLE 5-11

Quebec: Ownership of Establishments 1961

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Employees</u>	<u>Percentage of Labor Force in Establishments Owned By:</u>			
	<u>Number (thousands)</u>	<u>Francophone Canadians</u>	<u>Anglophone Canadians</u>	<u>Foreigners</u>	<u>Total</u>
Agriculture	131.2	91.3	8.7	0.0	100.0
Mining	25.9	6.5	53.1	40.4	100.0
Manufacturing	468.3	21.8	46.9	31.3	100.0
Construction	126.4	50.7	35.2	14.1	100.0
Transportation & Communications	102.4	37.5	49.4	13.1	100.0
Wholesale Trade	69.3	34.1	47.2	18.7	100.0
Retail Trade	178.7	56.7	35.8	7.5	100.0
Finance	62.2	25.8	53.1	21.1	100.0
Services	350.9	71.4	28.6	0.0	100.0
All Industries	1,515.3	47.3	37.7	15.0	100.0

Source: Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol.II
Table 19.

TABLE 5-12Canada Education, Male Non-Agricultural Labor Force 1961

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Total All Ethnic Groups</u>	<u>British %</u>	<u>French %</u>
None	.6	.3	.7
Elementary	41.0	30.5	53.5
Secondary 1-2 Years	22.5	25.2	21.4
Secondary 3-5 Years	25.8	31.4	18.1
University	10.1	12.5	6.3

Source: Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism, Vol. III, Table 6.

To summarize, if French-Canadian nationalism between 1931-61 was constrained by the contradictory requirements of integration and innovation, the concern was far more with the former than the latter. The system of institutions developed in Quebec to meet the twin challenges of diminished institutional autonomy and inferior socio-economic status enabled the French-Canadian community to deal effectively with the first challenge, but hindered it from dealing adequately with the second. The dialectic between stability and transformation swung heavily in favor of the former. "Within Quebec, the cultural survival so strenuously fought for has meant the survival of French-Canadian institutions. But these new institutions seem to have been unable or unwilling to adapt to the new industrial epoch" (ibid.: 98).

There is evidence that the leaders of Quebec who assumed power during the Quiet Revolution were acutely aware of this dilemma. Hence, there was a marked tendency to call into question the continued viability of both the traditional institutions of French-Canadian society and the system of ethnic cohabitation within Confederation which left the English so dominant over the French. As Jones (157) observes:

The revolution of modernization and the nationalist revolution are concurrent phenomena in contemporary French Canada. The Quebec that emerged from the Duplessis era was suffering from a social, economic, political and cultural retardation which threatened to prove fatal to the very survival of French-Canadians and which certainly would never give them the opportunity to develop.

PART B

:

SOUTH AFRICA: TOWARDS WHITE APARTHEID

THE BASIS FOR RENEWED NATIONALISM

The spread of urbanization in South Africa mingled English-speakers and Afrikaans-speakers in the cities but it did not do so on equal terms. Similarly to Quebec, urban life in South Africa saw a fairly rigid division of labor develop between English-speakers, who predominated in the higher status clerical and managerial occupations, and Afrikaans-speakers, who rapidly formed the bulk of the white labor force in industry and mining (Patterson, 1957: 148-9). In 1912, 65% of the white miners in South Africa were foreign born, the majority coming from England. In 1936, there were 46,000 white miners in South Africa (van der Horst, 1949: 113), of whom 75% were native born, the vast majority of these being Afrikaners (De Kiewet, 1942: 166). **As Table 5-13 indicates, Afrikaners in 1939** constituted 82% of the white unskilled laborers in the cities of South Africa, but only 8% of all managerial personnel and a minuscule 3% of all company directors. This differentiation was compounded by the fact that the bulk of indigents and poor whites living in the urban areas were Afrikaners.

The class differences between English and Afrikaners in the urban areas provided a framework in which longstanding cultural and attitudinal differences could be preserved. Afrikaans was rapidly transformed from the language of the

TABLE 5-13

Percentage of Afrikaners Among White
Men in Various Occupational Groups
In the Cities of South Africa.

<u>Occupations</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1948</u>
Unskilled Laborers	60	82	86
Mineworkers	53	69	79
Railway Workers	42	57	74
Factory Workers	--	50	63
Carpenters	18	31	46
Bricklayers	32	53	65
Fitters	10	8	21
Clerks	13	19	32
Civil Servants	32	43	54
Teachers	28	49	61
Business Managers	6	8	15
Merchants	--	4	10
Professionals	11	9	15
Company Directors	--	3	5
Percentage of Afrikaners among whites surveyed	23	30	40

Source: Lawrence Saloman, "The Economic Background to the Revival of Afrikaner Nationalism", in Jeffrey Butler, ed., Boston University Papers in African History, Vol. I, Boston University Press, 1964.

rural hinterlands to the predominant language of South Africa's white working class. English remained the language of industry, management, commerce, technology and engineering. The Dutch Reformed Church became a significant force among the white working class, and worked extensively with the large force of Rand gold miners, newly recruited from the platteland.

Some of the most important differences between urban Afrikaners and non-Afrikaners were attitudinal. The Afrikaners brought to the urban areas the racial thinking of the frontier, the result of years of conflict with the African tribes in the hinterland (De Kiewet: 166; Patterson: 151). The particular Afrikaner experience with proletarianization, involving as it did acute problems of indigency and competition with native labor for urban jobs, only served to accentuate these prejudices (Horowitz, 1967: 43). The growing white urban proletariat, seething with resentment at English economic power and black labor competition, provided an important source of support for Afrikaner nationalism. If militant Afrikaner politicians were to gain adherents in the urban areas, they would have to win the support of the Afrikaans-speaking working class.

Any successful nationalist movement needs more than a mass base. As Emerson has suggested, it needs an aggressive bourgeoisie, ready to assume a leadership role. At the end of the Boer war, the traditional Afrikaner elites of clerics and professional men were in a good position to provide such leadership. They were heirs to a solid history of

nationalist activity, including the nineteenth century cultural nationalist movements in the Cape (Walker, 1964: 389), and experience in governing the two independent Boer Republics. The nationalism of this elite was further galvanized by the bitter defeat they suffered in the Boer War and the feeble economic condition of so many of their compatriots, both on the platteland and in the emerging cities.

As we saw earlier, the Afrikaner elites had, for a long time, practised politics as a vocation. Events following the Boer War and the unification of South Africa ensured that extensive political participation on the part of the Afrikaner elites would be absolutely vital for the improvement of the Afrikaner position in South Africa. The end of the Boer War found the English-speaking element and its sympathisers in command of the government and civil service. Despite this fact, other aspects of the situation favored the Afrikaner position. Afrikaners made up approximately 60% of the voting public in the new union, ensuring that group substantial influence in government. In addition, Dutch, along with English, was made an official language of the national parliament and the civil service, opening up new opportunities for Afrikaners and the Afrikaner point of view. Furthermore, political careers were an important avenue of advancement for educated Afrikaners who, like their French-Canadian counterparts, were excluded from the upper echelons of English-controlled business and industry.

As Patterson (73) puts it:

The Afrikaners have since Union played a far greater part in South African political life than have the English-speaking South Africans. One obvious reason for this is their numerical majority, which has enabled them to dominate politics since 1910. In addition, like the French-Canadians, the Afrikaners saw that through political action they could regain some if not all of the independence they had lost through defeat and annexation. Finally, politics and the public service offered an alternative way of life for young Boers and French-Canadians whose land was gone and whose entry into industry and commerce was initially all but blocked.

Like the French-Canadian political leaders, the Afrikaner elites viewed the parliamentary system as something alien, imposed on them as a consequence of British colonialism (*ibid.*: 79). They would have preferred a more authoritarian style of government modelled after President Kruger's Transvaal, with the government the exclusive interpreter of the general will of the people - that is, the Afrikaner people. However, like the French-Canadian leadership, they determined to put the parliamentary system to work in the service of their nationalistic ends. It soon became evident that the major thrust of Afrikaner nationalism would occur in the political arena.

FIRST NATIONALIST REACTION TO URBANIZATION

The earliest nationalist reaction to the urbanization of the Afrikaner population was one of distress and worry. The feeling of frustration was compounded by the recent defeat of the Afrikaner cause in the Boer War and the alarming growth of the poor white problem. Some nationalists, like their counterparts in French Canada, felt that the only

solution to the problems of Afrikanerdom was to resettle poor whites back on the land. The state was called in to help poor whites return to the land. Some were given direct assistance and loans; others became tenants on government farms (De Kiewet: 223). The Dutch Reformed Church, like the Catholic Church in Quebec, took a leading part in the resettlement of indigents in frontier territory. At Kahamas, a region in the far northwest corner of the Cape Province known for its hot and arid climate, the Dutch Reformed Church established a successful agricultural settlement. But, as elsewhere, the rural rehabilitation of the poor whites was only a palliative and not a cure for the economic and social problems facing the Afrikaner nation.

Other Afrikaner intellectuals, again like their French-Canadian counterparts, confronted the economic plight of the Afrikaners with attacks on "Anglo-Jewish capital" and strident demands for economic mobilization. As early as 1880, a passage in the Cape nationalist newspaper Di Patriot illustrates some of the frenzied rhetoric of the Afrikaner economic campaign.

There must be no English shops, no English signboards, no English advertisements, no English bookkeepers. Then a national bank must be started to displace the English banks. Next, munitions of war must be started in the two republics...So must we become a nation (Patterson: 164).

Like the French-Canadians, Afrikaner nationalists ascribed their economic inferiority to "political circumstances forced on the Afrikaner at a former stage of his

economic development" (P.G. Mayer, quoted in Saloman, 1964: 237). The vocabulary used to discuss economic issues was definitely politico-military. Thus, in 1916, Malan conjured up an Afrikaner economic army which would "conquer the cities" (Patterson: 163). The militant, yet rather abstract, political framework with which the Afrikaner elites interpreted their economic woes could be explained, in part, by their almost total exclusion from any controlling influence over the industrialization process. Economic backwardness, British Imperialism and defeat in the Boer War were linked together in a manner similar to the way French-Canadian nationalists associate their economic inferiority with the Conquest of 1759.

From the Afrikaner point of view there is much that is functional, even rational, about such a rhetorical intermingling of political and economic issues. The Afrikaner elites were devoid of capital resources, business skills and technological knowledge even remotely comparable to that possessed by the English-speaking community. From their standpoint, only political activity could give the Afrikaner community enough leverage to influence economic decision-making processes. Afrikaner political action would serve the dual function of extending Afrikaner influence over the English-dominated economy while at the same time attempting to redress the political balance upset by defeat in the Boer War.

By the 1920's, Afrikaner nationalism had moved from fanciful schemes and rhetorical bombast to a definite

crystallization of its aims. One key goal was to maintain the unity of the group, and resist Anglicization, by attempting to isolate the urban Afrikaner as much as possible from outside influences, and by transplanting the traditional beliefs to the new urban setting. This was to be accomplished by the creation of a host of interrelated nationalist organizations designed to achieve the economic, political and cultural unity of Afrikanerdom (Carter, 1959: 251) and to establish plural divisions separating that group from all non-national influences.

This effort to recreate in the urban environment the social and cultural autonomy which existed naturally in the platteland has received various labels. The writer, S.O. Scholtz termed it the "struggle for isolation" (Welsh, 1969: 266). It has also been known as the "dual-stream" policy (Patterson: 93), in which English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans develop separate institutional structures, as opposed to a "single-stream" policy of cooperation and integration. Perhaps the most accurate term is "white Apartheid" (ibid.: 61).

The desire for institutional enclosure was a goal which Afrikanerdom shared with French-Canadian nationalism. But militant Afrikaner nationalists wanted more than autonomy, they wanted domination. Their goal was complete control of South Africa's political and economic institutions by the whites as represented by the Afrikaners (Horowitz: 8). This was made clear in a circular issued in 1934 by J.C. van Rooy and I.M. Lombaard, the chairman and secretary,

respectively, of the powerful, secret, nationalist society, the Broederbond.

Let us focus our attention on the fact that the primary consideration is: whether Afrikanerdom will reach its ultimate destiny of domination in South Africa. Brothers, our solution of South Africa's ailments is not whether one party or another shall obtain the whip hand, but that the Afrikaner-Broederbond should govern South Africa (Carter: 251).

CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION: THE DUAL-STREAM POLICY

One of the first battles of Afrikaner nationalism was fought over the establishment of a separate school system. As has been mentioned previously, the end of the Boer War found the educational system a highly centralized organization with little voice given to local bodies. Instruction was in English with Dutch merely a second language. Education in South Africa was clearly an instrument of Anglicization (Patterson: 223).

The first Christian National schools were private schools set up in the Transvaal and Orange Free State in opposition to the central school board. "Christian-National" reflected an orientation to education based on extreme Afrikaner nationalism and the doctrines of the Dutch Reformed Church. When the former Boer Republics were given responsible government in 1906-7, the C.N.E. schools were incorporated into the public school system (*ibid.*). The advocates of C.N.E. demanded that greater powers be restored to the local school boards, for Afrikaans-speaking citizens usually constituted a majority at the local level. To block the tendency of many Afrikaans-speaking parents to send their

children to English-language schools, C.N.E. advocates demanded compulsory mother tongue instruction at the elementary school level. Finally, to ensure that Afrikaner children were educated in a wholly Afrikaans environment, nationalists insisted upon single-medium schools. In single-medium schools instruction would be carried on in Afrikaans only, with English taught as a second language, as opposed to dual-medium schools with instruction in both languages (Vatcher, 1965: 106).

The following decades were characterized by increasing agitation on the part of Afrikaner nationalists against those Afrikaner parents who sent their children to English-language schools. Mother tongue instruction gradually became compulsory at the elementary level throughout South Africa. In 1939, the cultural association F.A.K. organized a conference in Bloemfontein centering around the issue of Christian National Education (ibid.: 100). During the 1940's, the problem of language in the schools was an important issue in South African provincial politics. In 1943, the English-oriented United Party won in the Transvaal and established dual-medium schools. When the Nationalist Party won in 1948, they replaced the dual-medium schools with single-medium schools (Marquard, 1962: 195). In 1948, Afrikaner nationalist education proposed an even more intensive program of C.N.E., stressing the purity of language, culture and religion, and upholding the belief in fundamentalist Biblical principles (Patterson: 225).

The English community strongly opposed the C.N.E. program,

and English-speaking educators formed an organization to combat it (Marquard: 196). Despite this opposition, changes in the direction of more ethnic enclosure in education were introduced in the three provinces having Afrikaner majorities. Mother tongue instruction was made compulsory up to secondary school in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and in all primary grades in Cape Province (ibid.).

This desire for an educational system based on narrowly nationalistic goals inevitably subordinated the interests of the child to what was felt to be the higher necessities of the Volk. Ethnic enclosure continued into higher education. The student went to one of four Afrikaans-language universities: Stellenbosch, Potchefstroom, University of Pretoria and the University of the Orange Free State. Educational changes provided a model which was duplicated in many other aspects of South African life. The drive to create a separate Afrikaner-controlled educational system was paralleled by related efforts to segregate Afrikaans-speakers socially, economically and politically from their English-speaking compatriots.

VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: TOWARDS ETHNIC ENCLOSURE

Afrikaner nationalists were determined that the urban Afrikaner would carry on his social and cultural life within an environment that was as nearly as possible wholly Afrikaans. What had evolved naturally on the platteland had to be consciously created in the cosmopolitan urban environment. For this purpose, the cultural society F.A.K. (Federasie von Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings) was established in 1929 under

the initiative of the secret Broederbond, with the aim of coordinating all Afrikaner social, cultural and religious activities (Carter: 256). By 1937, F.A.K. headed a network of over 300 affiliated voluntary associations, ranging from language and cultural societies to women's and student groups. The goal was to ensure maximum social separation by providing nationalist-minded voluntary associations for Afrikaners in all walks of life.

Thus the F.A.K. network included the women's organization A.C.V.V. As well, there were elite social clubs such as the Marie van Riebeeck society, reflecting the division between the English-speaking high society of wealthy businessmen and the Afrikaans-speaking high society of prominent professionals (Patterson: 252-3). Welfare organizations such as the Helpmekaar Vereniging enabled the Afrikaner community to deal with the poor white problem. The Afrikaans Student-bond was formed to group nationally-minded students in their own organization distinct from the English-speaking National Union of South African Students (Legum and Legum, 1964: 100). Like the French-Canadians, the Afrikaners even had their own boy scouts organization - the Voortrekkers. Significantly a separate Afrikaans-language race relations institute, S.A.B.R.A., was set up whose conservative line differentiated it in more than language from the more liberally-minded English-language Institute of Race Relations.

Benevolent societies were an important part of the F.A.K. program (Patterson: 262-70). A.T.K.V. looked after the interests of railwaymen while AKPOL was an association of

Afrikaner policemen. As in Quebec, religion played a vital role in Afrikaans cultural and social affairs. Dutch Reformed clergymen were very much in evidence as animators, leaders and consultants to the various voluntary associations.

The F.A.K. program was undoubtedly successful in blocking Anglicization and in establishing an Afrikaans cultural presence in the major cities. However, there was a certain artificial quality about the plethora of new social and cultural organizations, and the aims they espoused.

In the towns ... Afrikaner or Boer culture is becoming less and less a distinctive way of life, and increasingly an imposed set of abstractions evolved and propagated by a clique of intellectual and political leaders, so as to prevent the mass of urban Afrikaners from mingling with their English-speaking neighbors. In its modern version, 'Afrikaans-culture' is largely a nationalistic slogan designed to emphasize national uniqueness and national destiny, and to conceal from the ordinary Afrikaner his cultural similarities with the outside world. It reflects the belief that each race or ethnic group should have its own culture, just as it should have its language, religion, territory and national organization (ibid.: 256-7).

NATIONALIST ECONOMICS: A STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS

The nationalist economic movement had two central objectives. Like the French-Canadians, Afrikaner nationalists confronted a situation in which the control of industry and commerce was in English-speaking hands. This lack of representation at the top of the industrial hierarchy was the most serious challenge to the institutional completeness of the Afrikaner community. At the same time, the poor white problem and the threat of competition from cheap, black labor

weakened the Afrikaner presence among the ranks of the urban proletariat. It was clear that the battle for ethnic enclosure in the economic field would have to be fought along two fronts: on the one hand, **a form of economic** mobilization to extend Afrikaner control of industry and commerce; on the other hand, action to protect the position of the urbanized Afrikaner worker in the labor market.

Protecting the position of the urbanized poor whites in the industrial labor market was rendered more difficult by the absence of any history of trade union activity within Afrikanerdom. The first unions in South Africa were craft unions composed of English-speaking skilled workers and based on British socialist and syndicalist principles. These established workers had little in common with the uneducated, unskilled Afrikaans-speaking poor whites entering the labor market. As one of South Africa's most successful trade union organizers has remarked,

[The trade union leaders]... because of their British tradition, never really understood the sentiments and problems of a nationally-minded agrarian people. The Afrikaner workers, because of their sentiments and background, require an entirely different approach from workers who have had a long industrial tradition. For labor leaders, who have always belonged to a ruling race and have never known the problems and aspirations of a people who feel oppressed, the national and agrarian questions seem to have no place in their political considerations (E.S. Sacks, quoted in Patterson: 121).

Furthermore, nationalist leaders, like their French-Canadian counterparts, worried that Afrikaner workers who joined trade unions would be lost to the fold of Afrikanerdom

(Legum and Legum: 46). They feared that the Volk would be split by a schism between "national" and "social" consciousness. They disliked trade unions in which English and Afrikaners and, eventually, blacks and whites would mingle. However, the British-dominated trade unions and the Afrikaner nationalists did have one thing in common - they both opposed the policies of the powerful Chamber of Mines which represented the mineowners. The skilled workers wished to protect their privileged high wage position against any encroachment. The nationalists insisted that poor whites be given priority over Africans in employment in industry.

The result was a pact in 1924, between the laborites under Cresswell and the nationalists under Hertzog, designed to promote the interests of white labor and oppose the Chamber of Mines (Horowitz: 6). This pact had its origins two years earlier in a massive and violent strike of white workers which broke out on the Rand in opposition to the plan of the Chamber of Mines to employ more black labor. The Judicial Committee which investigated violence during the strike reported that the strikers formed commando units and that 75% of the whites employed on the Rand at the time of the strike were Afrikaners who supported the nationalist movement. Union leaders and some members of the Dutch Reformed Church had successfully preyed on the racial feelings of the strikers by accusing the Chamber of Mines of trying to create a black South Africa (*ibid.*: 98-9). The confusion of issues in that strike, with the labor movement simultaneously in conflict with the Chamber of Mines and the growing black

underclass, was well illustrated by the strikers' rallying cry: "Workers of the world unite and fight for a White South Africa".

The pattern set in that strike marked the South African labor movement for many years afterward. De Kiewet (167) has written:

South African labor fought its battle on two fronts. It fought the characteristic vanguard action of labor in the Western world against capital. It differed from other labor movements by fighting a rearguard action against a group of a different race and a lower order of skill, without organization or political support, but which belonged nonetheless to the laboring population. In that population the trade unions were an elite, a self-conscious and self-regarding group.

Although the government and the Chamber of Mines succeeded in breaking the 1922 Rand strike, in the following years sympathetic governments provided the kind of protection for the poor whites that the strikers had demanded. The 1926 Mines and Works Amendment Act restored a color-bar on the mines, originally established in 1911, which the Chamber of Mines had been seeking to remove (Horowitz: 102-3). Under the color-bar law certain jobs were restricted to whites only and others, usually the most menial and the lowest paid, were designated for non-white labor. The color-bar principle was extended throughout the mining and manufacturing sectors of South Africa's economy by the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 (van der Horst, 1965: 118). The Apprenticeship Act prevented Africans from becoming artisans in most skilled trades in the mining, manufacturing

and construction industries. The Industrial Conciliation Act reduced the number of Africans eligible for collective bargaining and trade union membership (ibid.: 19). Related to the color-bar was what came to be known as the "civilized-labor" policy. Under this policy, certain broad categories of employment, usually jobs involving manual labor, were reserved for whites at what were considered "civilized" wages - that is, rates of pay three to five times higher than non-whites would get for performing equivalent work (De Kiewet: 214).

The color-bar and "civilized-labor" programs were successful in alleviating the poor white problem at the expense, of course, of the poor blacks. The Afrikaner worker had solidified his position in the lower rungs of the industrial hierarchy and was protected from black competition. The state-owned railways, in particular, became enclaves for poor white employment and the growth of secondary manufacturing was encouraged to absorb additional migrants from the platteland. Despite these undoubted successes, Afrikaner nationalists continued to be highly suspicious of the trade union movement. Like the French-Canadian nationalists, they wished the Afrikaner proletariat to participate in organizations dedicated to the national and religious aspirations of the Volk. Afrikaner, like French-Canadian, trade union activity arose not in response to the proletarianization of the masses, but rather in response to the organization of that proletariat by non-national trade unions.

The withdrawal of the Labor Party from the pact government in 1931, as a result of Prime Minister Hertzog's refusal to go off the gold standard at the time Britain did (Vatcher: 54), combined with the fact that the white unions had become predominantly Afrikaner in membership, though their leadership remained English-speaking, gave the nationalists the opportunity they needed. In 1936, F.A.K. and the Dutch Reformed Churches combined in an attempt to infiltrate and disrupt the unions from within (Patterson: 154). In 1948, the Broederbond, Albert Hertzog, son of the former prime minister, led a nationalist "reform" movement which took over control of the huge and powerful Mineworkers Union (ibid.: 158). The anti-communist legislation of 1950 further aided the nationalist assault on the trade union movement. Under the legislation, trade union officials accused of being communists could be "banned". At least 100 union officials unsympathetic to the nationalists were "banned", among them the famous organizer Emile Sachs, whose racially liberal Garment Workers Union **was an anathema to the nationalists.**

The South African Trades and Labor Council, which included white, mixed and non-white unions, could not withstand the assault of the nationalists. In 1948 the T.L.C. had 127,000 members. In 1954 it was down to 80,000 members (ibid.: 161-3). Meanwhile, the nationalists formed the all-white S.A.F.T.V. which claimed 100,000 workers. S.A.F.T.V. was strengthened by the Apartheid policies of the government, the hostility of Afrikaner workers to non-national trade

unions and the takeover of the powerful Mineworkers Union. The development of Afrikaner trade unions marked the culmination of the successful campaign mounted by the nationalists to retain the loyalty of the Afrikaner workers and prevent class fissures from splitting the unity of the Volk.

At the same time, business-minded nationalists were striving to improve the Afrikaner position in the higher reaches of industry and finance. The earliest efforts at Afrikaner economic mobilization, similar to those in French Canada, involved attempts to stimulate the development of savings and loan associations, credit unions and consumer cooperatives in the rural dorps and in the emerging urban centres (ibid.: 165). The Volkskas, strikingly similar to Quebec's Caisses Populaires, grew from a small cooperative loan bank to a large commercial bank with deposits of almost 45,000,000 pounds in 1954. Much of its success was due to its ability to draw on nationalist sentiments as an Afrikaans bank, in competition with English banking giants like Barclays. In 1954, there were 190 Afrikaans consumer cooperatives with a membership of over 100,000 (ibid.: 166).

Afrikaner businessmen organized themselves into a separate association, the Handelsinstituut, as distinct from the English-dominated Chamber of Commerce (Legum and Legum: 110). In the 1930's, patriotic sentiments were aroused through extensive "buy Afrikaans" campaigns, designed to tap the nationalist consumer. But the most significant thrust of the nationalist economic movement occurred with the

founding of the R.D.B. (Reddingsdaadbond) at an economic congress called by F.A.K. in 1939. The R.D.B. was especially designed to direct the Afrikaner economic forays into the urban areas. R.D.B. programs attempted to mobilize Afrikaner capital, break down ingrained prejudices against careers in industry and commerce, and provide aid and counselling to small business (Carter: 258-9).

R.D.B. campaigns were effective in stimulating institutional finance, such as building societies, insurance, banks and savings associations (Horowitz: 270-1). The Afrikaner stake in the economy rose from 3,170 firms with a total turnover of 61 million pounds in 1939 to 13,047 firms with a turnover of 322 million pounds in 1949 (Legum and Legum: 42). Yet, as Hartman (1962: 64-5) has stated, the economic achievements of the Afrikaners in the private sector of the economy were still "far from impressive". Afrikaners controlled only 10% of secondary industry and 10% of the capital in private finance. Altogether, the Afrikaner share of income in the private sector of the economy amounts to no more than 26% (Adam, 1971: 170). Meanwhile, the English community still controls 90% of the mining capital, 90% of the industrial capital, 88% of the finance capital and 75% of the commercial capital in South Africa (Legum and Legum: 108; Adam: 170).

If we examine the public sector of the economy, the picture changes considerably. Unlike the French-Canadians, the Afrikaner nationalists have shown little reluctance to use the state as a key instrument of economic mobilization.

Government controls over business in South Africa are extensive. There are strong legal controls over business operations. These had their origins in the early color-bar and "civilized-labor" policies and were extended in the more rigorous Apartheid programs of today. A second area of control is through direct ownership, which gives the Afrikaner nationalists command of leading industries through their political strength. The proportion of gross domestic fixed investment provided by the South African government jumped from 34% in 1947 to 41% in 1957 (South African Statistics, 1968: 17).

One of the leading publicly-owned industrial concerns is the Iron and Steel Corporation (IsCOR), which was taken over by the South African government when its issue of common stock failed to attract public interest in 1928 (Niddrie, 1968: 122). Government participation in the economy took a major step forward in 1940, with the establishment of the Industrial Development Corporation (I.D.C.) through an act of the South African Parliament (ibid.: 123). The corporation was empowered to finance and promote the development of new industrial enterprises. Some of the major accomplishments of the I.D.C. include the establishment of an oil from coal corporation (SASOL) and a phosphate fertilizer company (FOSKOR) (ibid.: 126). The I.D.C. has acted as a key instrument of Afrikaner economic initiative (Horowitz: 8-9). In addition, all transportation and public utilities are government-owned. So large does the public sector loom in South Africa's economy, that if

the state-owned enterprises are included in any comparison of Afrikaner and English economic power, the Afrikaner share of South Africa's economy rises from 26% in the private sector to a more respectable 40% overall (Adam: 171).

Finally, the Afrikaner nationalists can exert influence over the economy through their ties with Afrikaner businessmen (Hartman: 3-4). Afrikaner businessmen and public officials hold common ties of sentiment and religion and commitments to the Apartheid policy and Afrikaans culture unshared by English-speaking businessmen. Both the Afrikaner businessman and his counterpart in the civil service have cooperated hand in glove to further the advancement of Afrikaners in the private and public sectors of the economy.

It is interesting to speculate as to why the Afrikaners, whose historical anti-state bias was at least as great as that of French Canada, carried out a far more extensive program of state intervention in the economy than what was accomplished in Quebec. One reason is that the Quebec government, as a provincial government, was constrained in its economic initiatives in ways that did not apply to the South African central government.

A second and more compelling reason is that, while the industrialization of Quebec solved the problem of rural overpopulation without necessitating any state intervention, the industrialization of South Africa did not. The poor whites were not automatically absorbed into industry but instead needed state intervention to protect them from low wage black competition. Thus, extreme government intervention

in the economy originally received patriotic sanction as a means of assuring employment for the Afrikaner proletariat (Adam: 173). The policy of annexing economic enterprises to the state was initiated in the 1920's by the Hertzog - Cresswell pact government, in order to ensure the advancement of the Afrikaner position in industry, and to guarantee that industrial development was based on the principles of Apartheid and was carried out according to the best interests of the Volk.

The Afrikaner economic movement went a long way toward achieving institutional completeness in the field of economics. The poor white problem was eliminated and the Afrikaner position was consolidated at the bottom of the economic hierarchy. At the top, the policies of state intervention and nationalization pursued by successive nationalist governments greatly improved the Afrikaner position in key sectors of the economy. However, Afrikaners are still heavily underrepresented in the leading mining and manufacturing industries, and their position in finance is weak. The English community continues to hold the predominant economic power.

One reason why the Afrikaner nationalists are wary of moving against the largest and most powerful English-speaking industrialists is that they furnish the international connections and financial expertise necessary to maintain the prosperity of South Africa (Legum and Legum: 121-2). Despite repeated threats, the huge mining interests of the Oppenheimer family have never been nationalized, even though Oppenheimer

is the type of successful Anglo-Jewish capitalist long hated by the nationalists. His conspicuous activities in the international money markets to prevent capital outflows in times of domestic crisis have won him some private, though grudging, respect in nationalist circles.

A good example of this occurred in the period 1960-61, when confidence in South Africa was low as a result of its withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the racial tensions associated with the Sharpeville shootings (ibid.). Morale was low and there was a significant capital outflow - no less than 81 million pounds in 1960 (ibid.). New capital began to flow into South Africa again only after Oppenheimer personally arranged a 10 million pound loan in the United States for one of his companies (ibid.). Clearly, both the Afrikaner government and the English-speaking business community have a vested interest in maintaining South Africa's reputation as an attractive market for investors.

Finally, in recent years a new and significant underrepresentation of Afrikaners and all white South Africans in the lower levels of the industrial hierarchy has emerged. As Afrikaners, the descendants of poor whites, advance up the urban status ladder, their positions are taken by urban Africans who take the lowest jobs (Ford, 1971: 263). But as shortages of qualified whites develop in skilled occupations, more and more Africans are being promoted to fill the gaps. During the past decade, this situation has caused renewed fears of an entirely Africanized proletariat to spring up among working-class Afrikaners.

POLITICS: THE TRIUMPH OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM

If the economic goals of the nationalist movement were only partially fulfilled, in the realm of politics it was entirely successful. By the late 1940's nationalist Afrikanerdom was able to evolve a single party, the Nationalist Party, which served as a party of integration, closely attached to other nationalist organizations and as the exclusive interpreter of Afrikaner political aspirations. After the Nationalist Party achieved power in 1948, the South African government was transformed into an arm of Afrikaner nationalism. The victory of the Nationalists under Malan in 1948 erased the stigma of defeat in the Boer War and was the most significant breakthrough of Afrikaner nationalism in its drive for ethnic enclosure and political domination. This victory did not occur in a vacuum. Over thirty years of nationalist political activity preceded it.

Afrikaner nationalism first emerged as a significant force in South African politics in 1914, when General Hertzog founded the Nationalist Party in opposition to the ruling South Africa Party led by Botha and Smuts (Horowitz: 89). Hertzog proposed a "dual-stream" strategy of Afrikaner isolation in opposition to the more inclusive "South African" policy of General Smuts (ibid.:92). Like the bonne ententes of French Canada, Smuts and his followers hoped to bring about closer relations between English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans in order to achieve a common South African identity.

To Hertzog and his followers, "single-stream" meant

assimilation to English culture and subservience to the British Empire (Vatcher: 43). Two events combined to strengthen the conviction of the Afrikaner nationalists that Smuts and Botha were far too pro-British for their liking. One was the governments' decision to participate in World War I on the side of Britain. The other was the growing alliance between Smuts and Botha and the powerful English mining interests (ibid.: 48). The alliance between Smuts' government and the English mineowners was confirmed during the violent Rand strike of 1922. Smuts sent in troops to crush the strike and support the position of the mineowners (ibid.: 50-1).

Hertzog's Nationalists took strong exception to Smuts' actions and threw their support behind the mineworkers' cause. The Nationalists were greatly concerned with the growing poor white problem in the new industrial centres. As a result of the 1922 Rand strike, they joined forces with Cresswell's Labor Party in a united hostility to both big business and the burgeoning black labor force which threatened the position of the white working class (Walker: 607-8). In 1924, the so-called Pact Government of Hertzog and Cresswell came to power and immediately devoted much attention to color-bar legislation and the poor white problem. As South Africa's white labor force became more and more Afrikanerized, Hertzog's success in wooing these workers over to the Nationalist Party began to diminish the strength of the Labor Party, until it was relegated to a very minor role in the coalition (Horowitz: 103).

The Nationalist Party and the South African Party became increasingly split along both ethnic and class lines (Vatcher: 51). The Nationalist Party came to represent the rural and urban Afrikaner proletariat and the Afrikaner professional intelligentsia (Patterson: 99). The South Africa Party, on the other hand, was the party of big business, English-speaking South Africans, and that minority of the Afrikaners not sympathetic to the nationalist cause (ibid.).

During the 1920's and 1930's, the Hertzog government undertook a legislative program designed to maximize South African independence from Britain. In 1927, South Africa established its own Ministry of External Affairs (Vatcher: 52). During that same year, the Union Flag Bill was passed giving South Africa a national flag to be flown alongside the Union Jack (ibid.: 54). When the 1931 Statute of Westminster gave the Dominion parliaments complete legislative sovereignty, the Hertzog government went one step further and passed the Status of Union Act in 1934 (ibid.: 52). This act proclaimed the Union Parliament to be a sovereign legislative body - in effect, re-affirming the Statute of Westminster but, at the same time, declaring South Africa to be an independent nation.

The breakup of the Hertzog - Cresswell pact in 1931, and the onslaught of the Depression, caused the Nationalists to seek an alliance with Smuts' South Africa Party in order to deal with pressing economic problems. In 1934, the Nationalist and South Africa Parties merged to form the new


United Party, and Hertzog and Smuts cooperated to form a fusion government dedicated to equality for the two official languages and protection for the white labor force (ibid.: 54). With the absorption of the Nationalist Party into the broader United Party, the keen edge of Afrikaner nationalism was temporarily blunted. However, many Afrikaner militants were never reconciled to the Hertzog - Smuts alliance. Alternative Afrikaner nationalist political organizations took up the slack created by the demise of the original Nationalist Party, and propelled Afrikaner nationalism forward in its drive toward domination of South African society.

One of the most important driving forces behind the political successes of the Afrikaner Volk has been the ultra-nationalist secret society, the Broederbond. The Broederbond was founded in 1918 as an Afrikaans cultural society by Afrikaners bitter over their defeat in the Boer War. By 1934 it had become a nationalist splinter group within the ruling elite (Annan: 171). It aimed to minimize contacts between Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans and to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth.

The Broederbond played a major role in establishing various nationalist organizations in the cultural, economic and educational fields (Carter: 255). The various associations affiliated with F.A.K. and the R.D.B. were organized under Broederbond initiative. Common membership in the Bond and the various Afrikaner political and cultural organizations created a web of interlocking relationships

Figure 2

The Position of the Broederbond
in the Power Structure of Afrikanerdom



Source: Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa:
Crisis for the West, Praeger, New York, 1964, p.16.

which welded the nationalist movement together, with the Bond as its hub. In 1938 the Bond was a leading force behind the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek, which served to inflame the forces of Afrikaner nationalism (Annan: 171).

The war years presented the Bond with a major dilemma. The Bond could either support the para-military, pro-Nazi Ossewabrandwag, or else Malan's more conventional Nationalist Party, which favored winning power by democratic elections. At first the Bond supported the Ossewabrandwag, which claimed 400,000 followers and which planned an uprising to coincide with a Nazi victory in Europe. But as the tide in Europe turned against the Nazis, the Bond wisely shifted its support to Malan's Nationalists (ibid.).

The victory of the Nationalists in 1948, the institution of the Apartheid policy and the withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961 resulted in the fulfillment of the long term goals of the Broederbond. With its objectives achieved, many are questioning the need for the continued existence of the Broederbond, and even Afrikaner nationalists admit that its influence may be waning (Adam: 176-7). If that is the case, the Broederbond, like the French-Canadian Ordre de Jacques Cartier, may be classified as one of those nationalist secret societies that comes into existence when a particular group feels it is under political and economic domination. As these grievances are rectified, the need for the secret society diminishes.

Today, the major function of the Bond appears to be the

provision of political jobs through its close connections with the ruling Nationalist Party and the civil service (ibid.: 172). As of 1964, the Bond's membership was placed at 6,768, divided into 473 local units, each having between five and fifty members (ibid.). The Bond is generally recruited among prominent Afrikaners in all walks of life, with teachers, lawyers and clergymen predominating.

The major competitor of the Nationalist Party for the right to represent the Volk was the para-military mass organization known as the Ossewabrandwag or O.B. The O.B. grew out of a series of celebrations held in 1938 to mark the 100th anniversary of the Great Trek. The O.B. was violently anti-British and much of its doctrine and political style was borrowed from German-style national socialism. Thus the O.B. leaders **wished for a German victory in Europe**, a one-party National Socialist Afrikaner Republic for South Africa and divided their own organization into Nazi-style commando units (Patterson: 114-5). The appeal of the O.B. was so immense that by 1941 it had approximately 400,000 members.

The advent of World War II helped the O.B. in a manner similar to the way the Bloc Populaire in Quebec was helped. The Afrikaners, like the French-Canadians, were traditionally isolationist and anti-British. Many in the Afrikaner community strongly opposed South African participation in the war. Furthermore, the Nazis' racist doctrines had great appeal among Afrikaner extremists who felt themselves to be a herrenvolk, destined to rule South Africa by divine right.

Nazi anti-semitism struck a responsive chord among many Afrikaners who resented Jewish economic success in South Africa. Again, certain Afrikaner intellectuals, such as Oswald Pirow and Balthazar Vorster, the present prime minister, felt an instinctive kinship to Germany's "Nordic" brand of fascism which is comparable to the attraction certain French-Canadian intellectuals felt for the somewhat milder "Latin" fascism of Italy or Portugal. The hope was that a Nazi victory in Europe would provide the spark for a successful nationalist uprising in South Africa.

If the O.B. was the fastest rising star of Afrikanerdom, it quickly turned out to be a morning star. German setbacks, in Europe and North Africa, caused public sentiment for the O.B. and its Nazi-style organization to wane appreciably (ibid.). What really hurt the O.B., however, was the amazing resurgence of the Nationalist Party at the end of World War II.

When Hertzog and Smuts joined forces in 1934, a group of militant Afrikaner nationalists under the leadership of D.F. Malan strongly opposed this move, and broke away from the United Party to form a new "purified" Nationalist Party. Malan became the leader. Whereas Hertzog believed that nationalist goals could be achieved through English-Afrikaner consensus, Malan insisted that they must be imposed unilaterally (ibid.: 104). He would accept nothing less than full Afrikaner supremacy, republican status for South Africa, and complete independence from Britain.

During the war years, Malan's Nationalists were

strengthened by Afrikaner opposition to participation in World War II. Malan outmanoeuvred the rival O.B. and tainted it with being pro-Nazi. He pointedly asserted that the Nationalists were the only party wholly Afrikaner in orientation. The German defeat left the Nationalists untarnished.

A second issue which strengthened Nationalist support during World War II and in the immediate post-war period was the growing resistance of South African whites to the presence of increasing numbers of blacks in the urban areas (Vatcher: 136; data on the urbanization of Africans are presented in Chapter IV, Table 4-4). The increased participation of Africans in the industrial labor force, necessitated by war-time demands for labor, was seen as a threat to "white civilization" (Horowitz: 202).

In 1948, Malan was victorious on a platform which elevated segregation to an ideal called "Apartheid". The Nationalists, along with the splinter Afrikaner Party (which soon amalgamated with the Nationalists), won every seat in the Afrikaans-speaking districts and formed a working majority in Parliament (*ibid.*: 269). This victory was accomplished with a minority of only 36% of the popular vote (Vatcher: 144). The United Party, on the other hand, won virtually every seat in the English-speaking districts. In line with this pattern of dual ethnic enclosure in voting, only about 20% of the Afrikaners voted for the United Party.

As Table 5-14 indicates, the Nationalists followed up their initial victory with increased majorities in 1953 and

TABLE 5-14

South Africa Elections - 1938-58

Number of Seats

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1958</u>
Nationalist Party	27	43	70	94	103
United Party	111	89	65	57	53
Labor Party	3	9	6	5	4

Source: State of South Africa Yearbook,
1973, p.36.

1958. Their percentage of the popular vote rose to 55% (ibid.). As Table 5-15 shows, the Nationalist success was linked to the growing tendency of South Africans to vote along ethnic lines. Nationalist strength increased substantially in those three provinces - the Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State - which have Afrikaner majorities. In recent years the Nationalists have monopolized representation in the Orange Free State, the province with the largest Afrikaner majority. Only in predominantly English-speaking Natal has Nationalist support remained negligible.

The Nationalists have entrenched themselves to the point where they maintain a virtual stranglehold on the South African government. In addition to the role played by ethnic bloc voting, several other factors aided the Nationalist cause. The Nationalist standings in Parliament were always better than their showings in the popular vote because the South African constituencies were weighted in favor of the rural areas (ibid.: 137). The solidly Afrikaner platteland, heavily overrepresented in Parliament, aided the Nationalist drive to power in much the same way that the disproportionate weight given to rural constituencies in Quebec aided the Union Nationale.

The Nationalists strengthened their position through manipulation and electoral chicanery. Their most outstanding accomplishment in this direction was the removal of all Cape colored voters from the common voting list. This process was initiated with the Separate Representation of Voters Bill of 1950, which removed colored voters from the common roll

TABLE 5-15

South Africa Elections - 1938-58
Number of Seats By Provinces

	<u>Labor Party</u>	<u>Nationalist Party</u>	<u>United Party</u>
		<u>Cape Province</u>	
1938	-	20	38
1943	-	19	35
1948	-	25	27
1953	-	30	24
1958	-	33	19
		<u>Natal</u>	
1938	1	-	7
1943	2	-	6
1948	2	1	11
1953	2	2	11
1958	-	2	14
		<u>Transvaal</u>	
1938	2	1	57
1943	5	10	49
1948	4	32	26
1953	3	43	22
1958	-	48	20
		<u>O.F.S.</u>	
1938	-	6	9
1943	-	13	1
1948	-	11	1
1953	-	13	-
1958	-	14	-

Source: South Africa Official Yearbook,
1960, pp. 109-10.

(ibid.: 142). This act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it contravened the Act of Union of 1910. Malan then set up a High Court of Parliament with precedence over the Supreme Court in constitutional matters. However, the South African Court of Appeals rejected the High Court of Parliament Act, and a temporary stalemate ensued.

This stalemate was broken in 1955 when the government succeeded in packing the Supreme Court with six new judges, and increased the membership of the Senate from forty-eight to eighty-nine, thereby guaranteeing the government a two-thirds majority in the Senate (ibid.). The following year, Parliament in joint session passed the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Bill, which effectively removed the colored citizens from the common voters roll, and placed them on a separate list eligible to vote for white candidates only (ibid.). In 1960, all African representation in the national Parliament was abolished.

The Nationalist cause was solidified by a lot more than mere chicanery. The Nationalist Party served as the exclusive party of integration for Afrikanerdom. As such it provided the main linkage between the Afrikaner elites and the political machinery of South Africa. Not only the elected representatives and the cabinet but also the civil service became heavily Afrikanerized. At the time of Union, the civil service was 85% English-speaking (Patterson: 86-7) but became increasingly Afrikanerized through the Nationalist policy of deliberately hiring and promoting political sympathizers.

Thus by 1957, 81% of the professional branch and 89% of the clerical branch of the civil service was Afrikaner. At the supervisory level, the proportion was 76% Afrikaner (Hartman: 62). Unquestionably, the government of South Africa had become a major instrument of Afrikaner nationalism.

Much of the strength of the Nationalist Party was due to its close ties with other Afrikaner organizations. The Nationalist Party was a true party of integration for its leaders were linked to other Afrikaner organizations, especially the powerful Broederbond (Patterson: 110-2). Former Prime Ministers Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd, as well as cabinet ministers such as the former Minister of Ports and Telegraphs, Albert Hertzog, were all high officials of the Broederbond. Collectively, they formed a kind of interlocking directorate of nationalist Afrikanerdom. Developments and personalities within the Broederbond and other organizations were mirrored within the Nationalist Party and vice versa.

One of the greatest achievements of the Nationalist Party was its ability to win the solid support of virtually all elements of Afrikanerdom. Especially significant was its achievement in winning the loyalty of the urban working class for the nationalist cause. Thus in 1948, Malan's Nationalists won every seat in the Afrikaans-speaking districts and had the support of about 75-80% of all Afrikaners (Horowitz: 269). The Nationalists prevented any overt rural/urban split within Afrikanerdom. They had only four urban seats in 1944 but in 1966, as a result of their successful appeal to the

urban working class, they had 55 urban seats (Welsh: 212).

The Nationalists were successful in welding Afrikanerdom into a united political front because they, like the Union Nationale, were able to draw on the powerful ethnic sentiments of a nationalist electorate. The "dual-stream" policy of segregating Afrikaners from English-speakers had paid off with a harvest of Nationalist votes. If nationalism alone was insufficient to maintain Afrikaner unity, it was well supplemented by the racial issue (Patterson: 94). The Nationalists, through their support of the color-bar and civilized-labor policies, had restored many thousands of indigent Afrikaners to the status of white men. These poor whites and their descendants never forgot what the Nationalists did for them and their voting record proves it. The policy of Apartheid represented the economic and social ascendancy of the white man in South Africa. The poor whites feared that only a very thin line protected their jobs and their neighborhoods from the demands of the black majority, and they wanted that line buttressed at every opportunity. The Nationalists promised to do just that.

Finally, the Nationalist reign was aided by a modus vivendi between the Afrikaner political elite and the English business elite, very similar to the one which prevailed in Quebec during the time of the Union Nationale. Since 1948, South Africa has experienced a dichotomy between the holders of economic and political power which is a consequence of the differential English-Afrikaner class distribution and the rigidity of the white ethnic cleavage in the political

realm (van den Berghe: 204-5). This dichotomy was bridged by a form of relationship which has been termed "cooperation-in-conflict" (ibid.: 206-7). The area of conflict and cooperation between the two elites centred around a third force - the huge African majority. The English businessmen oppose the rigidity of much of the Apartheid program and would like to make more extensive use of black labor and further develop the African consumer market. At the same time, they depend on the government to assure their supply of cheap black labor and fear any radical changes in the status quo. Van den Berghe (ibid.: 203) states:

"While this conflict (between English businessmen and Afrikaner politicians) is real and not simply verbal, the presence of the third force, the Africans, also makes for a wide area of agreement and cooperation between the two conservative elites, both of which have a vested interest in the status quo. The two dominant white elites have thus developed over the years an uneasy modus vivendi based on compromise, behind the scenes negotiations, and tacit agreement on basic aims."

Van den Berghe (ibid.: 208-9) further elaborates the essence of this agreement. In return for rather weak parliamentary opposition on the part of the English community, the government agrees to interfere as little as possible with business in implementing the Apartheid program. Furthermore, the government tolerates the existence of the often critical English-language press and agrees not to ban the United Party.

In the year 1960, a half century of Afrikaner nationalist political activity, originating in the dual-stream policies of

General Hertzog, reached its culmination with the holding of a referendum on the question of republican status for South Africa. The voting was close - the republic was approved by a majority of only about 75,000 votes - and generally followed ethnic lines. As Table 5-16 indicates, the heavily Afrikaner Orange Free State voted overwhelmingly for a republic while predominantly English Natal was strongly opposed. In the following year, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth, thereby cutting all formal ties with Britain (Vatcher: 173). The Afrikaner political triumph was complete.

The Nationalists' desire for an independent republic was motivated by a number of factors. First, there was the powerful thrust of Afrikaner nationalism to gain exclusive control of South Africa (ibid.: 170). Behind this drive lay a combination of lingering anti-British antipathy with the desire to impose Apartheid policies without any outside interference. Finally, the Nationalists hoped to end the divisions within the white population by removing Britain as a source of influence over Anglo-South Africans (ibid.).

This latter point is especially important, for it appears from the perspective of hindsight that the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth, which marked the climax of the longstanding English-Afrikaner conflict, may have also marked its transcendence. The reason is not difficult to ascertain. If 1960 was the year of the republican referendum, it was also the year of Sharpeville. The Sharpeville massacre occurred when 69 Africans were

TABLE 5-16

Republican Referendum 1960

	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>
	000'	000'
Cape	271	270
Transvaal	407	325
Natal	42	136
O.F.S.	110	33
S.W. Africa	<u>20</u>	<u>12</u>
Total	850	776

Source: State of South Africa Yearbook,
1973, p.38.

killed and 178 wounded in a conflict with the police over pass laws (ibid.: 171). This tragic event served to bring into ever sharper focus the fact that the oppression of the black population had become South Africa's most fundamental political concern. As the black-white dilemma moved to the forefront of South African social issues, the English-Afrikaner conflict faded in intensity.

INTEGRATION, INNOVATION AND SEGREGATION:
AFRIKANER NATIONALISM FROM 1934 - 1961.

In this chapter, modern Afrikaner nationalism has been viewed as a response to the twin challenges of diminished institutional enclosure and lower socio-economic status resulting from extensive urbanization and industrialization. Like the French-Canadian community in Quebec, the Afrikaner community in South Africa responded to the above double-edged challenge by creating a network of interrelated economic, political, cultural and educational organizations, designed to maximize the Afrikaners' institutional autonomy and, at the same time, to improve their socio-economic position. Thus, the Afrikaner community faced a dilemma similar to the one faced by the French-Canadian community in Quebec. On the one hand, the Afrikaner nationalist leadership had to maintain high internal integration within the Afrikaner community in order to achieve institutional enclosure. On the other hand, a high level of innovation within the Afrikaner community was necessary if it was to become more economically competitive. For a variety of reasons, the Afrikaners were more successful than the French-

Canadians in resolving these contradictions.

It is not difficult to establish that the tightly interrelated system of institutions established by F.A.K. and the Broederbond have been successful in maintaining a considerable amount of integration and enclosure within the Afrikaner community. Data on home languages are a good indicator of the Afrikaners' success in maintaining institutional enclosure. As Table 5-17 demonstrates, the proportion of the population whose mother tongue is Afrikaans went up two percentage points between 1936-60, while the proportion of English mother tongue decreased by two percent in the same period. It is suggested that the complex network of Afrikaner social and cultural institutions established in the first half of this century played a major role in strengthening the position of the Afrikaans language.

The data in Table 5-18 lend some support to this observation, for the Afrikaans language has been able to maintain and even improve its position even in such areas as Natal, where the Afrikaners constitute only about one quarter of the population. Whereas French-Canadians tend to lose their language in areas outside Quebec where they are in the minority, Afrikaners have managed to retain and strengthen the position of their language both in Natal and in urban areas such as Johannesburg, where Afrikaners are a minority of the white population. The success of the Afrikaner community in establishing an integrated network of social and cultural institutions has surely played a major role in preventing assimilation in areas where the Afrikaners

TABLE 5-17

South Africa, Home Languages 1936-60, Whites

	<u>1936</u>		<u>1946</u>		<u>1951</u>		<u>1960</u>	
	000'	%	000'	%	000'	%	000'	%
English	783	39	934	39	1039	39	1142	37
Afrikaans	1121	56	1360	57	1503	57	1790	58
Other	<u>100</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>148</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	2004	100	2373	100	2642	100	3080	100

Sources: Union Statistics for Fifty Years 1910-60, Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria, 1960, Table A-18; Census of South Africa, 1960, Vol.7, No.1, Table A3.

TABLE 5-18

South Africa, Home Languages 1951 and 1960,
By Provinces, Whites, Percent.

1951

	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Natal</u>	<u>Transvaal</u>	<u>OFS.</u>
English	39	74	37	13
Afrikaans	58	22	59	85
Others	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>
	100	100	100	100

1960

English	39	72	33	13
Afrikaans	58	24	61	84
Others	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>
	100	100	100	100

Source: State of South Africa
Yearbook, 1973, Da Gamma,
Johannesburg, p.51.

constitute a numerical minority of the white population.

Other indices of integration within the Afrikaner community are the high degree of support given by the Afrikaners to the Nationalist Party - about 80% in recent elections - and the success of nationalist trade unions in capturing the support of Afrikaner workers. The growth of Christian National Education in all the provinces except Natal has meant that the Afrikaner child is increasingly contained in an educational environment wholly nationalist in orientation.

While the major thrust of Afrikaner nationalism has been toward political triumph and institutional enclosure, some headway has been made toward improving the Afrikaners' socio-economic situation. The gap between English and Afrikaners in the economic structure of South Africa remains substantial, but it no longer appears as insurmountable as it once did. For instance, between 1946 and 1960, the proportion of Afrikaners engaged in managerial, clerical and professional occupations increased by 178%, 110% and 38%, respectively (Adam: 172). Nevertheless, as Table 5-19 indicates, Afrikaners remain underrepresented in the higher status occupations, while English-speakers are overrepresented in the upper categories. In 1960, the average income of urban male Afrikaners was only 77% of that of urban male English-speakers (Census of South Africa, 1960, Vol.5, Table A7) - a figure strikingly similar to the 80% ratio of average urban French-Canadian male incomes to average urban English-Canadian male incomes in 1961.

TABLE 5-19

South Africa Occupations White Male Labor Force 1960

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>% Total All Origins</u>	<u>% English</u>	<u>% Afrikaners</u>
Professional & Technical	10.0	14.5	6.8
Managerial	6.3	10.6	3.1
Clerical	15.4	18.5	13.8
Sales	7.2	11.6	3.8
Farmers & Farm Workers	13.3	4.5	19.9
Miners	3.7	2.2	4.6
Transportation & Communications	7.4	4.0	10.2
Craftsmen, Production Workers & Laborers	29.7	28.7	29.5
Service Workers	5.0	3.5	6.1
Unemployed & Unspecified	2.0	1.9	2.2
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Census of South Africa, 1960,
Vol. 8, No. 2, Table A4.

Table 5-20 provides a good illustration of both the improvement in the position of Afrikaner capital in the private sector of the economy since the Nationalists assumed power in 1948, and the gap that still remains. There has been some improvement in the proportion of capital in the industrial and mining sectors of the economy which is controlled by Afrikaners, and Afrikaner businessmen control a respectable one-third of commercial activity. However, when compared to the Afrikaners' overwhelming political success, Afrikaner economic achievements to date remain modest.

The pattern of Afrikaner socio-economic inferiority is maintained in the educational sphere. As Table 5-21 demonstrates, Afrikaners are overrepresented among those whites who have completed only an elementary school education, and underrepresented among those whites who have attended university. The differential educational distributions of English and Afrikaans-speakers are both a reflection and a cause of the historic socio-economic disparities between the two white communities.

Several factors have aided the Afrikaners in their drive to improve their socio-economic position. The most important factor has been the continuing domination of the central government by the Nationalist Party since 1948. As has been previously demonstrated, the South African government has played a central role in developing a strong Afrikaner presence in the economy. Also important were the various Afrikaner economic organizations, discussed earlier, which acted to mobilize Afrikaner capital and business initiative.

TABLE 5-20

The Afrikaner Share of Income in
the Private Sector of the Economy, Percent

<u>Sector</u>	<u>1948/49</u>	<u>1954/55</u>	<u>1963/64</u>
Industry	1	1	10
Mining	6	6	10
Commerce	25	26	31
Transport	9	14	14
Liquor and Services	20	30	30
Professions	16	20	27
Financial	6	10	21
Sundry	27	35	36
Agriculture	<u>85</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>83</u>
Total	25	25	26

Source: Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial
Domination, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1970, Table 6, p.170.

TABLE 5-21

South Africa Education White Male Labor Force 1960

	<u>%</u> <u>Total All Origins</u>	<u>%</u> <u>English</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Afrikaners</u>
None	.9	.5	1.2
Standard Five (Elementary)	6.4	2.1	9.2
Standards 6 and 7 (Secondary)	35.2	26.6	42.4
Standards 8-10 (Secondary)	38.3	44.6	33.9
Diploma (Secondary)	11.3	16.1	7.7
University	6.1	7.7	5.0
Unknown	1.8	2.4	.6
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Census of South Africa,
1960, Vol.4, Table A5.

These forces within the Afrikaner community have attempted to bring about the necessary innovations to make the Afrikaners more economically competitive.

Adam has argued quite forcefully that the Nationalist government has pursued pragmatic policies which have fostered economic growth and development (ibid.: 179). He posits that the increase in the size and scale of government bureaucracies and state-owned industries **has encouraged** growing differentiation and stratification within the Afrikaner community, and brought about an expansion in the size of the Afrikaner middle classes (ibid.: 170-1). These observations are supported by the data on the improvement in the Afrikaner economic position since the Nationalists have assumed power.

The locus of the growing Afrikaner bourgeoisie, like that of Quebec's new middle class, lies in the huge government and private bureaucracies which have grown in recent years as a result of the Nationalist policy of economic and social intervention. Unlike the situation in Quebec up to 1961, it was government policy to encourage, rather than thwart, the expansion of these public and semi-public bureaucracies. Hence, the Nationalists played a central role in encouraging Afrikaner economic development.

However, there is evidence that the almost obsessive concern of the Nationalists with segregation and ethnic enclosure has hampered Afrikaner economic progress, and held back certain economic innovations of potential benefit not only to Afrikaners but to all South Africans.

According to Hartmann (42), there is still a strong

preference among Afrikaners to remain in farming or to opt for the traditional professions of law and the ministry. The longstanding concern of Afrikaner nationalism with political success has tended to encourage political and legal careers at the expense of entrepreneurial activity. The Afrikaners are still underrepresented in such critical areas as engineering, managerial **and entrepreneurial careers (ibid.)**. This continuing weakness of the Afrikaner community in the entrepreneurial and technical fields is accentuated by the demand of Afrikaner nationalists for racial segregation in employment, and the restriction of all high status jobs to whites only. Thus, the four million South African whites **were expected to staff nearly all the skilled positions in a** nation of well over sixteen million people.

As a result, the employment situation in South Africa, especially at the higher occupational levels, exhibits many of the characteristics of chronic over-employment. These are: high turnover among scarce categories of labor, poor performance by underqualified manpower, a desire for more immigrants, plus a constant clamor for an upgrading and expansion of the educational system (ibid.: 39). This "self-imposed" burden (ibid.: 43) has undoubtedly set back South Africa's progress toward higher levels of industrialization and prosperity. A government survey has placed the shortage of chemists at 12%, of engineers at 15%, and of physicists at 18% (ibid.: 40). Future projections suggest the shortage will increase in the coming years. It is conceivable that the modus vivendi between English businessmen and Afrikaner

politicians was seen as desirable by the South African government because the English business community supplied the scarce economic expertise which the Afrikaners were incapable of providing.

The desire of the Afrikaner nationalist movement to impose racial segregation and ethnic enclosure has hindered Afrikaner, and South African, economic progress in two closely related ways. The imposition of a color-bar in industry has hampered the efforts of those industrialists, both Afrikaner and English, who wish to develop the South African economy through greater use of skilled black labor. Thus, Anton Rupert, the chairman of the Afrikaner-controlled Rembrandt Tobacco Company has publicly attacked the government for attempting to forbid large-scale industrial investments in the Bantu areas (Legum and Legum: 41). At the same time, as has been suggested, the insistence on white supremacy at the higher occupational levels has placed a great burden on the minority white population to staff all the skilled and high status positions in the South African economy. The weight of this burden has been increased due to the pre-eminent concern of the Afrikaner community with political success, and the consequent failure of the Afrikaners to develop economic and technological elites on the same scale as Anglo-South Africans.

In sum, the Afrikaner community has successfully dealt with the threat to its institutional enclosure posed by industrialization and urbanization. However, in the economic sector, the record of Afrikaner nationalism has been

ambivalent. On the one hand, the growth of Afrikaner capital formation and state intervention in the economy **helped to alleviate** the poor white problem, raised the standard of living of the Afrikaner proletariat, and spawned the growth of a substantial Afrikaner middle class. This expanded Afrikaner middle class is both the cause and the consequence of the pragmatic economic policies pursued by the Nationalist government (Adam: 171). The Afrikaner middle classes have displayed a growing impatience with the rigidities of Apartheid and color-bar legislation, and have made common cause with the English-speaking business community in an effort to gradually incorporate more black labor into the expanding South African economy (Munger, 1967: 40).

On the other hand, the rigid Apartheid and color-bar policies, which have placed the South African economy in a legislative straitjacket, had their origins in the poor white problem, a key concern of Afrikaner nationalism earlier in this century. These policies are still strongly supported by the large Afrikaner proletariat and nationalist trade unions, who are suspicious of the modus vivendi and common interests developed between Afrikaner and English elites (Adam: 172). By and large, the Afrikaner working class **supports a pragmatic color-bar policy which will protect their jobs from black competition (ibid.)**.

The ambivalent economic policies pursued by the Nationalist Party reflected the growing class divisions within the Afrikaner community. The indications are that these divisions will increase in the coming years. As Adam

(ibid.: 179) states:

The historical friction between the English and Afrikaans-speaking populace is gradually being replaced by class contradictions within the two groups. As an entrepreneur, an Afrikaner has more in common with his English-speaking counterparts than with his fellow Nationalists.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has been devoted to a discussion of stage four of the interaction process outlined in the second chapter. In this fourth stage, the subordinate ethnic segment of the dual society responds to the twin challenges of diminished institutional enclosure and reduced socio-economic status posed by urbanization and industrialization, and establishes a network of interrelated socio-cultural, economic and political institutions designed to maximize ethnic enclosure and raise its socio-economic status.

As has been demonstrated in this chapter, the incorporation of rural French-Canadians into the industrial system of Quebec, and rural Afrikaners into the industrial system of South Africa, did not result in growing integration and assimilation with French-Canadians and Afrikaners rising rapidly in the economic hierarchy. Instead, the period of industrialization was marked by intensive economic and political mobilization on the part of French-Canadians and Afrikaners, and attempts to achieve the kind of ethnic enclosure in the urban areas which was a natural consequence of the old rural way of life.

There were several important reasons for this course of events. For one thing, the historic socio-economic cleavages between French and English in Quebec and English and Afrikaners in South Africa were maintained in the new industrial centres. The division of labor found English-speakers occupying the more prominent positions in industry with French and Afrikaans speakers occupying the lesser positions. The Afrikaner sense of grievance was intensified by the fact that they had to compete with the huge pool of cheap black labor for these lesser positions.

Secondly, historic cultural differences were maintained in the urban areas and came to coincide with the socio-economic distinctions. French and Afrikaans became common urban languages in Quebec and South Africa. The Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed Churches followed their flocks into the industrial centres. Thirdly, the traditional professional elites of French Canada and Afrikanerdom played a vital role in maintaining ethnic nationalism. Their authority lay in the political arena outside the new economic institutions, and their influence was not weakened but may in fact have been strengthened by the advent of industrialization. For the ethnic division of labor and political structures of both Quebec and South Africa enabled these elites to achieve a mutually satisfactory form of cooperation-in-conflict with the English-speaking industrial magnates. In order for these French-Canadian and Afrikaner elites to maintain their balance of power with English capital, it was necessary for them to develop a strong and dependable political base. Hence

nationalism and ethnic mobilization were encouraged as a means of improving their bargaining position.

Finally, in both cases, the modus vivendi worked out between French-Canadian and Afrikaner political elites and English business elites counteracted the drive toward ethnic enclosure. In Quebec, the economic nationalism of the Action Liberale Nationale was forgotten during the Union Nationale's long term in office, and Duplessis cooperated with the English-speaking business community in suppressing trade union activity. In South Africa, a modus vivendi was worked out between the Nationalist Party and the English business interests, and earlier threats to nationalize the gold mines were ignored. The willingness of both the French-Canadians and the Afrikaners to make compromises in the economic sphere can be related to the difficulties experienced by both groups in attempting to improve their economic position.

In evaluating the consequences of both the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner nationalist movements up to 1961, it was found that both movements were more successful in dealing with the challenge of diminished institutional enclosure than they were in meeting the problem of inferior socio-economic status. It has been suggested that this phenomenon could be, at least partially, explained by the heavy emphasis which both French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism placed on ethnic enclosure and political success, and the consequent lack of attention which both nationalist movements devoted to those social and economic innovations necessary to improve their economic situation. This emphasis

on political success at the expense of economic pursuits can, in turn, be related to the historic orientation of both the French-Canadian and Afrikaner elites toward political, legal and clerical careers.

Another reason for the imbalance between economic and political achievements is structural. It has been suggested that the emergence of a powerful French-Canadian and Afrikaner economic elite posed certain problems for the internal integration of both the French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalist movements. In Quebec, the Duplessis government acted to stifle the growth of a new middle class of educators and civil servants which could serve as a source of opposition to its policies. In South Africa, there has been conflict between the Nationalist government and those Afrikaner businessmen who object to the economic restrictions imposed on them by Apartheid legislation. Both the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner political leadership appeared content to reach a modus vivendi with English-speaking businessmen, rather than launch an all-out campaign to achieve supremacy in the economic sphere. The two nationalist movements have had to weigh the consequences of economic success - in both cases, an expanded and more powerful bourgeoisie - against the desire to maintain internal integration and to pursue traditional policies antithetical to the interests of that bourgeoisie.

The disparity between the political and economic achievements of French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism may have implications for the sociological theory of ethnic

relations. Blumer's observations on industrialization and ethnic stratification were discussed at some length in chapters one and two. Blumer had suggested that pre-industrial patterns of ethnic stratification **were continued** in the new industrial setting. This observation has been amply confirmed in this study, which has examined pre-industrial and industrial patterns of French-English and Afrikaner-English differentiation and stratification.

Blumer, however, offers a second observation - that the lines of ethnic stratification are responsive to political pressures. The findings of this study suggest that this second observation cannot be accepted without substantial modification. It would appear that in both Quebec and South Africa, transformations in the patterns of ethnic stratification have lagged behind political changes. Both the French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalist movements pledged themselves to rectify the inferior socio-economic status of their respective ethnic clients. Despite these pledges, and subsequent activities designed to carry **them out, progress** to date in this endeavor has been minimal at best. The position of the French-Canadians in the economic structure of both Quebec and Canada as a whole **changed little in** the period 1931-61. The socio-economic position of the Afrikaners **improved considerably in the period 1936-1961,** but their status remains substantially inferior to that of **English-speaking South Africans.**

It is suggested that the apparent disjunction between political pressures, on the one hand, and any actual

transformations in the lines of ethnic stratification, on the other, may be explained by a number of intervening factors. The most likely intervening factors are those factors mentioned earlier as constraining the capacity of the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner nationalist leadership to act as agents of economic innovation. They are: the historic tendency of French-Canadian and Afrikaner elites to opt for careers in politics, the law, and the clergy, rather than business; the mutually contradictory nature of the relationship between internal integration and ethnic enclosure, on the one hand, and economic innovation, on the other, for both the French-Canadian and Afrikaner communities; and, finally, the modus vivendi worked out between both French-Canadian and Afrikaner political elites and English-speaking businessmen. These factors, as well as others not mentioned above, intervene between political pressures and the lines of ethnic stratification, and greatly complicate the relationship between the two phenomena.

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CHAPTER SIX

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN DUAL SOCIETIES:

A THEORETICAL REINTERPRETATION

This dissertation has examined the bonds of conflict and cooperation in two dual societies, Canada and South Africa. In particular, those structural and institutional factors which have served to heighten or extinguish the conflict between English and French in Quebec and English and Afrikaners in South Africa, have been discussed in some detail. From the perspective of this dissertation, English-French and English-Afrikaner relations have evolved through four stages of development.

In stage one, presented in chapter three, an antecedent European settler community - the French in Quebec and the Afrikaners in the Cape Colony - laid claim to a new world territory and established its hegemony over a native population. In stage two, also dealt with in chapter three, the antecedent settler community, in turn, came under the political domination of a second group of European settlers - in both cases the British. Conflict ensued between the two European settler communities. Stage two comes to a close when both communities are able to arrive at an agreement to form a new dual society on the basis of mutual recognition for the two ethnic and linguistic groups.

Stage three, discussed in chapter four, occurs when the amicable relations established between the two segments of the dual society are disturbed by the social transformations

associated with urbanization and industrialization. The traditional institutions of the antecedent community are threatened as members of the former group become employees in the new industrial enterprises established under the auspices of the dominant community.

In stage four, presented in chapter five, the subordinate community reacts to the twin challenges of diminished institutional autonomy and deteriorating socio-economic status by turning inward, and attempting to achieve maximum ethnic enclosure in the new urban and industrial setting. There is also an effort on the part of the subordinate group to rectify its socio-economic inferiority. Polarization between the two ethnic segments once again becomes manifest. Stage four ends when the drive toward ethnic enclosure is halted, and intergroup cooperation is restored, by a growing modus vivendi between the political elites of the antecedent group and the economic elites of the second group.

MOBILIZATION AND RECONCILIATION

Throughout the histories of Canada and South Africa, as presented in this dissertation, both the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner communities have oscillated between, on the one hand, an inward-looking nationalism - a desire to achieve maximum ethnic enclosure - and, on the other, a tendency to strive for an acceptable basis of cooperation with their English-speaking compatriots. Among the options for French-Canadian survival which have appeared and re-appeared throughout Quebec's history, Cook (1971: 73-9)

distinguishes those which concentrate exclusively on Quebec from those which envisage a broader form of cooperation with English Canada. The South African equivalent for the distinction between option Quebec and option Canada is the opposition between the Afrikaner nationalist and the South African approaches. De Villiers (1971: 367) contrasts two polar conceptions of the position of the Afrikaners in the larger South African society which have emerged at various critical periods of that nation's history. One approach, the Afrikaner nationalist policy, looks toward an exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, in contrast to the South African policy which anticipates a broadly-based white South African unity growing out of English-Afrikaner cooperation.

The disjunction between the desire of both the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner communities to achieve maximum ethnic enclosure during certain periods of history, and their efforts to establish a workable modus vivendi with their English-speaking compatriots at other times, can be better understood if analyzed according to Apter's typology of political systems. Apter (1968) differentiates between three types of political systems which operate in developing societies: the mobilization system, the reconciliation system and the modernizing autocracy. There is support for the view that Quebec (Guindon, 1968: 40-4) and South Africa (Worrall, 1972: 25), with certain exceptions, constitute developing nations. Both the French-Canadians and the Afrikaners came under British imperial rule. Both groups were politically and economically subordinate to the British,

and both have striven, in recent years, to transform this situation.

From this perspective, Apter's mobilization and reconciliation systems are relevant to the comparative analysis of French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism. Apter provides five categories according to which the two patterns of political organization may be distinguished. They are: 1. the pattern of legitimacy prevailing in a given political organization, 2. the pattern of loyalty, 3. the extent of decisional autonomy, 4. the distribution of authority, and 5. the mode of ideological expression (Apter: 277).

According to Apter, a mobilization system functions as an "organizational weapon" (ibid.). Its goal is to effect substantial political and economic change, and there is a resulting strong emphasis on government-directed economic initiatives (ibid.: 279). In mobilization systems, the goals of political and economic change have a highly emotional and symbolic connotation (ibid.: 280). The five central characteristics of mobilization systems are: 1. hierarchical authority, 2. total allegiance to the political hierarchy, 3. tactical flexibility, 4. unitary authority, and 5. ideological specialization (ibid.: 277-8).

It is suggested that the mobilization form of political organization is associated with an inward-looking nationalism, and an emphasis on ethnic enclosure and economic reconquest. As such, it strongly resembles the option Quebec and/or independentiste school of French-Canadian nationalism, and

the dual-stream tradition of Afrikaner nationalism. The mobilization system seeks to establish what Kuper has termed a polarization of ethnic cleavages. Efforts are made to attain maximum institutional segregation, while contacts with other ethnic groups are discouraged. There is an emphasis on internal ethnic unity and integration, at the expense of participation in the larger society. Furthermore, it is argued that the mobilization system emerges into prominence during a time of crisis, or strained relations, between the segments of dual societies.

The other form of political organization relevant to the comparative analysis of French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism is what Apter has termed the reconciliation system (ibid.: 278). The reconciliation type of political organization places a high value on compromise and cooperation between diverse sectors of society (ibid.). Economic growth is less centralized and more diffuse, with a greater reliance on private entrepreneurship. Political and economic decision-making is more decentralized, and there is an emphasis on harmonious relations between culturally distinct groups (ibid.: 279).

The five primary characteristics of reconciliation systems are: 1. pyramidal authority, 2. multiple loyalties, 3. the necessity for compromise, 4. pluralism, and 5. ideological diffuseness (ibid.: 278). The reconciliation system, as described by Apter, parallels Kuper's conception of the depluralization of intergroup situations. The cleavages between the segments are bridged as attempts are

made to establish a stable basis of intergroup cooperation. Rex's notion of institutions of the truce between conflicting groups is useful in conceptualizing the patterns of ethnic collaboration developed under the reconciliation system. The reconciliation pattern is related to the bonne ententiste, or "option Canada", approach in French Canada, and the single-stream policy in South Africa. Its predominance corresponds to a decline in intergroup tensions and a growing desire by both segments to achieve some form of cooperation.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS UNDERLYING COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT IN DUAL SOCIETIES: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL.

Apter's typology of political systems, outlined above, is an essential component of the conceptual model to be introduced in this section. As has been suggested, the history of both the French-Canadian and the Afrikaner communities has been one of oscillation between the mobilization and reconciliation approaches. The mobilization system appeared to predominate during times of political crisis, while the reconciliation system gained supremacy during periods of relative tranquillity. To state the case more strongly, it is argued that the prevalence of the mobilization system reinforces the tendency toward intergroup conflict in dual societies. Alternatively, the predominance of the reconciliation pattern greatly facilitates efforts at conflict-resolution and the formation of truce institutions. Thus, the type of political system (as defined by Apter) dominant at a particular point in time directly affects the extent of cooperation or conflict prevailing between the

segments of dual societies.

Furthermore, it is argued that the type of political system dominant at a given point in time is, in turn, affected by three primary structural factors which influence the transition from one form of political organization to the other. These structural factors, discussed extensively in the body of the dissertation, are: 1. the presence or absence of socio-economic inequality between the segments of the dual society, and its definition as a salient issue, 2. the presence or absence of a threat to the continued existence of the central institutions of the socio-economically subordinate segment, and 3. the presence or absence of an influential elite faction within the subordinate group which is dissatisfied with its position in the larger society. In the scheme proposed above and outlined in **Figure 3**, **the three structural factors serve** as independent variables affecting the dependent variable, which is the extent of conflict **or** cooperation between the segments of the dual society. The type of political system acts as an intervening variable between the three structural factors and the dependent variable.

It is not difficult to discern the rationale for identifying the three structural factors mentioned above as independent variables influencing both the type of political system prevailing in a dual society at a given point in time, and the consequent state of cooperation or conflict between the segments. The relationship between socio-economic inequality and intergroup conflict has received substantial

FIGURE 3

Factors Underlying Relations of Cooperation or
Conflict Between the Segments of Dual Societies.

A. Independent Variables

Structural factors: 1. socio-economic equality/inequality
 2. institutional stability/instability
 3. elite satisfaction/dissatisfaction

B. Intervening Variable

Type of political system: mobilization/reconciliation

C. Dependent Variable

State of relations between
the segments: cooperation/conflict

treatment in this dissertation (see especially chapter two). There is an impressive body of literature which cites economic inequality as a prime generating factor behind nationalist fervor (Hayes, 1931: 238; Shafer, 1972: 190-2). The mobilization system has been presented as a means of achieving rapid and centrally-directed economic development. When socio-economic inequality is perceived as a critical issue, there is pressure to adopt a mobilization form of organization. Conversely, when socio-economic inequality is reduced, or is no longer perceived as a salient issue, the reconciliation system, which implies a more decentralized approach to economic development, will gain support.

The critical significance of threats to the institutional autonomy of French-Canadian and Afrikaner society as a force underlying the emergence of French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism is a phenomenon which has been extensively discussed in this dissertation. The relationship between a threat to traditional institutions and the growth of nationalism has been commented on by Kedourie, who has asserted that nationalist feeling becomes most intense when stability is disrupted and institutions are subjected to violent social and intellectual change (Kedourie, 1962: 101). Given the vital role of institutional systems in maintaining ethnic enclosure, it is probable that if and when these institutions are threatened, the ethnic group so affected will strive to mobilize to protect its autonomy. Alternatively, when the central institutions of an ethnic group are stable and secure, that group is in a better position to seek a

reconciliation with its adversary.

Finally, the role played by the elites of the socio-economically subordinate group is a crucial factor affecting the transition from one type of political system to the other. Emerson has argued that nationalist movements are dependent on the existence of an active nationalist elite which can galvanize the masses into an effective political instrument (Emerson, 1960: 8). When the elites of the subordinate group become dissatisfied with the position they are allocated in the political and economic institutions of the larger society, then they will strive to raise their status, and expand their "ethnic space" (Guindon, 1968: 51), by creating alternative political and economic institutions. The mobilization system provides the ideal means for opting out of the larger society and establishing alternative political and economic institutions. Conversely, when the elites of the subordinate group can reap substantial rewards by participating in the major economic and political institutions of the larger society, support for the reconciliation system, which facilitates such participation, is likely to increase.

The schema, which has been outlined above and diagrammed in Figure 3, will now be summarized and restated. Relations, of cooperation or conflict between the segments of dual societies are significantly influenced by three independent variables - all structural factors - and one intervening variable - the type of political system. The presence of substantial socio-economic inequality between the segments of a dual society, combined with a grave threat to the

central institutions of the socio-economically inferior segment and status dissatisfaction among the elites of the latter group, greatly increase the probability that the subordinate group will adopt a mobilization approach. The mobilization approach, in turn, heightens the probability of intergroup conflict.

Alternatively, the diminishing salience of socio-economic inequality as an issue between the segments, the presence of strong and stable institutions within the subordinate segment, and the incorporation of the elites of the latter segment into the economic and political institutions of the larger society, all facilitate the adoption of the reconciliation approach on the part of the subordinate community. The reconciliation approach, in turn, facilitates intergroup cooperation. This schema will now be utilized in a brief re-examination of the material on French-English relations in Quebec and English-Afrikaner relations in South Africa, already presented in chapters three, four and five.

FRENCH-CANADIAN AND AFRIKANER
NATIONALISM: A RE-EXAMINATION

QUEBEC

1820 - 1840: Mobilization*

The mobilization system came into sharp focus in Quebec politics when the patriote movement under Papineau split with

* This period is discussed in chapter three. See also Mason Wade, The French-Canadians, Vol. I, MacMillan, Toronto, 1968, 93-219; Fernand Ouellet, Histoire Economique et Sociale du Quebec, Vol. I, Fides, Montreal 1971, 196-212.

the clergy as competitors for the allegiance of the habitants, and gained a working majority of the provincial assembly early in the nineteenth century. The patriote movement evinced many, though not all, of the characteristics of a full-fledged mobilization system. Papineau was able to maintain tight control over the patriote ranks with his strong leadership and personal charisma. Loyalty values were increasingly vested in the French-Canadian nation, with a diminishing interest in English Canada. Tactics were flexible, with an emphasis on constitutional and parliamentary procedures during the 1820's and early 1830's, and a tendency toward violent confrontation in the late 1830's. The ideology of the patriotes could be described as liberal-nationalist, combining an affection for American-style Jacksonian democracy with a growing nationalism and a desire for independence.

The social basis of French-English relations in Quebec encouraged mobilization on the part of the French. Socio-economic inequality between French and English had become quite evident in Lower Canada. The British occupied the leading economic and political positions. The French remained, for the most part, habitants. The English were dominant in the urban areas, while the French were entrenched in rural Quebec. The French worried that the introduction of social and economic changes favored by the English - such as the freehold system of land tenure - constituted a threat to the traditional agrarian institutions of French Canada. There was concern that the large English and Irish immigration would inundate

the French-Canadians under an English sea. Finally, a new secular bourgeoisie of professional men had emerged in Quebec society, dissatisfied with their subordinate position in British North America, and determined to bring about substantial changes.

1840 - 1867: Reconciliation*

The crushing of the patriote rebellion, the publication of the Durham report and the union of Upper and Lower Canada signified the transition to a new era of reconciliation between French and English. Papineau's star had waned with the collapse of the patriote cause, and ethnic polarization was replaced with a new system of English-French cooperation, as exemplified by the Baldwin-Lafontaine alliance and the later collaboration between Macdonald and Cartier. The liberal nationalism of the patriote years had been replaced by a revival of the influence of the clergy, and there was a growing interest in good relations with English Canada.

The social realities of Quebec society at mid-century favored reconciliation. While the socio-economic disparity between English and French remained large, the ascendancy of the Church in Quebec ensured that economic inequality would be downgraded as an issue. Under the auspices of a strengthened Catholic Church, the French-Canadians had taken measures to ensure the survival of their language and culture in North America. By the time of Confederation, the immediate threat to French-Canadian survival posed by the Durham Report had

* These events are discussed in chapter three. See also Marcel Rioux, Quebec in Question, James Lewis and Samuel, Toronto, 1971, pp.53-60; Mason Wade: 220-392.

passed.

A crucial factor acting to improve relations between both ethnic groups was the incorporation of members of the French-Canadian elite into the economic and political structures of the larger society. The failure of the Rebellion of 1837-8 precluded violent confrontation as a means of solving Quebec's problems for the immediate future. At the same time, the institution of responsible government enabled Quebec's professional elites to enjoy mobility and success in government and business. Cartier is a good example of a French-Canadian leader who was able to advance himself politically and financially in the post-Rebellion period. As a politician, he played a crucial role in the Confederation negotiations through his close association with Sir John A. Macdonald. In economic matters, he was heavily involved in railway construction and other forms of economic development.

The regime of reconciliation between English and French was stable and longlasting. It remained in force, with certain exceptions - notably the Riel Rebellion and the World War I Conscription Crisis - until the industrialization of Quebec forced a reconsideration of prevailing patterns of intergroup relations.

1933 - 1944: Mobilization*

The industrialization of Quebec resulted in many

* Events in this section are discussed in chapters four and five. See also Sheilagh and Henry Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1973, pp. 105-138 and Herbert Quinn, The Union Nationale, University of Toronto Press, 1963; Jean-Louis Roy, Les Programmes Electoraux du Quebec, Vol. II, Ottawa, Lemeac, 1971, 257-263.

expressions of discontent on the part of French Canada's elites during the 1920's, but 1933 is indicated because that was the year when the Social Restoration Program, which was to become the platform of the Action Liberale Nationale Party, was first formulated. There were many signs of growing mobilization and withdrawal from the larger economic and political system. The Church consolidated its authority over the province of Quebec by developing a network of economic, political and cultural institutions under clerical auspices. The purpose of these institutions was to encapsulate the French-Canadian, as much as possible, within a world which was French and Catholic.

Political and economic nationalism intensified. Two new nationalist political parties were formed - the Bloc Populaire and the Union Nationale - breaking the old pattern of French-Canadian participation in the major Canadian parties. There was agitation for an independent Laurentian state. In the economic sphere, there was opposition to industrialism and capitalism, as well as campaigns to improve the position of French-Canadian small business and to establish a corporatist state. The ideological atmosphere was nationalist, corporatist and Catholic.

The social phenomena underlying this resurgence of ethnic polarization related to growing urbanization and industrialization. Industrialization had thrown into sharp focus the economic inequality between French and English in Quebec, with the latter occupying the dominant positions in industry while the former were relegated, for the most part,

to the factory floor. The Depression only served to intensify the economic issue. Furthermore, industrialization and its concomitant, urbanization, directly threatened the old system of rural isolation which had guaranteed the French-Canadian community against assimilation. Finally, the industrialization of Quebec menaced the position of the professional and clerical elites, for thousands of French-Canadians had come under the economic control of English-speaking capitalists. Hughes and Hughes (1952:113-5) have argued that a traditional elite will respond vigorously when an outside group of capitalists moves in and attempts to press economic development in the region controlled by the former group. Such was the case in Quebec.

1944 - 1960: Reconciliation*

During the period of Duplessis' uninterrupted rule, attacks on capitalism and industrialization and demands for an independent or corporatist state were heard less and less frequently. A growing modus vivendi between English-speaking businessmen and French-speaking Union Nationale politicians was increasingly evident.

This latter phenomenon is an important factor in explaining the post-war accord between English and French in Quebec. While the economic inferiority of the French was still evident, the Duplessis government, in the interest of its close relationship with the English business community, did little **either to** change or publicize the situation. The

* This period is covered in chapter five. See also Hubert Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered", in Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin, eds., French-Canadian Society, Vol. I, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1968, pp. 137-161.

extensive network of French-Canadian socio-cultural institutions had proven relatively effective in resisting assimilation.

The modus vivendi worked out between French political elites and English economic elites played a major role in reconciling the former to the industrialization of Quebec. The modus vivendi provided the French elites with campaign funds and jobs, and provided a major source of employment for the French-Canadian population. The industrialists were guaranteed, among other things, labor peace. Under these conditions, intergroup cooperation was maintained.

South Africa

1820 - 1902: Mobilization*

Events following the British occupation of the Cape Colony brought about a growing polarization between Boer and Briton, and a consequent withdrawal of Afrikaner support from the colonial administration. The two most critical conflicts between the two groups were the Great Trek of 1836-46 and the Boer War of 1898-1902. The second event was, in many ways, the outcome of issues left unresolved after the unfolding of the first. The end of the Boer War resulted in the consolidation of all South Africa under British control, and ended the fragmentation which had begun with the Great Trek.

The conflict between English and Afrikaners in the

* Events in South Africa during this period are discussed in chapter three. See also Eric Walker, History of Southern Africa, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1964, pp. 124-500; Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, pp. 3-41; Cornelius De Kiewet, A History of South Africa, Oxford, 1942, pp. 30-140.

nineteenth century had its roots in a number of structural cleavages separating the two groups. Socio-economic differences were a significant issue. The English were the townsmen and government officials, while the Afrikaners were, for the most part, frontier farmers. During the gold-mining boom in the Transvaal, the English were the uitlander industrialists, mineowners and prospectors regarded with suspicion by the Boers.

The Afrikaners looked on the social changes introduced by the English as a threat to their way of life. Early British attempts to eliminate slavery and transform the traditional system of land tenure were a factor behind the Great Trek. The rapid growth of the uitlander population in Johannesburg, and the mining boom in general, were seen as threats to the Afrikaner population in Transvaal.

Finally, Afrikaners had evolved their own leaders whose power base and frame of reference were quite distinct from those of the British colonial administration. The Trek leaders, such as Retief, were trekking farmers themselves, and resisted British efforts to control their way of life. The later generation of Afrikaner leaders to emerge in the Boer Republics - such as Kruger of the Transvaal - maintained their political strength on the basis of Boer independence, and consequently opposed British efforts at annexation.

1902 - 1933: Reconciliation*

After the surrender of the Afrikaner forces at the close

* This period is analyzed in chapters three and four. See also De Kiewet, 141-152; William H. Vatcher, White Laager, Praeger, 1965, 40-57.

of the Boer War, Afrikaner leaders like Botha, Smuts and Hertzog moved towards a reconciliation with English-speaking South Africa. The 1910 Act of Union, which created a new dual society, was an important fruit of their efforts. There was a move toward a single-stream approach, which envisaged a united white South African nation growing out of both the Afrikaans and English-speaking strands. The ideological fervor of Afrikaner nationalism was muted.

Structural conditions reinforced the trend towards reconciliation initiated after the Boer War. While the Afrikaner community retained its economic inferiority, that issue would not become a major factor in South African politics until the late 1920's and early 1930's. The constitution guaranteed the linguistic and cultural rights of the Afrikaners, and seemed to defuse any imminent threat to Afrikaner survival.

A very important factor was the loss of interest in violent conflict on the part of the Afrikaner elites, after their defeat in the Boer War. At the same time, the expanding political and economic horizons of a unified South Africa provided the Afrikaner elites with new avenues of social mobility. Two ex-Boer War generals, Botha and Smuts, succeeded each other as Prime Minister, while both, in addition, became identified with the huge mining industries established around Johannesburg.

1934 - 1943: Mobilization*

Worral suggests that 1934, the year that Malan and his

* This period is discussed in chapters four and five. See also Patterson, 135-175 and 239-271; Vatcher, 89-116.

followers split from the fusion government to form the "purified" Nationalist Party, marks the return of Afrikaner mobilization and a withdrawal from the larger South African political system (Worrall: 26-7). This dual-stream policy was carried out through the establishment of an interrelated network of Afrikaner economic, political and cultural institutions. The aim of this program was to isolate the Afrikaner from all non-national influences, and to struggle for Afrikaner supremacy in the political field, and for an improvement in his economic situation. The ideological atmosphere was intensely nationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-British.

The key to understanding this resurgence of nationalism in the Afrikaner community lies in the changing situation brought about by industrialization and urbanization in the late 1920's and early 1930's. The industrialization of South Africa accentuated the problem of socio-economic inequality between English and Afrikaners by highlighting the latter's new status as an employee of the former. This situation was compounded by the poor white problem, and the competition between white and black labor over employment in the mines and factories. Furthermore, widespread urbanization threatened the system of rural isolation on which the Boer way of life was based. Finally, Afrikaner elites, like their counterparts in French Canada, reacted against the possibility that they would lose control over the growing working class sector of the Afrikaner population.

1943 - 1960: Reconciliation*

Worrall suggests that 1943 was a critical turning point in Afrikaner-English relations, for it marked a transition away from extreme mobilization and towards the reconciliation of intergroup differences (ibid.: 30). An early sign of change was the decline in Afrikaner support for the Nazis in World War II (ibid.). More important in the long run, a modus vivendi was worked out between the Nationalist Government, after it assumed power in 1948, and the English business community.

A changing set of social conditions made such a modus vivendi possible. The degree of economic inequality between English and Afrikaners was reduced, though by no means eliminated, by government policies designed to end the poor white problem and encourage the growth of an Afrikaner bourgeoisie. The tight network of Afrikaner cultural institutions had withstood and rolled back the threats to Afrikaner cultural survival, previously the cause of so much concern. Finally, Afrikaner political ascendancy and growing economic strength had opened up new channels of social mobility to the Afrikaner elites, and had created new opportunities for equal status contacts with their English-speaking counterparts.

* This period is discussed in chapter five. See also Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination, University of California Press, 1971.

EPILOGUE

Throughout this dissertation, every attempt has been made to emphasize the comparability of French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism. In particular, it has been argued that both French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism, in this century, constitute a response to the challenge of urbanization and industrialization. The primary thrust of this dissertation has been to analyze similarities in the socio-economic basis of the two nationalist movements. However, any point of view, no matter how well argued, can provide, at best, only partial insights. Concentration on the parallels between French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism has been achieved at the expense of a comparable understanding of their differences.

While French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism may have followed more or less parallel courses of development up to mid-century, in recent years their paths have diverged significantly. In Quebec, after 1960, the reassertion of ethnic nationalism occurred on an unprecedented scale. Confederation was challenged, separatism and the two-nations theory were offered as solutions to the allegedly insoluble problem of ethnic co-existence. The mobilization system seemed once again in the ascendancy.

In South Africa, after 1960, the picture has been quite different. The trend toward English-Afrikaner reconciliation has been reinforced in recent years (Worrall: 28-9). The verligte, or liberal, wing of Afrikaner nationalism, located predominantly among the growing Afrikaner middle class, has

been urging an end to the old policies of ethnic enclosure (ibid.). The single-stream version of a united white South African nation, first proposed early in this century, is gaining adherents today, but under vastly changed circumstances.

The nature of these changes in circumstance help explain the different historical paths taken by French-Canadian and Afrikaner nationalism since 1960. French-Canadian nationalism is faced with the fundamental division of Canadian society: the duality between English and French, Canadian and Canadien, and the latter's position as a perpetual minority (Brunet, 1954: 30-1). It is within the relatively rigid boundaries of Canadian dualism that French Canada must define its future. In South Africa, on the other hand, the axis of conflict has shifted from English-Afrikaner dualism to the far more critical problem of relations with the black majority. The Afrikaner community must define its future not only in terms of South Africa, but must also take account of the wider world of black Africa in general. For this crucial task, the English community is an invaluable ally.

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